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Author’s Preface
We know more or less all there is to know about the way the hos-
tilities of the 1914–1918 war developed. What’s still left  to be cleared 
up are just a few details which will not have much of an eff ect on the 
general picture of the armed confl ict. At the most they’ll help to nu-
ance the chronicle of the war. Of course, we won’t manage to explain 
or sort out all the problems. We certainly won’t ever be able to estab-
lish the precise fi gures for losses sustained by the belligerents in par-
ticular clashes and battles. Th ere will just be estimates. On the other 
hand, better prospects for research are opening up for historians in-
terested in the soldiers’ predicament, in what was going on behind the 
front lines, in the role civilians, communities, and nations played in 
the war, in the war economies and everyday life, or in the role of the 
women who made an energetic entry into a “man’s” story. It will be 
worthwhile to study the stories of individual soldiers and what they 
suff ered, of heroism and treachery, of people losing and recovering 
their faith in God, of struggling to survive and growing accustomed 
to death. An area which off ers promising horizons for research is his-
torical anthropology, which has the cognitive instruments needed to 
embark on new paths of study and the eff ective verifi cation of what 
has been accomplished hitherto. Another opportunity to enhance 
our knowledge of the Great War are the case studies being conducted 
in many of the world’s academic centres, examining the inside story 
of the war from the point of view of its rank-and-fi le participants. 
Yet another prospective area for study are the attempts to classify the 
diff erent types of armed confl ict. In a word, research on the fabric of 
the war and its participants off ers the chance for progress on the way 
to a global understanding of the nature and essence of the Great War. 
Th e hundred years that have elapsed since the Sarajevo assassination 
on the 28th of June 1914 and the outbreak of war are an incentive to 
search for new areas of scholarly exploration.
Th is book is an attempt to embark on fresh paths of research using 
new instruments of cognition. It searches for answers to questions in 
historical anthropology. It contains a clinical review of a collection 
of diverse source materials from all the important fi elds of battle and 
their aft ermaths, as well as from the civilian background. It makes 
use of a  variety of resources relating to the Eastern, Western, and 
Southern European fronts, as well as fronts beyond Europe. To make 
the book more readable I have decided to break free of the usual 
academic custom of footnoting and have put only a selected biblio-
graphy at the back.
I would like to thank Professor Michał Baczkowski, Professor 
Tadeusz Czekalski, and Professor Tomasz Gąsowski of the Jagiel-
lonian University in Kraków for reading the book in statu nascendi 
and sharing their opinions and comments with me. I am indebted to 
Professor Tomasz Schramm of the Adam Mickiewicz University in 
Poznań, whose suggestions helped to verify some of my judgements 




I. The War Starts
1. Sarajevo
Sarajevo, capital of the Austro-Hungarian province of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, lay on the peripheries of the Habsburg Empire and 
was not remarkable in any way except for its population of many 
cultures and religions, and its variegated architecture. Its modern 
districts held a  central position and were built according to impe-
rial standards. It was a city of the administrative and business nou-
veaux, with a cosmopolitan class of state offi  cials, representatives of 
many nations, but dominated by native speakers of German, loyal to 
the House of Habsburg and the Roman Catholic religion. Th e new 
town with its cafés and restaurants, theatre and cinema, fashionable 
shops, elegant streets and promenade, was encircled by squalid and 
impoverished districts, with no running water or sewerage, cluttered 
up with cheap tenement houses, shacks and shanties, more reminis-
cent of the Ottoman Empire. Herds of animals roamed the streets, 
women covered up from head to toe in traditional Muslim apparel 
shuffl  ed along, and child beggars, many of them disabled, loitered on 
street corners, while the menfolk, clad in loose-fi tting woollen trou-
sers, spent their days in the cafés, drinking Turkish coff ee. Th e land-
marks of each district were their places of worship. Muslim mosques 
were the predominant edifi ces, oft en in close proximity to Orthodox 
Christian churches used by the Serbs, and Roman Catholic churches 
which served the Croats.
But the impression of drowsiness was only superfi cial. In fact, 
there was a  strong undercurrent of tension between the Habsburg 
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authorities and the Bosnian Serbs, who deeply resented and could 
not be reconciled to foreign occupation. It had aggravated during 
the Balkan Wars. Th e Serbs had been roused by the Serbian victories 
in the First Balkan War against Turkey, and the Second Balkan War 
against Bulgaria, and they were proud of Serbia. In 1913 Sarajevan 
schoolchildren had paraded in the streets with ribbons on their caps 
with the names of cities occupied by the Serbian army, publicly de-
claring that Bosnia should be part of Greater Serbia. Anti-govern-
ment activities proliferated. Propaganda materials were smuggled 
in from Serbia, urging the Serbs of Bosnia and Herzegovina to en-
gage in acts of violence against the “Habsburg invader,” as they called 
Austria-Hungary. Th e government in Vienna was alarmed and on 
2nd May 1913 introduced “exceptional powers,” partially suspend-
ing the 1910 Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina, replacing civilian 
with military authorities, bringing in military courts, and imposing 
border control to confi scate newspapers smuggled in from neigh-
bouring Serbia. Another part of its preventive measures were army 
manoeuvres, to be held in June 1914, intended to stress the Habs-
burg resolve to keep Bosnia and Herzegovina. Th ey were to be led 
by the 84-year old Emperor Franz Joseph, but when he fell ill with 
pneumonia, his doctors advised him not to travel. He was to be re-
placed by the heir to the throne, the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, who 
was Inspector-General of the armed forces, commander-in-chief in 
the event of war. Nonetheless, in view of the tense situation General 
Oskar Potiorek, the military governor of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
was considered as an alternative to the Archduke. In the event neither 
were the manoeuvres called off  nor did the Archduke withdraw from 
the visit. Th e manoeuvres were scheduled to fi nish on 28th June – 
hardly a  randomly chosen date, Vitovdan (St. Vitus’s day), the an-
niversary of the Serbian defeat in the Battle of Kosovo Pole in 1389. 
Serbian nationalists took it as an outrage to have their national day of 
mourning profaned.
Th e Archduke arrived in Bosnia straight from his favourite resi-
dence at Konopiště near Prague. On 24th June he sailed on the bat-
tleship Viribus Unitis to one of the Dalmatian ports and on the 26th 
11
started the manoeuvres. Local newspapers had been writing about the 
visit for weeks. Th e people of Sarajevo decorated their houses with 
fl owers and fl ags, as recommended by the authorities. Six Serbian 
conspirators from Bosnia and Herzegovina, members of an organisa-
tion called Mlada Bosna (Young Bosnia), decided to spoil the holiday 
atmosphere. Th eir aim was to kill the Emperor’s nephew. It wasn’t the 
fi rst Serbian plot against him. Th e conspirators were convinced Franz 
Ferdinand was one of the most anti-Serbian politicians, and for them 
a symbol of a monarchy they hated. Th e Archduke was indeed in fa-
vour of the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and did not hide 
his dislike of Serbia, which he called a land of cut-throats, fools, and 
plums, or pig-breeders. On the morning of 28th June Franz Ferdinand, 
his wife, and entourage alighted from the train. Th e city welcomed 
its illustrious guests with fi ne, warm weather. From the railway sta-
tion the motorcade of six cars, which the tight-fi sted Archduke had 
“hired” from his subordinates, headed for the city hall. Th e cars took 
the route which had been announced to the public, for the specta-
tors lining the streets to express their respect and admiration for the 
Archduke. At 10.15 a.m. one of the plotters, the typesetter Nedeljko 
Čabrinović, threw a  bomb at the Archduke, but it exploded under 
the following car, injuring one of its passengers, who was taken to 
hospital. “I come here on a visit, and they throw bombs at me. It’s an 
outrage!” Franz Ferdinand is reported to have shouted. Nevertheless 
he and his wife continued the visit. Aft er about an hour the cars set off  
on the next part of the visit. Gavrilo Princip, the last plotter stationed 
along the route, did not miss his chance, though the Archduke’s car 
passed by him only because the driver made a mistake and had to turn 
back. “Suddenly I heard people shouting, ‘Long live!’ Immediately I 
saw the fi rst car… When the second car came up I recognised the 
heir to the throne with a lady next to him and I started having second 
thoughts whether or not to shoot. But all at once I was overwhelmed 
by a strange feeling and I aimed at the heir to the throne. Th e car was 
taking the corner at a slower speed,” Princip later declared in court. 
It was 11.30 a.m. He had fi red two bullets from his Browning: one for 
the Archduke, one for the hated Potiorek, but perhaps he had closed 
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his eyes and hit the Duchess instead, as he later confessed. She died on 
the spot. Her husband expired somewhat later. 
Princip did not run away. He swallowed a  suicide pill, but the 
cyanide in it had evaporated and it failed to work. Th e local Serbs 
did not hide their delight over the assassination, while the Croats, 
who were favoured by the Austrian authorities, and the Islamic 
inhabitants loyal to the monarchy expressed solidarity with the 
Habsburgs and called for severe punishment for the assassins. “Down 
with the Serbs, down with murderers,” they shouted. Alongside the 
Austrian Germans, the Croats, whom Vienna treated preferentially, 
were the most outraged. Th e reaction of the Hungarians, who did 
not like the Archduke, was satisfaction. Franz Ferdinand had held 
the Hungarian upper classes in contempt, calling them an “oligarchic 
clique,” and was against making Hungarian the second offi  cial lan-
guage in the military. Not surprisingly Hungarian offi  cers shouted, 
“Th at pig is dead.” Th ere were even rumours that the movers behind 
the plot were Hungarian offi  cers led by Prime Minister Tisza. Th e 
Polish upper classes of Galicia were not too worried by the death of 
the Archduke, who did not like Poles, particularly Polish aristocrats. 
Some Czechs were shocked, chiefl y on account of Duchess Sophie, 
who was a  Czech, but others could not conceal their satisfaction 
while still others couldn’t care less. It was not their problem, just as it 
wasn’t for numerous Czech Soldier Švejks. “So they’ve done it to us,” 
said the cleaning lady to Mr. Švejk. “Th ey’ve killed our Ferdinand.” 
“Which Ferdinand, Mrs. Mullerova?” asked Švejk as he continued to 
rub his knees, “I used to know two Ferdinands. One works for Pruša 
the chemist, and once drank a bottle of hair lotion by mistake, and 
the other’s Ferdinand Kokoška, the dog-turd collector. Neither’d be 
much of a loss.” Th at is how the Good Soldier put it in the opening 
scene of Hašek’s novel.
It certainly wasn’t the fi rst attempt by Southern Slavs to assassi-
nate an Austro-Hungarian offi  cial. Conspiracy and terrorism had 
been strong traditions among them since Ottoman times. Of course 
more plots were planned than accomplished, and more were foiled 
than succeeded. In 1910 there had been a Serbian plan to kill the Em-
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peror but it was not carried out; and in 1912 some Croats attempted 
to murder the Ban of Croatia. Th ere had been several plots to kill 
Franz Ferdinand: in 1902 in Italy, in 1906 in Slovenia, in 1910  at 
Ostrava in Moravia, and in 1913 in Vienna. Numerous conspiracies 
had been planned in Sarajevo against Potiorek. All unsuccessful. In 
1912 a Bosnian Croat had intended to kill Leopold von Berchtold, 
the Minister of Foreign Aff airs. 
By the late 19th century assassination had become a way of con-
ducting politics. Bombs were thrown at kings and premiers, guns 
aimed at presidents, ministers, and other state offi  cials. Th ose who 
died included two presidents of the United States, the king of Italy, 
the tsar of Russia, the king of Serbia, and the consort of the Aus-
trian emperor. Death was supposed to speed up history and help to 
achieve otherwise unattainable goals. Ever since the times of Mikhail 
Bakunin and Peter Kropotkin anarchists had been resorting to vio-
lence in the belief that the tyrant’s death would disintegrate the state. 
Conspiracies were hatched to punish insolence and avenge the of-
fended, to seize power, to chastise those the conspirators thought 
worthy of discipline. Assassination excited the young imagination, 
arousing fanatical fi ghters ready to die for the cause, whose deaths 
served as a legacy for future generations.
Assassination attempts were facilitated by ineffi  cient security sys-
tems. Monarchs and ministers oft en failed to appreciate the risk of 
assassination in the belief that hiding behind the backs of the mili-
tary was demeaning to themselves and their country. Th at’s what 
happened with the Archduke, who ignored warnings from counter-
intelligence and the police. In 1918 General Maximilian Ronge, head 
of the Austro-Hungarian military intelligence service, observed that 
he had never considered security as vital as during those manoeu-
vres, yet to his disappointment the Archduke turned down his sug-
gestions – why or what made him do so was a mystery to Ronge. In 
June 1914 the secret police had hard evidence that there was trouble 
brewing and wanted to protect the heir to the throne. But they did 
not do much. Th ey only ordered secondary school students not from 
Sarajevo to leave the city. In outcome there were only 112 local po-
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licemen and 6 detectives, none of them Serbo-Croat speakers, pro-
tecting the Archduke. One policeman for every 100 m of the route. 
In those days there were no armoured, fast-moving vehicles for VIPs. 
Franz Ferdinand was travelling in a  Gräf und Stift  cabriolet with 
a 28 HP engine, which made the assassin’s task all the easier. 
Who was Princip? He was born into a poor family, his father was 
a postman. Th anks to his ability and hard work he completed a sec-
ondary school education in Sarajevo and went up to study in Bel-
grade. He was short and frail, had a lean, pale yellow face, and one 
could hardly imagine how such a skinny and lowly individual could 
have resolved to perpetrate such an assassination, as the investigating 
magistrate wondered. Historians are still wondering, since he wasn’t 
the ringleader and didn’t stand out in the group. No doubt he and the 
other conspirators were deeply convinced they were doing the right 
thing. So who were they? What was their motive? Th ey were a unit of 
an underground liberation movement operating on a broad territory 
and comprising young Southern Slavs, mostly Serbs, with some Cro-
ats and Slovenes. Th e borders between diff erent units in the organisa-
tion were fl exible, hence the diffi  culty in establishing who belonged to 
what, complicated by the fact that they left  no written records. Th eir 
aim was the secession of the Slavic lands from Austria-Hungary and 
the creation of a South Slavic state. Apart from two sovereign states, 
Serbia and Montenegro, the lands inhabited by Southern Slavs were 
under Austrian rule (this included Dalmatia, Styria, and Carinthia); 
or (like Vojvodina and Croatia) belonged to Hungary. Th en there was 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, long occupied and eventually annexed by 
Austria-Hungary in 1908. Serbs considered it a  “still un-liberated” 
Serbian territory. Th e conspirators were highly critical of the Austro-
Hungarian regime, which they saw as demoralising and promoting 
foreign offi  cials and merchants at the expense of locals. Th ey took 
this as a grave aff ront and an expression of the government’s coloni-
alist policy. Th ey were disparaging about the Western Latinate tradi-
tion. “Syphilis and clericalism is the infelicitous legacy of the Middle 
Ages from which modern civilisation cannot break free,” as Princip 
is reported to have said.
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Members of Young Bosnia included school and university stu-
dents, workers, young people in rebellion against staid parents. 
Most came from rural backgrounds. In 1913 only 50 individuals 
in Bosnia were university graduates, and a few hundred had com-
pleted secondary education. Bosnia had no university, and only 
5 Gymnasium secondary schools. Some in the upper strata of Vien-
nese and Budapest society thought even that was too much. Since 
Bosnian students were denied the right to associate, they went un-
derground. Th e conspirators were supported ideologically and fi -
nancially by the Serbian diaspora. Already on 3rd December 1913 
a Serbian paper published in Chicago announced that the heir to the 
Austrian throne would be visiting Sarajevo in the spring, and urged 
Serbs to take up arms – knives, guns, bombs, dynamite, anything 
they had. “Death to the Habsburg dynasty!” it rallied them. Politi-
cally and militarily they were aided by Lieutenant Colonel Dragutin 
Dimitrijević, head of the Serbian intelligence service in Belgrade, 
who used several pseudonyms, mainly Apis. “War between Serbia 
and Austria is inevitable,” he wrote in a newspaper he controlled. 
“Th e war will be determined by our commitment to our tradition 
and culture, and rooted in the destiny of our race, which cannot 
allow itself to be assimilated. Th e war must bring freedom for Ser-
bia, the Southern Slavs, and the people of the Balkans. Our entire 
race must stand up together to stop the invasion of enemies from 
the North.” Not surprisingly, his staff , Serbian intelligence offi  cers 
and members of an organisation called Ujedinjenje ili Smrt (Unity 
or Death), which had probably been operating since 1909 and was 
called “the Black Hand” by its opponents, trained the conspirators, 
armed them with 4 Belgian revolvers and 6 bombs, and helped 
them to cross the border between the sovereign Kingdom of Serbia 
and Austro-Hungarian Bosnia. Apis pursued his own policy with 
no consultation with either the king or the prime minister, who 
were both opposed to such risky moves. He and his political associ-
ates saw Serbia as the Yugoslav Piedmont – the spark to set alight 
war with Austria. Eff ectively, Princip and the other young plotters 
were just tools in their hands. 
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Apis was convinced that Russia would not leave Serbia in the 
lurch, and that Russia would not be left  without the support of France. 
Hence he pursued a deliberate policy for the outbreak of a war which 
would lead to the emergence of a Great Serbia. In this sense his ac-
tivities can hardly be regarded as anything but provocation. His close 
contacts with the Russian intelligence and secret services, which had 
a  considerable infl uence in Belgrade, were intended to guarantee 
Russia’s solidarity. Some historians believe that ultimately Apis was 
guided by the German intelligence service, which was carrying out 
Berlin’s policy to trigger the outbreak of war and manoeuvre Vienna 
into military engagement. But this is only one of the six most fre-
quently cited hypotheses on the links between the Sarajevan conspir-
ators and the outside world. Another theory says that Princip’s hand 
was steered by those Viennese politicians who did not want to see 
Franz Ferdinand on the throne, which is why they deliberately chose 
the day, 28th June, to provoke the Serbs, and and were deliberately 
negligent about having the route properly secured.
Th e conspirators were not cold-blooded implementers of some-
one else’s orders; neither were they hired killers, but romantics, 
deeply convinced that violence could and should be used to achieve 
superior aims. Th ey did not calmly reckon up the odds. Like the Rus-
sian anarchists, they said killing tyrants was worthwhile to liberate 
the people and make them happy. Th ey belonged to a generation of 
fanatics ready to set the world on fi re to get what they wanted. In 
their private lives they practised the revolutionary code of asceti-
cism. Some were teetotallers and abstinent in matters of love, treat-
ing a declaration of love for a woman as a sign of weakness and a slur 
on female dignity. Aft er the assassination they claimed they did not 
regret it. On being sentenced, Čabrinović wrote that if the heir to 
the throne had not come to Bosnia, he would have found and slain 
him in Vienna. He stressed that for Serbs the visit had been an overt 
provocation as Franz Ferdinand had come to observe manoeuvres 
held on Serbian soil, and against the Serbian people.
Th e Archduke and Duchess had a quiet funeral, with no military 
honours, and no pomp and circumstance. Th e Emperor’s decision 
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irritated the friends of the deceased, but the government in Vienna 
was reluctant to lavish special tributes to an individual who was un-
popular at Court and had married a Czech countess. As she was not 
of the royal blood, their children were debarred from the succession 
to the throne and used her surname. Due to the morganatic mar-
riage Sophie was looked down on, both in life and aft er death. Later 
the car in which the couple made their last journey, along with their 
blood-stained clothes, Sophie’s hat and lace gown, and her husband’s 
green-plumed hat and fi eld-marshal’s uniform, were put on display 
in Vienna’s military museum as Habsburg relics. Th e Austrian postal 
service issued a memorial stamp for the third anniversary of the as-
sassination.
In the aft ermath the Austrian authorities dealt bloodily and bru-
tally not only with the conspirators but also with the other South 
Slavic underground youth organisations, most of which were annihi-
lated. Th e assassination provided an opportunity to subdue the Slavic 
territories of Austria-Hungary. Th e trial of the conspirators and their 
accomplices lasted from 12th to 23rd October 1914. 25 persons were 
charged. On 29th October the Sarajevo court delivered the verdict. On 
3rd February 1915 three of the arrested were executed. Th ey did not 
include the assassin himself, whose age on arrest was 19 years and 11 
months, one month of the age of majority, which prolonged his life. 
He was sentenced to 20 years in prison and sent to the infamous Tere-
zin gaol near Prague, fi t only for rats, as inmates used to say. Princip 
and the other incarcerated conspirators were maltreated. On the 28th 
of every month they got no food, and each year on 28th June were 
locked up in an unlit dungeon. Princip died on 28th April 1918 of tu-
berculosis, which found excellent conditions for rapid development. 
Only fi ve of the accused in the Sarajevo trial survived to the end of 
the War and the emergence of the new Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, 
and Slovenes. Th e rest died of hunger or disease. In 1920 the assassin’s 
body was exhumed, transported to Sarajevo, and buried there. Aft er 
1918 many of the schools, streets, and institutions in Serbia and Bos-
nia-Herzegovina were named aft er Gavrilo Princip, as was the bridge 
over the Miljacka in Sarajevo. In Communist times a plaque with an 
18
inscription in Serbian was put up on the spot from which he had fi red 
the fateful shots. It read, “From this place on 28th June 1914 Gavrilo 
Princip gave expression to the national defi ance against tyranny, and 
to the many centuries of our nations’ struggle for freedom.”
From the outbreak of the War to the end of 1914 the Austro-Hun-
garian authorities arrested over 5,000 Serbs in Bosnia. Some of them 
were charged with crimes against the dynasty. 150 were hanged, 37 of 
them in Trebinje, where the biggest demonstrations against the heir 
to the throne had taken place in 1906. Th e arrested were put into three 
concentration camps, set to hard labour, and died off  at a fast rate. 
Serbian associations and church schools were closed down. Some 
Serbian property was confi scated. Food rationing was introduced 
in Bosnia already in the autumn of 1914. Not surprisingly for Ser-
bians, the Austro-Hungarian regime left  a bitter memory of foreign 
occupation. On 3rd November 1915 a trial of 156 Bosnians, mainly 
from the educated classes, started in Banja Luka. Th ey were accused 
of favouring terrorism. Th e verdict was delivered on 22nd April 1916. 
16 were sentenced to death, but the Emperor Karl exercised his right 
to clemency and commuted the death sentences to life imprison-
ment. Over 80 were jailed.
Apis did not live to see the end of the War. Th e wide-ranging polit-
ical infl uence enjoyed by the Serbian special services was becoming 
a nuisance for the king and court, and the government of Serbia. He 
was never forgiven for helping the conspirators without Belgrade’s 
consent and for the consequences of Sarajevo. He was suspected of 
plotting against the king. In the summer of 1915 he was dismissed 
from his post as head of the intelligence service and in December 
1916 he and his friends were arrested. He was court-martialled in 
Salonica, where the Serbian civilian and military authorities in exile 
had their headquarters, sentenced to death by fi ring squad, and ex-
ecuted on 26th June 1917. 
Th e Sarajevo assassination was no harbinger of war. For decades 
there had been no dearth of assassinations in Europe, but none of 
them had turned into a casus belli. It was thought that this time it 
would be the same, the excitement would fade and things would re-
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turn to normal. Th e European ruling classes carried on in a sense of 
security they felt they had a right to. However, this time history was 
about to take a diff erent course. 
2. The last hours of peace
Th e Great War started on 28th July 1914, from what looked like 
a local, peripheral quarrel between Serbia and Austria-Hungary, be-
tween the Karađorđević dynasty and the Habsburgs, soon – within 
the fi rst few days of August – to turn into a war between the Dual Al-
liance and the Triple Entente, and thence, within the next few weeks 
of 1914, to bloat up into a world war. Th e outbreak of war was pre-
ceded by a spate of mobilisation, full or partial, carried out by the bel-
ligerents. Mobilisation was a transition phase between peace and war. 
Th e men subject to mobilisation, draft ees or called up from leave, as 
well as volunteers, had draft  cards delivered to their homes, summon-
ing them to report to specifi ed units. Th ey packed, said their prayers 
and good-byes to their families and went off  to their military draft  
centres. Within a  few days army barracks fi lled up with thousands 
of young men. But while some were in a  hurry to be conscripted, 
others were rushing to the altar. Churches of all denominations were 
crammed with newlyweds and their families. Only on the Saturday 
and Sunday, 31st July and 1st August in Berlin alone there were two 
thousand weekend weddings. It was the same in other countries and 
cities of Europe setting off  to war, as conscripts and volunteers alike 
hastened to tie the knot.
Once in barracks, the young men were given medical tests and 
had their hair cut. Next uniforms, equipment, and weapons were is-
sued to them. Having received their uniforms and arms, they were 
allocated to a company, companies were allocated to a battalion, bat-
talions to regiments, and regiments to divisions. Infantry divisions 
had ancillary units – supply units, sanitary units, kitchens, cavalry 
units, cyclist units, and postal services – attached to them. Divisions 
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were loaded up onto festively decorated rail carriages and transport-
ed to rally points where they joined a corps, which joined up with 
other corps to form an army. It all proceeded according to a detailed 
schedule. Th e French and German armies mobilised and concen-
trated their units in the most effi  cient manner. In France only 1.5% 
of the men called up did not report for service, and in Germany the 
fi gure was even less – 0.9%, demonstrating the effi  ciency of the state 
authorities and perhaps also the general acceptance of war by the 
men who were mobilised. Even in Russia mobilisation went pretty 
smoothly, despite the vast distances and meagre communications 
network. Only 4% of the Russian conscripts never reached barracks. 
Mobilising cavalry divisions was a problem though, as transportation 
for just one of them required 40 trains – as many as for an infan-
try division fi ve times the size. Trains were used to transport troops 
to the front. A  German infantry corps consisting of two divisions 
needed 170 carriages to transport the offi  cers, 965 carriages for the 
men, and 1915 carriages for its artillery and engineers – a  total of 
over 3,000 carriages and 80 trains, and on top of that an analogous 
number of trains for equipment and victuals. Mobilisation plans had 
to be precise. Th at is why the German and French plans entailed data 
even on the number of axles that had to roll over a given bridge in 
a given time. 
Th e men setting off  for barracks were given a hearty send-off  with 
church bells ringing, and military bands welcomed them on arrival 
with boisterous tattoos. Enthusiastic crowds cheered them at railway 
stations and on the streets of festively decorated cities with houses 
draped with the national colours and portraits of the head of state. 
Words of welcome, gestures of admiration, and community singing 
of national anthems and patriotic folk songs were showered on them 
in town and country alike. Hats fl ew up in the air and handkerchiefs 
waved to greet them, and girls put fl owers – roses, lilies, cornfl owers 
and evening stock – into their gun barrels. Th e enthusiasm must have 
had its eff ect on the soldiers, even those who were leaving for the 
front with a heavy heart and anguish on their faces, and those who 
just a day or two before had taken part in a sad farewell ceremony 
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at their local church or synagogue, saying good-bye to their com-
munity, crying with their wives, mothers, and sisters. “Soldiers were 
sent off  to the sound of the balalaika, conscripts danced on crowded 
platforms beating up clouds of dust, and their relatives bade them 
farewell, making the sign of the cross and weeping,” a Russian shop-
keeper recalled. Th e sunny weather must certainly have contributed 
to the air of optimism, good humour, and even better expectations. 
It was all so impressive: never since the Napoleonic Wars had the 
streets been so full of soldiers and civilians.
Festooned with decorations like a  honeymoon couple’s car, the 
train carriages enhanced the soldiers’ sense of optimism. Slogans 
encouraging them to battle and mocking the enemy were plastered 
on the walls. German posters read “Every bayonet thrust means one 
Frenchman less” and “To Paris for breakfast.” Th e pleasant atmos-
phere was dubbed “the August experience” and enhanced by uplift -
ing and morale-boosting songs like “It’s a  long way to Tipperary,” 
which eventually became one of the most popular wartime tunes. 
Over the next days and weeks censored papers and picture-houses 
conveyed a  propaganda image to the public of happy, smiling sol-
diers full of romantic and patriotic excitement – an idealised, very 
one-sided picture. Many photographs from this period preserved in 
private collections and made public later show sad, anxious, or even 
terrifi ed soldiers. Th ose leaving heavy-hearted and full of foreboding 
did not get into the propaganda pictures of a happy army going to 
war. Another group the propaganda failed to display were those who 
just a day or two before had taken part in anti-war demonstrations.
Th e positive attitude to the war was patent in the work of the writ-
ers who had signed up or been conscripted. Th ey wrote that war 
meant the affi  rmation of vitality, energy, the power of the spirit, vir-
tue, that it “had made the world beautiful.” War was an act of crea-
tion, “the rising shape of a new era,” “a marvellous wonder,” “a sa-
cred moment,” “a war of purifi cation,” the start of “a new life.” War 
was “the only life..., a ripple of excitement, and nothing in the whole 
world could match it.” Th e “time of triumph had come for the most 
splendid values.” It was the “hour of youth.” People prayed earnestly 
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to be able to contribute to the war eff ort, to swap civvies for a glori-
ous army uniform. 
Th e biggest support for the war was indeed observed among the 
writers and artists, intellectuals, academics, and students, as the ar-
mies of all the belligerent countries reported. Opinion polls carried 
out among the students showed that the overwhelming majority of 
them were happy to go to war. Civil servants, administrative staff , 
teachers, and representatives of the legal professions who were called 
up showed a good deal of understanding and approved of the war. In 
the French department of Charente an opinion poll was conducted 
among teachers. Th ey were asked for their attitude on mobilisation 
and the war. Initially, out of 330 respondents 188 did not approve of 
mobilisation, 66 had reservations, and 76 responded with patriotic 
enthusiasm. But aft er a few days, once they were in their army units, 
they succumbed to the “charm of war” and the pro-war climate. As 
many as 131 of the 288 respondents said that they were going to war 
with patriotic enthusiasm, 103 out of a sense of duty, and only 54 re-
luctantly. Most of the students of the Sorbonne taking part in the 
opinion poll approved of the war and agreed that “we experience our 
greatest power in camp life and under shellfi re.”
Students and many others treated the war as an exciting adven-
ture or as sports rivalry. War carried a promise of something new, it 
meant turning over a new leaf, it off ered new prospects. “Young men 
marched triumphantly; now they were being cheered, though before 
they had been just ordinary people no-one respected or took any no-
tice of,” wrote Stefan Zweig. Soldiers recalled how proud they were 
to put on a uniform, in which they felt useful and appreciated, aft er 
all, they were being cheered by the crowds. Never before, in civvy 
street, had anyone hailed them like that. Th ey knew that such a lot – 
the future of their countries and nations – depended on them, the 
young generation. “Th is is a time when it’s worthwhile being a sol-
dier! Cannon fi re rules the world’s destiny. Civilians seem useless, 
and women are an obstacle, a nuisance,” wrote the Polish Princess 
Maria Lubomirska on 31st July 1914. But what was the reaction of 
the countryfolk, who made up the majority in every army except for 
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the British Expeditionary Force? As a rule they were unsympathetic 
or hostile. But the enthusiasm of the crowds changed their attitude. 
Nonetheless a  substantial number of them were dissatisfi ed with 
their lot. You could hardly expect people who were their families’ 
sole breadwinners to be pleased. Th eir wives and mothers applied to 
the local authorities, or directly to the military, for their discharge, 
saying that without them farming would grind to a halt. Usually their 
petitions came to nothing. So they consoled themselves that the war 
would not last long. “Home for Christmas,” they wrote.
Even in multinational states like Austria-Hungary, Russia, or Ger-
many, mobilisation went fairly smoothly. Conscientious objectors 
on ethno-national or religious grounds were few and far between. 
Th is was an opinion confi rmed by the inhabitants of Polish territo-
ries. Polish men serving in the German army felt solidarity with the 
Germans; Poles serving in the Austro-Hungarian army felt solidarity 
with that army; and Poles in the Russian army felt solidarity with the 
army of Russia. “Men went to war gladly and prayers were said in the 
churches for an Austrian victory,” said the peasant leader Wincenty 
Witos, future prime minister of a free Poland. Lithuanians from the 
Russian part of Lithuania and from the part under Prussia behaved 
in the same way; and so did Ukrainians under Austro-Hungarian 
or Russian rule. Th ey went with their own. Everyone felt the same 
happiness, and the sense of discipline and solidarity with “one’s own” 
king and country turned out to be strong. Moreover, Polish, Lithu-
anian, or Ukrainian soldiers under the colours of “their own” armies 
did not have much of a  choice, since they did not have a national 
army of their own in which they could serve, and they saw no reason 
to commit themselves to one of the powers that had partitioned their 
country against another.
Th e fi ghting spirit displayed by the crowds, soldiers, and artists 
passed on to the politicians, including those who were apprehen-
sive of, or against war. Nearly all parliamentarians, including those 
in the British dominions, acquiesced and acknowledged the war as 
a sacred act for the defence of their country, and readily voted in fa-
vour of their respective war budgets and wartime legislation granting 
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governments special powers. Only a few individuals like Karl Lieb-
knecht in the Reichstag had the courage to vote against. “Peace on 
the home front” and “a holy alliance” reigned supreme. No longer 
were there any left -wing and right-wing Frenchmen; neither were the 
Germans and the British divided nations. Even in Russia deputies to 
the Duma overwhelmingly acknowledged the war as a war of defence 
for their country, voted in a  war budget, and reacted to the Tsar’s 
address with an ovation. Very few indeed, like the Bolsheviks, did 
not concur. But it was in Russia in fact that the fi rst cracks started to 
appear within a few weeks, and opposition parties came out strongly 
against the tsarist regime. In the other countries, too, dissenting poli-
ticians emerged aft er some time. By the end of the war support for 
them had risen considerably, but nowhere except in Russia did they 
dominate the political stage.
Th e countries which mobilised and subsequently entered the war 
imposed a  series of typical measures, only to be expected in such 
circumstances, with the aim of making things easy for their own, 
and diffi  cult for the enemy. Th ey closed their borders and introduced 
censorship: newspapers could no longer publish war correspondence 
from the frontline unless they obtained permission from the military 
authorities. Munitions and fuel stores were safeguarded, especially 
against spies and sabotage; and persons the authorities suspected of 
disloyalty were arrested. But the scale of these detentions was much 
smaller than what had been envisaged before the war. In the gen-
eral enthusiasm for the war in France and Germany the plan to ar-
rest those blacklisted as “enemies of their country” was withdrawn. 
It turned out that nearly all the pre-war suspects marched off  to war 
without demur, some had even volunteered. We can only guess what 
Jean Jaurès, the French anti-war socialist, would have done if he had 
lived to the patriotic time of trial – he was assassinated just a few days 
before the outbreak of the war by a pro-war extremist.
In August 1914 the military of the belligerent countries took con-
trol of the railway lines and inland waterways, and were granted the 
right to shoot at anyone who defi ed them. Sentry-posts were set up 
along the roads, manned by soldiers to control travellers’ documents. 
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In border zones the police took hostages, and civilians were evacu-
ated to prevent sabotage. Austria put a prohibition on church bell-
ringing and cattle-grazing on mountain slopes within a 30-km fron-
tier zone along her southern and eastern borders, and ordered all 
windows shut aft er dusk. Th e belligerents made it diffi  cult for enemy 
states to communicate with each other and with their special agents 
in neutral countries. Just a few hours aft er declaring war the British 
cut the Transatlantic submarine cables the Germans had been us-
ing, forcing the latter to switch to the radio broadcasting station at 
Bremen and the American lines.
3. Could war have been avoided? 
During the War and in its aft ermath the opinion circulated that 
it could have all taken a diff erent course, that war could have been 
avoided. Th at one should not succumb to the infl uence of a deter-
ministic view of history being inexorable, and say that since war did 
break out therefore it was inevitable. So was it possible to preserve 
peace? Could war have been averted? Th e chances to preserve peace 
were based on a couple of premises which soon turned out to be illu-
sive. First there was the belief that the monarchs of Europe were unit-
ed by bonds of solidarity and an aversion to war. Th e monarchs were 
indeed interrelated by consanguinity and kinship, making up one 
big family. Kaiser Wilhelm II and the Tsarina were cousins through 
their mothers, so as were Nicholas II of Russia and George V of the 
United Kingdom, what’s more, they were each other’s spitting image. 
Edward VII was uncle both to the German Kaiser and to the Tsarina, 
while the latter was the sister of Irene of Prussia, who in turn was the 
Kaiser’s cousin and sister-in-law. Nearly all the monarchs reigning 
in large and small states alike were related to or descended from the 
Saxe-Coburg-Gotha dynasty, which Bismarck had maliciously called 
“the breeding stallions of Europe.” In letters they addressed each oth-
er as “Dear Cousin,” “Dear Brother,” and “Friend.” One of the signs of 
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solidarity between the “Cousins,” the emperors, kings, and princes, 
was their mass attendance at the funeral of Queen Victoria in 1901, 
who was the aunt of some of them, and the grandmother of oth-
ers. In 1914 seven of her descendants were on the thrones of Europe. 
1910 witnessed a parade of monarchs, the most spectacular public 
show of monarchical solidarity, at the funeral of Edward VII, “the 
uncle of kings.” Relations between the monarchs were based not only 
on their family ties, but also of their shared traditions, similar val-
ues, and court etiquette. But even families occasionally go through 
tiff s, feuds, and wars, and so even in the family of monarchs tension 
erupted time and again, despite the veneer of fraternity. Th ere was no 
guarantee that the monarchs’ Europe, grounded on a mutual legacy, 
would not allow a war to break out. Even had the monarchs all come 
out in opposition to war, there would still have been no certainty that 
they could have prevented it. None of the reigning monarchs had 
absolute power; none could impose his will; they all had to listen to 
their advisers, ministers, generals, and – in the age of the European 
constitutions – also the voice of their people, the nation, even though 
the monarchs were the symbols of their states, emblems of sovereign 
statehood, and their portraits were displayed in public buildings. So 
they could not have stopped a prospective clash of arms even if they 
had wanted to. But did they want to? Th at is a question which is hard 
to answer unequivocally.
Once war had broken out, the monarchs were compelled to make 
a dramatic choice between solidarity to their royal relatives and to 
their own nation. Or, in fact, they were deprived of the choice, since 
they could not come out in opposition to their subjects. Under pres-
sure from his British subjects George V changed his German sur-
name to the English name Windsor, which is still the surname of 
Britain’s monarch today. He also deprived the German Emperor of 
the honorary title of commander of the British army, and struck Ger-
man and Austro-Hungarian offi  cers off  the British register of the of-
fi cers’ corps, and removed several knights of the Garter belonging to 
enemy countries from the Order. His monarchical cousins in bellig-
erent countries did likewise.
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Th e second hope for the prevention of war was confi dence in the 
diplomats, who had always found ways to defl ate even the most dan-
gerous tension without resorting to war. Th ey had always striven to 
reconcile antagonists, exercising the diffi  cult art of eff ecting a compro-
mise. Usually they would call a conference with the “concert of pow-
ers,” and that would be enough. In 1913 the Chancellor of Germany 
warned that in the next war, which would erupt on trivial grounds, not 
only the Hohenzollern crown would be at stake, but also the future of 
Germany, and he cautioned that trying to set off  a war was not only 
imprudent but also criminal. Nevertheless in 1914 neither monarchi-
cal nor diplomatic solidarity proved suffi  cient to stop the War.
Th e third source of confi dence in the impossibility of war was the 
position of the socialist parties congregated in the Second Internatio-
nal. Th eir view was that armed confl ict was benefi cial for international 
capital, imperialist states, and nationalistic governments, but not 
for the proletariat, which had to strive under a  socialist leadership 
to maintain peace. Th e socialists threatened to bring the workers out 
on a general strike if war broke out, and they thought this would be 
enough to restrain warmongers. Th is, too, turned out to be illusory: 
the anti-war demonstrations organised on the eve of the outbreak of 
the War did not stop it. Anti-war feelings were particularly high in 
Britain. Th e prospect of dying for “stinking Serbians” and “drunken 
Russians” (as the British press wrote) was not encouraging. But when 
war did break out, the pacifi st socialists, including the British ones, 
vanished from the streets in solidarity with their own nation. National 
solidarity won over class solidarity, which was a shock for many.
Fourthly, the military alliances, the Triple Entente and the Triple 
Alliance, were intended to act as an insurance policy against the out-
break of war. Yet they failed. Neither were the political and economic 
relations between countries in the opposing blocks any use. Th ese 
ties, many of them reinforced by treaties, could have given rise to 
hopes for peace. But the yearning for war proved stronger than the 
desire for peace.
Fift hly, hopes for peace were pinned on the pacifi sts. Th eir works 
commanded a substantial readership. Norman Angell’s best-selling 
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pamphlet, Th e Great Illusion, argued that European integration had 
reached a point when a war which would dismantle the bonds would 
be traumatic for all. Another widely read work was a  six-volume 
elaboration by Jan Bloch, a Polish Jew and one of the wealthiest in-
dustrialists in the Kingdom of Poland under Russian rule. It was pub-
lished in Paris in 1898 and translated into several languages (Eng-
lish version: Is War Now Impossible?). Karl Kraus was yet another 
author on the impossibility of war; his work was popular in Austria 
and Germany. Yet neither he nor Angell, nor any other pacifi st de-
vised a practicable scheme to prevent war, or established an eff ective 
pacifi st movement. Pacifi sts tended to be socially isolated and politi-
cally insignifi cant. Th e German Kaiser contemptuously called them 
eunuchs. Soon it turned out that pacifi sts were most outspoken on 
peace in times of peace.
A sixth chance to save peace was envisaged in the pressure exerted 
by international business, which had good reason for apprehension, 
since war would mean the breakdown of their hitherto commercial 
and fi nancial connections, and instead preferred to negotiate deals 
for the allocation of economic spheres of interest. Just two weeks 
before Sarajevo British and German businessmen reached an agree-
ment for the building of a railway from Baghdad to Basra. Two British 
members were to join the board of the German-controlled Baghdad 
Railway Company. In February 1914 a similar settlement had been 
arranged between French and German entrepreneurs. However, the 
infl uence of big business proved too weak to avert war. At any rate 
the arms and munitions industry was generally in favour of war.
Th e political tension, growing year by year especially between the 
great powers over dominance in Europe, the recovery of lost terri-
tories or the acquisition of new lands, infl uence in the Balkans and 
the Near East, for the re-allocation of colonial land and for predomi-
nance on the seas and oceans led to an unprecedented arms race. But 
did armaments inevitably spell war for Europe? Th ey may have done, 
but it is hard to tell with certainty, though of course there are such 
opinions. Th ey were defi nitely conducted on an unparalleled scale. 
All European countries, big and small, not excluding Montenegro, 
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were increasing their defence budgets, which showed that the idea of 
war was popular in the parliaments, too, and a means of assimilating 
public opinion with the real prospect of war. Spiralling war budg-
ets indicated that most parliamentarians accepted government plans 
to escalate expenditure on arms. Only in 1909–1914 arms budgets 
rose by an average of 50% in the countries of Europe. In 1913 they 
accounted for 3.5% of GDP, and 5% by 1913. Armaments led to 
a substantial rise in the burden of taxes imposed on society – serious 
enough in Germany for fears of state insolvency to emerge. Th e only 
chance envisaged to halt such a gruesome prospect was to sidestep 
it – start a war during which the state’s liabilities to its own citizens 
could be put on ice. Especially naval budgets rose at an astronomical 
rate. Scores, and sometimes hundreds of associations and organisa-
tions supported naval shipbuilding, eff ectively making up a  strong 
pressure group.
Th e country most interested in a colonial reshuffl  e was Germany, 
while Austria-Hungary had no such ambitions. Th e Germans con-
sidered they had got less than their fair share of the colonial cake. 
Th ey did have about 3 million square kilometres of colonies on two 
continents, inhabited by 13 million people, which offi  cially they 
called “protected areas,” but it was not much either as prestige or eco-
nomic assets. Already in 1900 in a book on the great powers (Die 
großen Mächte: ein Rückblick auf unser Jahrhundert) Max Lenz had 
forecast that war was unavoidable for the redistribution of the de-
clining British Empire, which would be replaced by a German em-
pire. He argued that colonies would change hands in line with the 
principle of Social Darwinism: weaker proprietors like the French, 
Portuguese, and British, would drop out, and more powerful masters 
like the Germans would come in. In 1913 Heinrich Claß, president 
of the Pan-German League, predicted that Germany’s future would 
be secure once it gained predominance not only in Europe but also 
wherever it could be victorious overseas. He saw territorial enlarge-
ment as the basis of Germany’s national existence. Th is idea may be 
read as containing the seeds of war, but an idea is not the same as its 
practical hatching.
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Th e Germans were not happy with their position in Europe, 
either. Holding the central place on the continent, they were obsessed 
with the notion of being wedged between the devil and the deep blue 
sea – Russia and France. In reality they did not have very much to 
fear from these neighbours, at least not for the time being. It was 
more of an artifi cially prompted psychosis rather than a real threat, 
but it helped to enhance pro-war attitudes.
Th e arms race was goaded on by imperialist propaganda and 
war rhetoric. Nationalism gradually turning into chauvinism was 
another factor preparing nations for the challenges looming ahead. 
Alongside love of one’s own country and nation and national pride, 
it also contained another ingredient – contempt of and hostility to 
other nations, and a national arrogance which sanctioned the claim 
of a national right to rule other nations. Nationalists maintained that 
the road to national unity and solidarity led through war. War, they 
said, would be a catharsis cleansing the nation of its weak points and 
shortcomings. Italian nationalists stressed that war was the fastest 
and most heroic means to building up wealth and willpower. Vik-
tor Adler, one of the leaders of the Austrian anti-war Social Demo-
crats, observed on 29th July 1914 that for the nationalists war was 
like a means to salvation promising hope of a change for the better. 
But nationalism did not become the prevailing mode of thinking, 
and nationalist parties and associations did not dominate the politi-
cal scene. Liberal and conservative parties on the one hand, and so-
cialist parties on the other, continued to be the strongest political 
organisations, although the infl uence of nationalist ideas could be 
observed in all of them, not excluding the socialist groups. Liberals 
proved the most susceptible to the whispers of nationalism. Th e main 
strength of the nationalists were their organisations and associations: 
small numerically but vociferous, disciplined, hierarchically struc-
tures and amply fi nanced. Such were the German associations – the 
Deutscher Ostmarkenverein (German Eastern Marches Society), the 
Army League (Deutscher Wehrverein), the Navy League (Deutscher 
Flottenverein), and the Pan-German League (Alldeutscher Verband); 
the British organisations – the National Social Purity Crusade, the 
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National Service League, the British Navy League, and the Imperial 
Maritime League; the French organisations – the Ligue des patriotes 
(League of Patriots) and Action française (French Action); the Rus-
sian Black Hundred (Chornaya sotnya); and the Italian Nationalist 
Association (Associazione Nazionalista Italiana). Th ese organisations 
were capable of rallying public opinion to their cause, promoting war 
and the arms race, and impacting on governments, parliaments, and 
monarchs.
Nationalism fed on a corrupted version of Social Darwinism in-
tended to raise awareness of a  need for military confrontation for 
the sake of glory and national values. Social Darwinism was popu-
lar especially in England, disseminated by Benjamin Kidd, author of 
Social Evolution (fi rst published 1893). Similar views were promoted 
by Harold F.  Wyatt, one of the founders of the Imperial Maritime 
League, who wrote of war being a test “which God has given for the 
trial of peoples.” 
Th ere was a cultural atmosphere conducive to war. Th e late 1890s 
had initiated a  farewell to positivism and scientism and ushered 
in Neo-Romanticism. By the early 20th century millions had come 
to believe the artists, writers, and intellectuals that they were liv-
ing non-descript, prosaic lives, full of consumerist boredom, with 
no greatness, loft iness, or spirituality about it. Th ere was no point 
to such a bourgeois lifestyle, apparently. War was expected to bring 
purifi cation, liberation, and demonstrate the nation’s stamina, as 
Th omas Mann wrote. It was claimed that war brought nobility and 
taught the virtues of discipline and obedience. Th e humdrum life of 
drudgery could only be transformed by something that was loft y and 
invigorating, and that something was war. What mattered was the 
hero’s active life of martial exploits. Th e Neo-Romantics and adher-
ents of the Avant Garde perceived war as a manifestation of spiritual 
strength, vitality and creativity. War was a life-giving principle, an ex-
pression of the supreme culture, as Friedrich von Bernhardi wrote in 
1911 in Deutschland und der Nächste Krieg (Germany and the Next 
War), a book which went through six editions in Germany in just two 
years. In 1912 the French painter Pierre Bonnard wrote that in the 
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vortex of war it was not just the instincts that were rediscovered, but 
the virtues that were renewed. In 1891 the French writer Emile Zola 
observed that only warlike nations developed, and that a nation died 
as soon as it disarmed; according to him war was the school of disci-
pline, dedication, and courage. Another group of artists enthusiastic 
about war were the Italian Futurists; Filippo Marinetti dubbed war 
“the world’s only hygiene.” In general the Avant Garde, in permanent 
rebellion and summoning others to throw off  the straitjacket of mo-
rality, stand up in defi ance against the old world and replace it with 
a new, better, and more noble reality – ought to have acknowledged 
that much of the blame for evoking the War was theirs.
Th e renowned historian David S.  Landes has pointed out that 
many thought of war being rather like a picnic. Th e tragedy of the 
War was due to people’s credulous vanity. Th ey thought it would be 
a  kind of social event – a  kaleidoscope of elegant uniforms, mag-
nifi cent courage, admiration from women, parades and a  sense of 
felicity. Th e War broke out because there was not enough foresight. 
Th e diagnosis of the causes of the outbreak of the War put forward 
by ex-President Th eodore Roosevelt were not very diff erent: Europe 
had not engaged in fi ghting for a long time and decided to awaken 
its spirit of action. In the circumstances war became acceptable and 
even desirable.
Th e fashionable historians and philosophers of history produced 
more arguments in favour of war. In 1887 Heinrich von Trietschke 
wrote that the justifi ability of war was founded directly on the aware-
ness of its moral inevitability. Since history was in a permanent state 
of fl ux, therefore war was justifi ed and had to be regarded as one of 
the orders sanctioned by God. People took to heart what he had to 
say, and also the words of the early 19th century conservative thinker 
Joseph de Maistre, who maintained that war was the normal condi-
tion of mankind. Th e intellectual preparation for war was attended 
by the ideas of Henri Bergson, who said that Europe needed spiritual 
revival by a strong clash of its component parts; and by the philoso-
phy of Friedrich Nietzsche, popular throughout Europe. Nietzsche 
called for action and violence, and a struggle against sloth, bourgeois 
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philistinism and middle-class hypocrisy, and his slogans attracted 
many followers. One of them, “war and courage have done more 
great things than charity,” was printed on propaganda leafl ets which 
soldiers of diverse armies found in their kit. Nietzsche summoned 
them to lead a life full of risk, to rise up in rebellion against liberalism 
and the established standards. Ideas directly or indirectly eulogising 
war appealed to millions, especially to the young, and of course they 
would be the ones marching off  to war.
Th e fi ction written at the time also exerted a certain infl uence on 
the psychological and emotional preparation for war, which tended 
to be portrayed in contemporary novels as an exciting adventure. Es-
pionage and visions of the future were popular subjects. Novels were 
published in instalments in newspapers, on the Germans landing on 
the British coast, or on British forces arriving on German soil. Th e 
boys’ books, magazines, full of the adventures and exploits of brave 
soldiers ready to die for their country, were another form of prepara-
tion for the war looming on the horizon.
Another factor contributing to the war preparations was the offi  -
cial policy on history the various states pursued, chiefl y through the 
schools. School curricula put special emphasis on the principal battles 
the nation had fought, both to honour victories as well as to recall de-
feats in an eff ort to stir up a desire for revenge. Celebrations were held 
for the anniversaries of the nation’s important wars, or of the birth and 
death of its heroes. For the French this meant Napoleon’s victories, 
while Germans commemorated the Battle of Leipzig, in which Na-
poleon had sustained defeat. In 1913 the German authorities staged 
a grandiose event held at the Leipzig Memorial, a celebration of na-
tional unity coinciding with the festivities for the twenty-fi ft h anni-
versary of the accession of Kaiser Wilhelm II. Th e Russians commem-
orated Napoleon’s retreat from Moscow, while in July 1914 the French 
honoured the seventh centenary of the Battle of Bouvines.
Schools held patriotic events and propagated negative stereotypes 
of enemy nations, particularly in school magazines. Pupils were taken 
on outward-bound courses organised in a military manner, and mus-
tered for military and civil defence training during P.E. classes. All of 
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these activities exerted a fundamental impact on the mental prepara-
tions for the confl ict. Textbooks instructed pupils on patriotism and 
the sense of making a sacrifi ce for one’s country. War was not likely, 
but it could not be ruled out, as one French schoolbook informed 
pupils in 1912. Th at was why France was armed and ready to fi ght at 
any time, it told them. By defending France they would be defending 
the land of their birth, the richest and most beautiful country in the 
world. Another way of mobilising and educating students and pupils 
were mass patriotic events, such as Britain’s Navy Day or the youth 
festivals held in Germany.
A factor which helped to intensify the atmosphere leading to 
war was the series of crises starting with the annexation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. Next came the Agadir or Second Moroccan Crisis 
(the Panthersprung) in 1911, followed in Germany by a wave of anti-
French pro-war hysteria. Th e mob called the Kaiser a coward, clam-
ouring for him to abdicate and for the Chancellor to resign. Th ere 
was also the Pig (or Customs) War between Belgrade and Vienna, 
1906–1909; the war between Italy and Turkey over Libya, 1911–1912; 
and fi nally the Balkan Wars, which upset the existing balance of pow-
ers. Th e fact that every year witnessed a new crisis heightened the 
tense atmosphere and encouraged hot-headed behaviour. Prejudices 
proliferated, along with mutual resentment, distrust, and national-
istic phobias. Th e permanent state of tension turned into a veritable 
tightrope-dance over a precipice. Each new crisis added to the already 
accumulated charge until a critical mass was reached. A large-scale 
armed confl ict could have erupted at any moment. A spell of cold 
war set in. Successive crises only spiralled the scale of armaments 
even more, “rehearsed” the militarisation of national economies, and 
induced the foundation of more “defence unions.” Anxious citizens 
asked questions about the coming war. Daisy Hochberg, Princess von 
Pless wrote in her memoirs for 1911 that she was continually thinking 
about the coming war and whether there was a chance of avoiding it. 
In her recollections the Polish aristocrat, Princess Matylda Sapieha, 
noted that by the beginning of the winter of 1912 to 1913 there was 
more and more talk of a war breaking out between Austria-Hungary 
and Russia. In Poland there was an undercurrent of turmoil. Th e at-
mosphere in independence groups was near to boiling point. Tension 
was mounting so much that in Galicia in 1912–1913 more and more 
volunteers were joining Polish and Ukrainian paramilitary rifl emen’s 
organisations. When the immediate danger had passed the rate of 
recruitment fell. 
However, none of these factors need have precipitated a  global 
confl ict. Successive crises could have continued to come and go, re-
solved by well-tested procedures; the world could have continued to 
arm; armies to train and parade; and war plans to sleep in closely 
guarded safes. Life could have continued in peace; although under 
constant tension from crisis to crisis it would have certainly not have 
been comfortable. For how many years can you sit on a powder keg? 
Not long. So it comes as no surprise that more and more oft en peo-
ple realised that despite the risks war brought and the uncertainty of 
its fi nal outcome the attempt should be made. According to Joseph 
Conrad, war was inevitable and could not be halted, as the conse-
quence of the motives that determine the conduct of nations and 
peoples, like a tempest which Nature itself must discharge. So if war 
was inevitable, there was no sense in putting it off . Th is argument was 
like the surgeon’s line of thinking: if an operation is the only chance 
to save a patient’s life, the sooner it is done, the better the odds for 
its success and the patient’s survival. Th at’s how the British journalist 
Sir Sidney Low put it on the eve of the War’s outbreak: a justifi ed and 
necessary war was no more brutal than a surgical operation. It was 
better to cause the patient pain and get blood on one’s fi ngers than 
to let the disease spread far enough to be a threat to oneself and the 
world at large. Aft er all, war was just another way of pursuing policy. 
Something that might be called the obligation of war had emerged. 
All that had to be done was to choose a date. Th e vicious assassina-
tion in Sarajevo on 28th June 1914 seemed to meet all the expecta-





Th e 1914–1918 war was conducted primarily on the land, but there 
was also war on the oceans and seas, as well as airborne warfare. How-
ever the crucial form of warfare which determined the fi nal outcome 
was the action undertaken by land forces. Before August 1914 the 
generals had imagined that they would be able to achieve the aims the 
politicians set them by manoeuvre warfare. Th is was the type of war 
they had been preparing for, studying its potential variants and check-
ing its diverse scenarios for years. Its success would be determined 
by the rapid movement of troops and the chief part in combat was to 
be played by the infantry. Th e fi rst weeks of the war confi rmed these 
expectations as well as the role ascribed to cavalry, which was useful 
in reconnaissance and for carrying out raids on communication lines, 
and effi  cient in combat as a “mounted infantry.” On the Eastern front 
there were a few heroic cavalry charges at enemy forces. However, in 
the autumn of 1914 manoeuvre warfare petered out on the Western 
front, turning into trench warfare. On the Eastern and Balkan front it 
took a mixed form in view of the vast distances and scattered distribu-
tion of forces. At times it was more reminiscent of manoeuvre warfare; 
at other times it resembled trench warfare. On the Alpine front it was 
trench warfare from the very start. Th e military action conducted in 
the deserts of the Near East, Mesopotamia, Egypt, and Palestine had 
some of the features of manoeuvre warfare, and some of trench war-
fare, carried out in extreme desert conditions with limited access to 
water and communication lines. A very diff erent type of combat was 
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conducted in winter conditions with snow blizzards and temperatures 
well below freezing point. Yet another kind of warfare involved land-
ing operations, oft en of a combined nature from the land and sea, and 
sometimes with the use of aircraft . In 1914 the generals had not antici-
pated the use of alternative models of warfare other than manoeuvre 
warfare. Th e emergence of several basic types of warfare as the war 
progressed was due to the dynamics the course of action took, and for 
many it was a surprise. If the war had fi nished aft er a few weeks, or 
even aft er a few months, there would have never been a division into 
the diff erent types of warfare which developed aft er some time.
Towards the end of the War in the autumn of 1918 the type of 
warfare conducted on the Western front changed when the front was 
breached in several places, and returned to manoeuvre warfare. Th is 
happened because the Allies had gained decisive superiority over 
the German forces in terms of resources and personnel. At this time 
fast-moving units such as motorised troops, motorcyclist and cyclist 
units demonstrated their advantages. Just as it had begun with ma-
noeuvre warfare, so too the First World War came to an end with the 
manoeuvre method.
2. Trench warfare
Trench warfare has become the symbol of the First World War. 
But the soldiers engaged in it had to learn its rules as they went along, 
or in fact as they stood or squatted, since the theoreticians of the art 
of war and the chiefs of staff  had not expected that there would be 
a need to abandon manoeuvre war for war in the trenches, which was 
little known at the time. In 1907 a British offi  cer had heralded that 
in practice every army would turn into a garrison in a very extended 
fortress, but his was an isolated opinion. Th e pacifi sts, too, had been 
warning that the forthcoming war would be like a permanent clinch, 
exhausting but hard to resolve. But the military commanders and 
politicians treated their opinions as pacifi stic propaganda. Th e Polish 
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fi nancier, industrialist and pacifi st Jan Bloch was one of those who 
foresaw the coming of trench war.
In trench war technology gained the upper hand over the art of 
war, and the word “battle” acquired a new meaning. Th e British his-
torian Basil Liddell Hart wrote that the period from 1915 to 1917 did 
not deserve much attention as regards strategy, since strategy became 
subservient to tactics, and tactics were lame. In trench war the in-
fantry, and above all the artillery and engineers rose in importance, 
while the role of the cavalry diminished, though it was still useful for 
reconnaissance and cover operations. If it took part in combat, its op-
erations were like those of the infantry. Horses were used as a means 
of transport, not for battle.
How did soldiers take trench war? Th ey could hardly have been 
expected to like it. Th ey did not care for the role of trench rats fi ght-
ing off  real rats – oft en their chief enemy. Th ey bolstered morale with 
jokes and irony. In the trains taking them to the front they could read 
that if the weather was bad, the war would be conducted indoors. Th e 
generals did not take to trench war, either. Lord Kitchener, the British 
Secretary of State for War, did not consider it proper warfare, but was 
at a loss what to do. Another general accused the Germans of behav-
ing like frightened moles, refusing to fi ght like men. Th e military liked 
action and hated inaction. Th ey wanted warfare conducted by soldiers, 
not by technology and an anonymous crowd. One of the soldiers wrote 
from the trenches that they had a dehumanising eff ect, turning people 
at best into effi  cient machines mindlessly carrying out orders.
Trench warfare originated in circumstances that enforced it. In 
October 1914 the Germans attacking on the Western front stopped 
to rest, collect their thoughts, rally their reserves and top up on am-
munitions before striking again. To avoid enemy fi re and sallies both 
the Germans and the Allies started entrenching, which they treated 
as a temporary measure. Offi  cially trenches were regarded as a way 
to spend winter in combat conditions and their aim was to save lives.
In the early spring of 1915, aft er wintering in the trenches, the 
troops left  their dugouts to face the enemy but sustained heavy losses 
and ran back the trenches for shelter. Aft er a while they tried again, 
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with the same result. Over the next months and years both sides tried 
again and again, but nothing much changed. Th ere was stalemate 
on the front. Not surprisingly, the title of Remarque’s famous novel, 
All Quiet on the Western Front, comes from German staff  reports. 
Beating the enemy entrenched in their defence line turned out to be 
impossible. In 1914 Field Marshal Sir John French, Commander-in-
Chief of the British Expeditionary Force, wrote to a friend in London 
that the war was nothing like what they had been used to, and that 
battle meant one side carrying out a siege, and the other defending 
a besieged fortress, only on a gigantic scale. Both sides would agree 
with the opinion of Erich von Falkenhayn, Chief of the General Staff  
of the German Army as of the autumn of 1914, who observed that 
the fi rst rule of trench warfare was not to lose even an inch of ground, 
and if that happened, to recover it immediately in a counter-attack, 
even at a cost of fi ghting to the last man. Th e trench war went on and 
on, and the trenches became the main theatre of war and their envi-
rons the killing-fi elds, for fi rst of all the front usually took the form of 
a straight line, which ruled out attacks from the fl ank. Secondly, for 
years neither side managed to gain material superiority or enough 
manpower to break the deadlock. Th irdly, thanks to the dense net-
work of roads and railway lines the side under attack could obtain 
reinforcements, supplies, and ammunition fairly quickly. As a result 
for nearly four years neither side won very much but both sustained 
huge losses.
In these circumstances the only thing the armies in the West 
could do was to work assiduously to reinforce their defence lines 
over a stretch of about 800 km, which was to make for more eff ective 
defence and give them better conditions to make a surprise attack. 
Already in the spring of 1915 work started on the digging of new 
trenches parallel to the existing ones. Sometimes enemy trenches 
were only 100–150 m away from each other. Trenches were dug in 
the war in the Near East as well. On the hilly terrain of Gallipoli the 
distance between the Australian and Turkish trenches could be as 
small as 20 m. Soldiers would post their opinions of each other up on 
boards, and these could be ironic or humorous, but not necessarily 
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hostile. Th ere were instances of soldiers from enemy forces meeting 
for a drink, and on the Western front there were even football match-
es played on no-man’s land by ad-hoc teams spontaneously made up 
from opposing trenches. At such times there were numerous friendly 
gestures between soldiers from mutually hostile armies, which seri-
ously worried their commanding offi  cers. In the fi rst months of the 
war there was even an informal, unwritten rule not to fi re from a hid-
ing-place, during mealtimes, when the men on guard duty changed, 
or during patrols along the barbed-wire lines. It was not fraterni-
sation, the men said, but self-preservation, in accordance with the 
principle of “live and let live.” 
Th is climate could well have prompted the idea to celebrate 
Christmas together. Th e fi rst fraternal gestures of this kind were met 
with diffi  dence by both sides, suspicious that they concealed a ruse, 
a Christmas prelude to an unexpected attack. But it turned out this 
was no trick. Soldiers exchanged Christmas greetings with no hos-
tile feelings, celebrating together and forgiving each other. Such be-
haviour was an expression of religious feelings, the desire to live in 
peace, the need to feel accepted in the midst of a  brutal war, and 
a  sign of homesickness. Th e Christmas Eve truce applied to about 
2/3 of the French and German troops, and 4/5 of the British and Ger-
man troops. In 2005 Christian Carion made a fi lm entitled “Joyeux 
Noël” on this subject. Th e guns went silent, just as the fi lm shows. 
Th ose taking part were astonished and excited. Soldiers from hostile 
armies met on no-man’s land, put up and decorated Christmas trees, 
lit candles and even fi reworks, embraced each other, had drinks and 
Christmas specialities together. It was the beginning of a ball, one of 
them commented. Some visited enemy trenches. Th ey talked, said 
prayers together, and exchanged presents such as watches, tobacco, 
bottles of alcohol, tinned beef, chocolate, socks, biscuits, crucifi xes 
and medals, barrels of beer, and even took each other’s autographs, 
which they sent home to their families. Th ey had plenty of gift s to 
exchange, as their HQs had provided a large supply of presents. Th ey 
also exchanged newspapers. Th ose who knew the language of the 
enemy could compare the information in their own and the enemy 
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press on the same events, and discovered what wartime manipula-
tion and propaganda means.
On Christmas Day soldiers continued to meet each other and sing 
carols. Th ey wrote in letters to their families how extraordinary it 
was. One British soldier wrote it was the most wonderful Christmas 
he had ever had and that he would have never believed it if he had 
seen it in the cinema. On some sections of the front the truce lasted 
until the New Year. Another British soldier wondered what would 
happen if the spirit that had overcome the trenches overcame the 
people in the whole world: instead of insulting each other people 
would start singing Christmas carols together, and instead of taking 
revenge, they’d be exchanging presents, and wouldn’t the war come 
to an end immediately? Naturally enough, the commands decided to 
stop this. Th ey imposed a ban on holiday meetings, which damped 
down the men’s fi ghting spirit, demolishing the image of the enemy 
as monsters. Many refused to obey orders to fi re on the enemy lines. 
On some stretches of the front whole units infected by the Christmas 
spirit had to be withdrawn and replaced with new units. Th e press 
rallied to the assault, warning of the fatal consequences of mutual 
revelling, which the papers said was a sign of weakness on the part 
of the enemy, if they had to call for a Christmas truce. A few cases of 
an Easter truce were reported in the spring of 1915, but this time on 
a much smaller scale. In the next years as hatred of the enemy grew 
in line with what the war propaganda prescribed it became harder 
and harder to hold meetings and conversations with the enemy and 
treat them like gentlemen. Th e soldiers’ behaviour became more and 
more brutal. A soldier who had seen his friend killed stopped having 
second thoughts and shot to kill. Having learned what contact with 
the enemy could do to their men’s morale, the authorities of the bel-
ligerent sides gave orders for the system of trenches to be laid out in 
a way to make such contact impossible.
As of 1915 trenches were being dug on all the fronts. Th ey were 
used for protection against enemy attacks, and facilitated, or indeed 
made attacks against the enemy possible. Th ey were intended to 
enable machine gun, light mortar, grenade, and sniper’s posts to be 
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positioned up to a few score metres forward. Trenches were 1–2 me-
tres wide, but at intervals of a few score metres had wider stretches, 
going up to 3–4 metres in places called “nodes of resistance” where 
ammunition, food supplies and medical equipment was stored. Be-
tween trenches there were narrow communication ditches for run-
ners carrying messages. Usually a pair of messengers would be sent, 
in the hope that at least one of them would reach the destination and 
deliver the message on time. Where technical conditions allowed, 
trenches would be dug to a depth of at least 2 metres, or more, in two 
storeys, down to 8–9 metres. Th e trenches in Gallipoli and moun-
tainous regions were shallower, as the rocky terrain made digging 
diffi  cult.
Shooting platforms would be installed about a metre below ground 
level. Th e front of the trenches would be protected with sandbags or 
stones, and the sides would be boarded up with planks. Th ere would 
be loopholes left  between them for observation with a  periscope. 
Th ere were many kilometres of fortifi cation lines, so to assist com-
munication trenches were given street names such as Haig Street or 
Avenue Joff re, in honour of the commanders.
Diff erent construction types and techniques were employed in 
mountain areas and, for instance, in Flanders, where the water table 
was not very far down below ground level and the irrigation system 
had been destroyed. Th e trenches of Flanders were like muddy ponds 
or quagmires. To make things easier, wooden fl oors were put down 
in them, and pumps fi tted with rubber hoses were in operation. But 
there were even reports of men drowning in the mud when it hap-
pened to rain during combat.
Minefi elds and barbed wire, known as “the devil’s rope,” “the steel 
fence,” or “the barbed garden fence,” were an important component of 
the defences. Barbed wire was the soldier’s bane. When barbed wire 
went up on the front the techniques and eff ects of warfare changed, 
and the memory of it would haunt veterans for a long time. Barbed 
wire was invented by the Americans for fencing fi elds and pastures. 
In 1898 the British used it in the Boer War. In successive armed con-
fl icts it was used more and more. During the First World War barbed 
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wire was laid out at ground level on a  network of steel pins. Th is 
had to be done at night, as quietly as possible so as not to arouse the 
vigilance of enemy snipers. Th e British designed a supporting pin in 
the shape of a corkscrew, which could be screwed into the ground 
with hardly any noise. Other activities conducted at night included 
burying the dead, evacuating the wounded from the trenches, and 
conserving, repairing, and reinforcing shelters.
To secure the best eff ects for attack and defence there had to be 
a  good system of communication and observation. Th is could be 
achieved by a network of wires running in tubes at about 2 m below 
ground level. Wires laid out on the surface deteriorated soon and 
were destroyed. Other communication systems included the wireless 
telegraph and reconnaissance patrols sent out to no-man’s land and 
enemy trenches. Observations were carried out and information sent 
from church and mine shaft  towers. Even the services of dogs were 
employed. On the other hand, trees – and especially the stumps of 
trees left  standing in the areas under shellfi re – were no good either 
for observation or for transmitting messages. A  soldier serving in 
the Battle of Warsaw in 1915 wrote that the forest had been devas-
tated for kilometres on end and looked as if it had been struck by 
a  hurricane; the boughs hanging down from shattered trunks and 
the scattered branches marked the places hit by shrapnel. Within the 
trenches these methods were not very reliable means of communica-
tion between offi  cers and men, and the use of coloured fl ags, whis-
tles, bugles, and fi rework rockets proved much more eff ective.
Not all the trenches played the same or a similar role. Some were 
hardly ever troubled; others were constantly scenes of battle, espe-
cially where big battles were fought using material resources. Some 
soldiers spent a few years in the trenches (with intermissions); while 
others never experienced an enemy attack and never themselves at-
tacked. Th ey had the luck to spend their entire time in service in 
the rear, at a safe distance away from the front line. All they knew 
about the war was what they were told or read. Some were wounded 
several times; others fi nished their service with no injuries at all or 
with just a scratch. For the latter the main problem was how to kill 
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time, how to go home with money in their wallet, how to overcome 
the deadly boredom and banality; and their offi  cers’ chief worry was 
how to keep the lethargic sitting around in the trenches from having 
a destructive eff ect on the men and their morale and mentality.
Trench war gave rise to serious problems with supplies, sleep-
ing, washing, eating, and performing the call of Nature. Complaints 
about the food were ubiquitous, but it was hard to deliver hot meals 
if neither fi res could be lit nor cookers installed in the trenches, to 
prevent the smoke and fl ames from giving away positions to the en-
emy. Th e predominant fare in the trenches was dry rations and cold 
of necessity: bread, tinned provisions, and sporadically fruit and 
vegetables. Bread, which was the basic food, was supplied from fi eld 
bakeries situated at the rear. Th e most effi  cient bakeries were the ones 
the Americans brought from home, which by the end of the war were 
producing a daily quota of 54 thousand loaves, each weighing 5–6 
kg, baked in 8 huge ovens. Th e worst times for food supplies were 
during periods of prolonged combat and in the autumn and winter. 
A report from the Western front said that at such times you could see 
plenty of masklike faces, starving and pale with cold; what most peo-
ple had on their minds was where to get their next meal. Alongside 
food, victuals also included water, beer, wine and spirits, depending 
on the national tradition. British and Australian soldiers brewed tea 
whenever they got the chance.
It was not until fortresses were built along lines of permanent re-
sistance that conditions improved somewhat. Th ese structures were 
huge reinforced concrete bunkers of several storeys, containing 
stores, hospitals, munitions stores, toilets, and canteens, with long 
communication tunnels lit up with electric lighting and equipped 
with subterranean telegraph lines. Life became easier and more lives 
could be saved. To all intents and purposes they were underground 
cities, and most of them were on the Western front. Next to them 
there were dugouts supported by tree trunks going down to a depth 
of 4–6 m, and covered with corrugated iron roofi ng. Th ey were lit 
up with candles, paraffi  n or acetylene lamps. But dugouts off ered 
protection only against minor shells. Well camoufl aged shelters pre-
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vented enemy aircraft  and observation balloons from identifying 
them. At a certain distance behind the trenches and shelters for the 
men there were special shelters for commanding offi  cers, fi tted out 
with armoured observation points. Th ey were well camoufl aged and 
fairly well equipped, rather like hotels, with beds, carpets, toilets, wa-
ter wells, stoves, chairs, furniture, portable bath-tubs, and thermos 
fl asks.
It was the duty of the engineers to protect the offi  cers and men 
against the terrible consequences of intensive shelling. Alongside 
the subterranean cities miles of tunnels were dug to shelter whole 
regiments and divisions. Such tunnels were constructed on all the 
fronts, even in the Near East, where on General Allenby’s orders they 
were built with underground electric lighting and even a  narrow-
gauge railway. Allenby managed to hide over 30 thousand soldiers 
away from the enemy’s gaze and artillery. On the Western front the 
Canadians had a  team of engineers who proved their high level of 
professional skills in tunnel construction. In 1918 they built 12 tun-
nels, the longest was 1,722 m. Th ey managed to accommodate most 
of their forces in these tunnels. Th e Germans turned out to be even 
more eff ective in the construction of state-of-the-art underground 
forts, keeping them in contact with neighbouring forts and with the 
rest of the country. Th e best known of these networks was the famous 
Hindenburg Line (Siegfriedstellung), 143 km long.
In the hot and dry areas, the Balkans and the Near East, the main 
problem was providing the soldiers with enough water. But the main 
annoyance in everyday life in the trenches on all the fronts were the 
plagues of rats, lice, cockroaches, fl eas, ticks, insects and mosquitoes. 
Th is was due to the bad sanitary conditions and the large numbers 
of corpses. In January 1916 one of the soldiers on the Western front 
wrote that when lights went out the rats and lice came out and were 
masters of the place. You could hear rats gnawing, scuttling and 
thudding along the planks, giving out muted squeals. Th ey worked 
very hard, and within a  few days any bodies left  unburied would 
be reduced to a skeleton clad in a uniform. Th ese four-legged gate-
crashers were the most diffi  cult enemy to beat. Rat-hunts were held 
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regularly. According to one soldier, on one night alone he and his 
mates killed nearly a hundred rats, not counting the ones in the mud 
and water, which they had to drown using stones. Rat-hunting was 
another remedy against boredom and hopelessness, for sometimes 
fi ghting on the front could come to a standstill for weeks on end. Rats 
were Enemy Number One, and Number Two were lice. Th e trenches 
earned the nickname of “Liceland.” “When we entered our dugouts 
and our bodies warmed up, the lice would come out of hiding in our 
clothes, line up in columns of four and start marching over our bod-
ies. Th ey were our constant companions,” a British soldier wrote.
A rota system operated in the trenches: it could hardly be any other-
wise. In the Allied armies it was usually a three-shift  system: 3 days 
in the trenches, 3 days training, and 3 days in the rear. In the German 
army it was a four-day system: 4 days in the trenches and 4 days off . 
Soldiers did not get much sleep, and sometimes hardly any sleep at 
all, as they had to do certain duties during the night which they could 
not do in daytime. Hence the opinion that they were dying for lack 
of sleep, dead-beat, or looked as if fast asleep. On their days off  in the 
rear they could use the shops and canteens off ering hot meals, to taste 
an unknown cuisine. Th ey could visit soldiers’ reading-rooms, mess-
rooms, or brothels. Th ey could paint, draw, or sculpt. Th ey could 
make crucifi xes and little altars out of shell fragments. Time spent 
in the rear was a good opportunity to write home. Th e letters they 
wrote were very similar to each other, regardless of nationality or 
front. “I received your card and the letter from home, too. Th ey wrote 
about the cow and the calf. My best regards to you and to every-
one at home too,” wrote a Polish soldier to his family near Bochnia. 
Writing was an inner compulsion. Soldiers knew that families suf-
fered if they got no letters from them, and they suff ered, too, if they 
had no news from their family.
Both sides worked hard to fi nd the best way to destroy the enemy’s 
defence system, asking again and again what should be done to dig in 
and keep their hard-won positions, to gain the upper hand strategi-
cally. One of the methods which was to lead to success was digging 
tunnels under enemy trenches. Already in 1915 British engineers 
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were digging at depths of scores of metres below ground level. Th ey 
employed miners who used the techniques applied to make pit shaft s. 
When they fi nished the job the engineers installed a  large amount 
of explosives at the end of the tunnel, and when they set it off  the 
enemy forces in the trench above them were blown up along with 
their trench. Th is is what happened at Mesen and at Ypres in July 
1917, when the British attack started with the explosion of 19 mines. 
“Th e ground began to tremble. My body went up and down, as if 
carried by an ocean wave,” wrote one of the British engineers, observ-
ing the eff ects of his work at Ypres. “Suddenly I saw the biggest ever, 
most terrible fi rework display… It was a veritable volcano, as if spit-
ting out a huge tongue of fi re,” wrote a Belgian witness of the Mesen 
operation. Th e explosion could be heard in London, 200 km away! 
A crater 69 m in diameter and 24 m deep was formed. 10 thousand 
Germans were killed. In the environs of Mesen and Ypres the Brit-
ish dug 24 tunnels of lengths from 180 m to 1,800 m in two years. In 
fact, both the Allies and the Germans were sapping, using pickaxes 
and shovels, and passing buckets of earth from hand to hand along 
a  line up to the surface. Sometimes sappers from opposing sides 
would meet, and close combat would ensue with the use of pickaxes, 
shovels and spades. Both sides used the most up-to-date precision 
instruments such as tapping systems equipped with microphones, 
and the most primitive but still eff ective tools like buckets turned 
upside down, which helped them discover and destroy sappers. If 
this did not succeed they would quickly evacuate the trench and set 
up machine-guns in a safe place, as straight aft er the explosion the 
enemy infantry would attack. So tunnels were not always a foolproof 
measure, especially as Nature oft en proved a formidable adversary of 
sappers, preventing digging and allowing water to seep in and fl ood 
the tunnel. Another obstacle was carbon monoxide. Th at is why dig-
gers were accompanied by animals such as rabbits or canaries. If the 
animals became restless it was a sign of serious danger. Th e miners’ 
war did not turn out to be a military panacea.
Hence the principal weapon in the struggle to destroy enemy 
defence lines was artillery, the maker of “hurricanes of steel.” How-
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ever, in the fi rst months of the war the predominant types of guns 
were ones which shot shells over an almost horizontal trajectory and 
proved ineff ective. Th is forced the belligerents to design and produce 
guns and shells capable of hitting and destroying enemy defences. 
Th e new guns, powerful mortars and howitzers, shot shells which de-
stroyed targets with a very strong force of explosion. However, trans-
porting them over terrain riddled with shell craters, barbed wire, and 
trenches was not easy. Heavy artillery destroyed both enemy defenc-
es and the delicate psyche of the men that operated it. Under a bar-
rage of shellfi re all that a soldier whose resistance had sunk to a low 
thought of was to put up a white fl ag as soon as possible and march 
off  into captivity. “Th e entire mountain seemed to be shaking in its 
foundations… huge lumps of rock were ripped off  and tumbled into 
the Russian trenches below. I had never seen such a display of fi re-
power before,” recalled a soldier in the Russian army who had fought 
in the Battle of Gorlice.
Fortunately for soldiers, artillery was not always eff ective. In 1914–
1915 only two out of every hundred shells fi red landed straight in 
a trench, and by 1918 it was only four in every hundred. Many shells 
never exploded. Th ose which hit the mud usually failed to explode. 
Oft en as many as 30 out of every hundred fi red never exploded. Th eir 
poor quality was chiefl y the result of the low quality of the materials 
and the imperfection of the machines used to produce them. Over 
fi ve days on the Somme in June 1916 the British fi red 1.5 million 
shells out of 1,500 guns, nonetheless before the off ensive the Ger-
man barbed wire defences remained “virtually untouched and very 
dense” and for all practical purposes were still serviceable despite the 
artillery fi re. Th e attacking soldiers found as much, thinking the en-
emy defences had been destroyed and there would be no problem 
with crossing them. However, it oft en turned out that attackers were 
gunned down as soon as they started to leave their trenches.
Sometimes soldiers were killed by their own artillery. Th is hap-
pened mostly in the second phase of the war, once a developed form 
of moving barrage known as the Feuerwaltz (“fi re waltz”), a  more 
eff ective type of artillery fi re, had been introduced. Its invention is 
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attributed to two generals independently of each other, the German 
Hans von Seeckt and the Pole Tadeusz Rozwadowski. But there was 
a  snag about moving barrage, which was supposed to advance just 
ahead of its own infantry advancing behind it. However, perfect co-
ordination was hard to achieve. If the barrage moved too slowly, its 
own men were hit. One of the Canadian offi  cers instructed his men 
that they should advance behind the barrage fi re as casually as if they 
were riding a bike along a beach, screened off  by a bus. When they got 
to the enemy line and the Germans put their hands up they were to 
send them to the rear. But he was being too optimistic. According to 
French estimates about 75 thousand soldiers could have been killed or 
wounded by their own artillery fi re. One of the French offi  cers owned 
up to belonging to the regiment which had killed the most English-
men. To avoid losses from their own artillery, the Austrians put pieces 
of white cloth on their kitbags, and had grey and red-and-white fl ags 
to mark the extreme positions of their attacking forces. So the ambi-
ent theory on the Western and Italian fronts, that the artillery cap-
tured a position and the infantry held it, all too oft en did not work. It 
was hard to surprise the enemy, who always had enough time to bring 
in reinforcements and deploy them in the rear.
Trench lines were breached on all the fronts except the Western 
front. On the Eastern and Balkan fronts artillery proved the criti-
cal factor. Th e Eastern front was far more extended than the West-
ern front, and owing to shortages the Russians had not been able to 
build an eff ective line of gunners’ trenches and shelters. But to breach 
enemy lines the attackers had to have a clear advantage in terms of 
materials and manpower, as happened in the Battle of Gorlice. In 
1915 some of the Balkan lines were breached, for example in Ruma-
nia and at Caporetto in Italy, thanks to the attackers’ overwhelming 
advantage in manpower and materials. Th ey made a quick advance, 
preventing the defenders from gathering reinforcements, which in 
Russia, the Balkans, and Rumania, were slow to arrive due to defects 
in the railway network.
On the Western front, too, it was believed that the success of an 
attack depended on its speed, hence soldiers were ordered to leave 
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behind in the trenches all accessories which would be of no use 
during an attack. Whole weeks were spent on training leaving the 
trenches, running and jumping, and the soldiers were kept fi t. In 
practice, however, rapid attack was out of the question over a shell-
pocked fi eld riddled with anti-personnel mines and laced with 
barbed wire. To make an assault feasible at all at least some of the 
mines and barbed wire had to be cleared. Th ere were men specially 
trained to cut the wire with shears. For protection against machine 
gun fi re they carried shields like medieval knights, and when they 
had done the job, put up white tape to guide the attackers. However, 
vigilant defenders fi xed bells on the barbed wire to warn of the ap-
proach of intruders, or they might connect up a live wire or set up 
a dense mesh net against grenade attacks. Even the successful de-
fusing of the mines and removal of the barbed wire did not mean 
that the road to the enemy lines was clear, for beyond the barbed 
wire there might have been an earthwork, a series of wooden fences, 
low-lying trip-wires, and camoufl aged pits waiting to catch potential 
attackers in traps like the ones for hunting big game. Some laboured 
to defend themselves, and others to outsmart them. 
To beat the barbed wire broad planks or mattresses were put on 
it, but the task required time and a lot of luck, since enemy soldiers 
were waiting for any who dared to attempt it. In the late phase of the 
war attackers were aided by the Bangalore torpedo, a tube fi lled with 
strong explosives inserted in the wire. It was fi rst developed by the 
British Indian army. In 1917 the Germans introduced barbed tape 
(razor wire), which could not be cut or destroyed, since it could not 
be snapped and was rolled up into an entanglement, but it turned out 
that all the barbed wire could be negotiated by tanks. 
Th e most diffi  cult tasks were building trenches, laying mines, and 
spreading out barbed wire in the marshy, wet and rainy terrain of 
Flanders. Th e soldier’s worst enemy there was the rain, water, and 
mud. Th is was a subject that appeared in hundreds of memoirs and 
commentaries. Some even said that aft er their Flemish experience 
they “had a  favourable attitude to English weather.” Th ey remem-
bered the rain which soaked the trenches and made them disinte-
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grate, and rendered guns useless. Th eir primitive pumps and ad hoc 
irrigation systems were not much help. War veterans had really bad 
memories of Flanders. 
“Rain, midnight rain, nothing but the wild rain,” wrote Edward 
Th omas in the poem “Rain.”
Th e rain did not cease to pour down, and the vast fi elds of craters 
turned into a sea of stinking, asphyxiating mud in which men, ani-
mals, and tanks struggled hopelessly and stuck. Th e few roads which 
could still be made out amid the mud were constantly under Ger-
man artillery fi re, under which endless supply columns wandered 
intrepidly all night long. Such were Winston Churchill’s recollec-
tions of the autumn of 1917. A German wrote that it was not war, but 
more like messing around in the mud. As they plodded through the 
mud, some soldiers lost their socks, shoes, and even their trousers. 
So they put empty sandbags on their shoes, and tied them up above 
the knee. Th ey marched with their heavy kitbags over wooden plat-
forms. If any of them fell into the mud it was hard to pull him out. 
“We were loaded like Christmas trees, so any explosion nearby made 
soldiers lose their balance and plunge straight into the mud.” It was 
even harder to transport artillery and drive carts carrying provisions 
pulled by horses or oxen. It took a soldier 3 to 4 hours to cover a kilo-
metre, a  distance he normally did in 20–25 minutes. None of the 
battles fought in the mud ended in success for the attackers. All the 
attacks launched by both sides drowned in the sea of mud and water. 
“Th e mud! We slept in it, we ate in it. Stinking mud everywhere. Th e 
bodies of the dead sank in it. Wounds festered in it. Th ere were also 
the carcasses of horses and mules in it, with guts bursting out of their 
bloated bellies. It was a nightmare,” a British soldier recalled.
But even in Flanders some attackers managed to reach enemy de-
fences. In the fi ghting in and around the trenches they used hand-
grenades, knives, revolvers, sappers’ daggers, steel-tipped clubs, 
knuckledusters, and sharp-edged pickaxes. Long bayonet rifl es 
turned out not to be of much use for fi ghting in the trenches, so the 
soldiers were issued shorter rifl es. Th ose who made it to the enemy 
lines and took the front trenches ran on, fewer and fewer in number, 
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to the lines further back. Th ose who got furthest were completely 
exhausted when the defenders turned their reserve forces on them – 
and the attack petered out. Success was transient. Experience of 
trench war showed that defence was easier than attack. Defenders 
could react faster to a changing situation than attackers.
Diverse methods of attack were tried in trench warfare, in search 
of gaps through which it would be possible to pass. Some generals 
were in favour of mass charges, others preferred single fi le. Some pre-
tended to launch attacks at various points along the front to divert 
the enemy’s attention and prevent him from identifying the real loca-
tion of the assault. Others trusted to combined attacks: poison gas, 
the use of mines to blast enemy trenches, and attacks by reserve units 
from the far rear. Work was going on all the time to improve mobil-
ity for infantry assaults. Good mobility was to be secured by elite 
stormtrooper units by the Germans in 1915, and later deployed by the 
Allies as well. Th e best and most experienced soldiers were consigned 
to these units. Th ey were given additional food rations, longer leave, 
and were relieved from kitchen duty. Th eir job was to infi ltrate enemy 
territory in small squads in order to spread panic, disorganise the en-
emy’s defence, and get him to retreat. Stormtrooper units destroyed 
command posts, communication systems, and supply depots. Th eir 
soldiers were equipped with hand grenades and cluster hand gre-
nades, knives, portable mortars, nail-studded wooden pikes, fl exible 
clubs on a wooden handle, and fi re-throwers. Th ey wore protective 
helmets and steel collars to protect the throat, and bulletproof vests 
reminiscent of medieval breastplates. Only in 1918 the Germans pro-
duced 500 thousand such vests, but not all stormtroopers put them 
on, since they impeded mobility, which was to be their main advan-
tage. Th e units which availed themselves of these vests were the snip-
ers, observers of artillery fi re and others, and a bulletproof vest saved 
many of them from serious injury. However, such security measures 
were virtually unknown outside the Western front.
In 1917 the Italians formed storming battalions known as Arditi 
(the Daring Ones), but they did not make a signifi cant contribution to 
the action, since no modifi cations were introduced in the tactics used 
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hitherto to accommodate them. On the other hand, German storm-
troopers scored successes at Caporetto. Oskar von Hutier’s 
stormtrooper units did very well, a model example of which was their 
capture of Riga. In 1918 the Allies’ storming units were to prove eff ec-
tive. Th ey were deployed in off ensives carried out simultaneously at 
several points. Short attacks with the use of a small force oft en proved 
more eff ective than long-lasting single assaults. On the Western front 
storming units oft en managed to penetrate quite deeply into enemy 
lines, but were unable to permanently breach the front.
What were the trenches like in the aft ermath of a  battle? An 
anguishing and terrible sight. Th e dead would tumble down into the 
trenches. If there were large numbers of corpses not all of them could 
be removed, especially as the wounded had to be given priority. 
Whenever combat continued for longer, the stench of decomposing 
corpses became intolerable. Stench and nausea made up one of the 
most frequent recollections of those who defended the entrenched 
fortresses. Th e sight of the heaps of wounded jumbled up with the 
dead gave rise to similar experiences of shock and disgust. Many 
went ill. Th ose who survived compared trench war to a  cemetery 
with bodies left  unburied. Sometimes defenders would demand ex-
tra rations of tobacco and face-masks to off set the stench of rotting 
human and animal bodies.
It left  a deep mark on their psychology. “What was human life in 
that heartless world, a world full of the stench of thousands of rot-
ting bodies? Death lurked at every step and divested those who had 
survived of their human instincts,” Ernst Jünger recorded his experi-
ence. Soldiers had to quickly learn to live with all this by activating 
adaptive strategies. Th ey became immune to brutality, death, and ob-
scenity. Th ey assimilated turpitude and agony. Th ey grew indiff erent 
to the fate of others. “You become absolutely indiff erent to everything 
the world has to off er except the duty to fi ght. You’re eating a slice of 
bread while someone is hit by a bullet and drops down next to you. 
For a moment you look at him, then you carry on eating. ... Eventu-
ally talking about your own death aff ects you as little as a discussion 
on an invitation to an offi  cial lunch,” an Austrian soldier wrote. Th e 
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monotonous routine of repeating the same activities and sitting in 
the trenches waiting for an attack or being attacked had a negative 
psychological eff ect as well. On 25th December 1914 Tom was writing 
to Janet in London that “the fi rst battles of the war left  so many dead 
both sides have held back until replacements could come from home. 
So we have mostly stayed in our trenches and waited.” Th e enemy was 
not keen on fi ghting, either. “But what a terrible waiting it has been! 
Knowing that any moment an artillery shell might land and explode 
beside us in the trench, killing or maiming several men.” Th ey knew 
very well that silence in the trenches might be a  silent prelude to 
a tempest of fi re and death.
Waiting to leave the trenches must have been extremely stress-
ful. “A couple of hours of waiting in suspense made some fi ll their 
time with prayers, while others cursed, and still others thought and 
talked of home and their dear ones. Th e silence of the grave, the calm 
before the storm, which always attends the order to prepare for at-
tack, can throw anyone off -balance,” says one of the soldier’s mem-
oirs. Th ose who had served for longer had it easier thanks to their 
experience. But not all of them. Some developed a state of oblivion 
akin to a narcotic trance, under the infl uence of strong emotions, or 
perhaps opium and cocaine. So they waited tensely for the signal to 
exit. Th ey left  as soon as the commanding offi  cer gave the sign with 
his cap, baton, cloth, or whistle. Th ere was nothing left  but to climb 
up the ladder and attack. “Anyone who went through the moment of 
leaving the trenches never again had to face such danger and dread,” 
wrote one of the survivors.
Th e sight of the craters and pits, of which there were hundreds 
of thousands, stayed in the soldiers’ memories. It was estimated that 
only the Battle of Ypres in 1917 left  over a million of them on a sur-
face area of two and a half square kilometres. Craters facilitated de-
coying, hiding, and attacking, as they were safer than the trenches. 
Enemy artillery did not aim at craters, and aircraft  could not detect 
men concealed in them. Usually deep craters soon fi lled up with wa-
ter to the size of Olympic swimming pools, which did not stop them 
from being good decoys, naturally above the water table.
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3. Alpine warfare
“Almighty God, Who rulest all things, save us from the unrelenting 
cold, from the whirling blizzard, from the fall of the avalanche, and 
guide our feet to a safe place. Protect us on the crags that make the 
head reel, on the vertical rock-face, over the treacherous precipice.” 
Th at was the prayer of the Italian Alpine rifl emen. Alpine warfare, 
also referred to as mountain warfare, was essentially a type of position 
warfare, but special in that it was conducted in extreme conditions, at 
high altitudes, in a mountain landscape with numerous obstacles in 
the form of sharp peaks, sheer precipices, rapid mountain rivers, in 
a rare atmosphere and oft en at low temperatures. Another hindrance 
was the drastic temperature swing: at midday it would be hot, but by 
night at high altitudes the temperature would drop to below freezing 
point. Mountain warfare was the most bizarre, absurd, and unimagi-
nable kind of war – a war against the forces of Nature. Th e weather 
and the mountains were an additional enemy. In the upper regions 
of the mountains there were winter conditions for most of the year, 
with blizzards and snowstorms even in summer. In the highest parts 
of the mountains combat was conducted above the permanent snow 
line. Visibility in the mountains could be next to nil due to snowfalls, 
mists, or sharp sunlight. Soldiers had to learn to live with all this and 
bear in mind the risk of frostbite, avalanches, and the need to carry 
through snow tunnels kitbags weighing 30–40 kg. Th ey had to ac-
climatise to the thin air conditions, which exhausted them quickly. 
Fortunately, most of the combat was not in winter, for the snow, ice, 
and avalanches ruled it out. Th e locks of their rifl es and the barrels 
of the big guns froze up. Usually armies waited till spring to attack, 
but oft en winter conditions would surprise them during combat in 
spring or autumn. Mountain warfare called for the right equipment 
and the right personnel. In the Italian army there had been training 
for Alpine rifl emen (Alpini) since 1872. Eight regiments had been 
created by 1915. Germany had an Alpenkorps, and Austria-Hungary 
had mountain companies. Th ere were also mountain units in the 
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French, Rumanian, and Bulgarian armies. Th e men who served in 
mountain units were recruited mostly from the inhabitants of the 
highlands, qualifi ed skiers and climbers. Th ey were equipped with 
skis, ice-axes, ice grippers for their boots, hooks, ropes, and snow-
shoes. Th ey had warm uniforms with protective devices. During the 
War the belligerents ran numerous training courses for those inter-
ested in the art of Alpine war.
Th e war was conducted at higher and higher altitudes on account 
of the advantage of controlling areas overlooking valleys and lower 
summits, hence also over the heads of the enemy. A mountaineer in 
a good position armed with a machine gun on a rocky ledge could 
stop an attack of enemy infantrymen, infl icting heavy losses. He 
could pelt the enemy with barrel-shaped rolling bombs, with a fuse 
timed to go off  when it reached the enemy position. Alpine warfare 
gave defenders even more of an advantage than lowland war did, 
since virtually every attack had to be directed upwards. If both com-
bating sides were situated at the same height, they oft en engaged in 
close combat on the ledges, which were nicknamed “walls of death.” 
In the mountains trenches tended to be so close to each other that 
you could hear enemy conversations, pots and pans jangling, and 
the wounded groaning. Th ere was combat only during the daytime, 
which is hardly surprising. Fighting went on even on glaciers, such 
as in the Passo Tonale in June 1915, at an altitude of 1,895  m, on 
the Marmolada Glacier (3,243 m), in the Adamello-Presanella Alps, 
and in the Ortler Alps. Both attackers and defenders moved about 
on skis.
Th e soldiers marching up into the mountains were accompanied 
by mine-setters, engineers, miners, and prisoners-of-war. Some of 
the miners were in uniform, some wore civvies with armbands and 
a military cap. Th ey built the roads leading up to the summits. Th ey 
used explosives to clear the ground for night shelters, stores, canteens, 
hospitals, and artillery positions. Th e shelters were built of concrete 
and waterproofed with bricks, corrugated roofs and tarpaulin. Th ey 
were connected to each other by means of underground corridors 
and ventilating shaft s. Stoves were installed inside to dry the damp 
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air. Entrances to shelters would lead along winding passages to pre-
vent shrapnel and, to a certain extent, poison gas from getting inside. 
Mountain units made an eff ort to instal a  telephone network and 
electricity supply throughout the territory they held; they also set up 
alarm bells, signalling systems, and refl ectors. Th e industrial war and 
the technological race had moved up into the mountains.
Once the shelters had been built the men, equipment, artillery, 
and barbed wire had to be transported up. It was a big job for the an-
cillary services. For every man out on the front there were 5–7 work-
ing in the rear. Th e hardest task was getting a fortnight’s fuel and food 
supply up. Soldiers in the mountains had tinned food only, as there 
was no way to transport fi eld kitchens, and the use of heaters was 
the height of luxury. But occasionally the supply system failed and 
soldiers went hungry.
Bringing water supplies was not easy. Beasts of burden were used 
to transport water, carrying it in tanks fi tted into baskets. Water 
pipes were constructed to carry water over long distances, into pits 
hollowed out on the campsite. Lighter equipment and soldiers were 
hauled up on a system of cable hoists; or mules, donkeys, and horses 
laden with baskets were used for transportation. In the lower parts of 
the mountains the men marched over the newly laid roads and em-
bankments, or were transported by rail on newly built narrow-gauge 
lines and on the ordinary railway lines. Higher up they had to march 
along marked trails which could be secured with rope or steel ladders 
if required. One such trail was 3,000 m long and earned the epithet of 
“the Italian ladder to heaven.” 
Once the soldiers were up at their posts they set about the con-
struction of fi ring positions to defend themselves against enemy ar-
tillery and machine-gun fi re. Th eir hit range was longer than in the 
lowlands: sometimes pieces of rock ripped out of the mountainside 
reached targets better than artillery shells did. Building conditions 
depended on the season. Th ey were worst during the spring and 
autumn blizzards. “Th ere’s a blizzard; we take the planks and metal 
stakes to build the shacks… For cover I have sacks full of snow and 
an iron shield. In front of our ditch there is barbed wire, most of it 
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snow-covered… It’s freezing cold. We’re completely out in the open 
air,” wrote Benito Mussolini. In summer they had to build, or rather 
gouge out defences in the rock, and make use of the natural caves. 
Instead of full-fl edged trenches they dug ditches and used the de-
bris to erect a parapet in front of the ditch, reinforced with sandbags. 
But in highland conditions the force of the backdraft  from artillery 
fi re was so big that these structures proved unstable, which increased 
casualties. Another factor which made for a higher fatality rate was 
the diffi  culty of transporting the injured to the medical centres which 
were situated at lower levels. Many of the wounded died through loss 
of blood before they could receive treatment. Burying the dead was 
diffi  cult for lack of space. “Men spend whole days lying next to the 
wounded and the dead; graves, which may be quite close to defence 
positions, are being ripped open by grenades, which send decompos-
ing corpses fl ying about the place… Th e men are overwhelmed with 
disgust, lose their appetite, and cannot wash for lack of water,” one of 
the Austrian generals reported.
Th ere was a  risk of rock avalanches, and avalanches of snow in 
winter. Luckily for the soldiers, shells that fell into deep snow usu-
ally did not explode. Th e percentage of undetonated shells was con-
siderably higher than in normal conditions. But even if it did not 
detonate, a shell could start an avalanche. “Th e most terrible enemy 
was Nature herself… whole platoons were wiped out without trace, 
noiselessly, without the slightest sound except that which the gigantic 
white mass itself gives out,” an Italian Alpine rifl eman recollected. 
Th e avalanches were huge, because there were huge masses of snow 
in the Alps. Th ey were death-traps. In winter at 2,000 m the snow was 
about 5 m deep, and at 3,000 m it was 9 m deep. Avalanches carried 
away entire units, stores, fi eld hospitals, fi ring positions, and massive 
guns along with the men attending them. 150–180  thousand were 
killed on the Tyrolean front, about 60 thousand of them snatched 
away by avalanches – over twice as many as were victims of poison 
gas on the Western front. Th e most tragic memories are of the winter 
conditions that came suddenly during the autumn of 1916. Th ere was 
snow and frost alternating with thaws and avalanches. In December 
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1916 about 10 thousand men were lost on both sides through ava-
lanches. It was probably the biggest disaster of its kind on record. 
Bodies were still being brought down when the spring thaw came.
In winter most of the soldiers moved down towards the valleys. 
However some spent winter at high altitudes guarding the alarm sys-
tems and equipment, maintaining and repairing guns and rifl es. “Th e 
blizzard was so strong, and the snow so deep, that having covered 
a few score metres on foot with the utmost diffi  culty, as the muscles 
in my shins had been stretched to the point of exhaustion, I tried 
to go on on my knees, but I couldn’t manage even that. For three 
days we were completely cut off  from civilisation,” Polish General Jan 
Romer recalled. Th e bad experience of avalanches made the belli-
gerents develop their rescue services and employ meteorologists and 
geologists to forecast the times and directions of avalanches. Special 
anti-avalanche barriers were built, or at least attempts were made to 
build them, as they were not very eff ective. In summer storms were 
dangerous, for even small pieces of metal could attract thunderbolts. 
During storms soldiers would put down their weapons and pick-
axes, take off  their helmets, leave steel shelters, abandon metal lad-
ders and telephone cables. Th under hitting rocks could kill or maim, 
and some who fl ed in panic, fell into precipices or ice cracks. Th e 
storms came with hurricane-like winds which swept up campsites 
and demolished wooden huts.
Once the men were in their positions, the guns were installed, 
usually on ledges prepared by the mine-setters and engineers. Th e 
parts of the guns, which had been brought up on ropes and hoists, 
had to be assembled. Some guns had armoured domes set up above 
for protection against enemy artillery. It took a few days to instal the 
guns, not always successfully. Sometimes this could be done only at 
night, though that did not make it safe, as the enemy lit up the rock 
face with refl ector beams and rockets, which did not make the job 
easier. Many a soldier was killed, many a gun fell into a ravine. De-
spite the diffi  culties both sides scored successes. Th e Italians were 
happy when they managed to set up six guns on the Tofana di Fuori 
peak (3,237  m); and the Austrians were even happier when they 
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managed to pull a 149 mm calibre gun up to the top of Mount Ortler 
(3,905 m). 600 men had worked on the job. It was the wartime re-
cord. Th e heavy 240 mm and 280 mm mortars were not brought up 
to such heights. Th e high trajectories of their shells made it possible 
for them to be deployed from the valleys and still hit targets high up 
in the mountains. Gun positions were protected by barbed wire, con-
crete, and steel obstacles.
Oft en the miners and engineers dug tunnels under enemy lines 
to blow them up. Th e Alpine tunnels were 80 cm wide and up to 
180 cm deep – narrower and lower than their lowland counterparts. 
A  maximum of 30–50 cm could be dug a  day, using simple tools 
such as pickaxes and drills, as using drilling machines which gave off  
harmful gases would have been dangerous. Th ere were teams trying 
to locate enemy digging. Th ere were cases of enemy tunnel-diggers 
meeting. When this happened, they engaged in close combat, using 
mining equipment and revolvers, aft er which the old tunnels would 
be plugged up and new ones dug. In July 1916 Italian mine-setters 
made a shaft  under Mount Batognica, but the Austrians managed to 
get through to the chamber in which the Italians had deposited two 
tonnes of explosives ready to be detonated, and cut the detonating 
wires at the last moment. However, a  few months later the Italians 
managed to detonate four huge mines, bringing down the summit 
by a  few metres. Whenever the dull sound of digging and hacking 
stopped, you knew that the explosives were ready to be detonated. In 
April 1916 the Italians blasted off  part of the peak of Col di Lana near 
the well-known skiing resort Cortina d’Ampezzo. 200 enemy soldiers 
were killed, but the Austrians remained in control of the valley. Th e 
Italians named Col di Lana the blood mountain, because they had 
attempted to storm it 97 times. In March 1918 the Austrians blew up 
an Italian unit near Trent by detonating 55 tonnes of explosives. 
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4. The winter wars
On the lowlands combat continued in winter as well, though not 
as intensively as in other seasons, and eff ectively petered out on many 
fronts and sections. Some campaigns started in the very early spring, 
although oft en sleet and snow made action diffi  cult. In general, win-
ter off ensives ended in failure, for example the off ensive of the Rus-
sian Carpathian army against Austro-Hungarian forces, which was 
conducted in January – March 1915. Th e Russian command de-
cided to launch an off ensive even though their men were not ready 
for a winter war. Th ey were not equipped with winter gear in time 
and were still in their worn summer uniforms, which aff orded no 
protection against the cold. “I was being overcome by an absolutely 
intoxicating drowsiness and warmth, even though the temperature 
was well below freezing point.” Th is was the eff ect of exposure to the 
severe cold. Soldiers were suff ering from frostbite and literally freez-
ing to death. General Vladimir Sukhomlinov, the Russian minister 
of war, thought the campaign unfortunate and absurd, an example 
of disregard for the soldiers and lack of consideration of likely losses. 
Th e Russian supply system failed. Russian soldiers were quite glad to 
surrender, in the hope that they would fed and given warm condi-
tions. But neither were the Austro-Hungarian soldiers prepared for 
a  winter war, since their planners had forecast the war would end 
before the onset of winter. As a result both sides together are esti-
mated to have lost about 800 thousand men in the space of a few win-
ter months. Th e Russians sustained greater losses and were deemed 
defeated. Th e chief factor determining the magnitude of losses was 
the eff ectiveness of logistic planning for action under extreme con-
ditions, since “no artillery fi re could have broken our resistance as 
totally as the damp, the cold, and the freezing conditions did,” one of 
the Austrian soldiers wrote. Still in March night temperatures went 
down to minus 200C. “On 1st March there was fog and a snowstorm, 
ruling out any kind of orientation whatsoever. Whole regiments went 
astray, and as a result losses were huge. For weeks on end on the en-
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tire area of combat and in the quarters no-one changed their clothes, 
which for many became a stiff  coat of ice adhering to their body… It 
was white hell,” wrote the Austrian Colonel Georg Veitl. 
Another action which failed owing to winter conditions was the 
Austro-Hungarian expedition sent to relieve the besieged fortress 
of Przemyśl. It was beaten by temperatures going down to minus 
300C at night. “Th e temperature was so low that when by accident 
I touched a steel telescope stand with my bare hand, a whole patch 
of skin came off . I saw that whenever a soldier stopped for a rest or 
could not go on because of a wound, aft er a half-hour at most of im-
mobility he would freeze to death before our very eyes,” one of the 
soldiers recollected. In the next years there was combat in winter, 
too, with similar problems and little eff ect apart from human loss-
es. But the winter of 1915/1916 was hot for the Balkans, when the 
Central Powers launched an off ensive against Serbia. It was the fi nal 
part of the campaign, terminal for Serbia. Photographs of King Peter 
of Serbia on a peasant’s cart pulled by oxen, and later on a peasant’s 
sleigh, have gone down in history. Th e heroic winter passage over 
the mountains of Serbia and Albania made a  lasting record in the 
national memory of the Serbs.
Th e winter of 1914/1915 impaired the Turkish off ensive against 
Russia. Temperatures went down to minus 260C.  Th e Turks had 
planned for a quick victory, and hence did not equip their forces for 
a winter campaign. Th ey issued food rations for four days; however, 
not only did the soldiers not get a suffi  cient quantity of warm cloth-
ing and tents, but in addition the Turkish Commander-in-Chief En-
ver Pasha ordered them to leave their winter overcoats and kitbags in 
the base camp so they could march faster. As a result thousands froze 
or starved to death, also because it was hard to light up campfi res in 
winter conditions. Overall more Turkish soldiers froze to death than 
were killed by enemy fi re.
Problem number one in the winter wars was transport. Owing to 
diffi  culties created by natural conditions, the heavy guns oft en had to 
be left  behind. Horses were used to transport lighter guns and ma-
chine guns; while horse-drawn carts were fi tted out with runners and 
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turned into sleighs to carry equipment, supplies and food provisions. 
Since army regulations did not envisage winter camoufl aging, sol-
diers had to use their own initiative for ways to survive. Th e more 
ingenious sort put white sheets on their uniforms. It was not until 
the bad experience of the winter of 1914/1915 that armies started to 
issue skis, white camoufl aging capes, warm clothing, woollen socks, 
warm vests and kaft ans. In addition soldiers insulated their uniforms 
with layers of newspapers. But it was not enough whenever combat 
went on for many weeks. When temperatures slumped tea and coff ee, 
and even wine froze up within minutes, and not surprisingly peo-
ple were reluctant to play the war game. It was hard to keep fi ghting 
when your bread, tinned food, and sausages turned into lumps of 
ice. “Before you can get to the drink you have to break the layer of 
ice, your meat and potatoes are frozen stiff , and even hand-grenades 
are all lumped together. Nice weather for polar bears,” were the com-
ments. Quite understandably the general atmosphere could not have 
been good. Th ere was widespread apathy, which inevitably aff ected 
the outcome of action. Generals who had a better knowledge of their 
men ordered a rest and promised they would start up in spring, when 
the sun came out and the grass was green. “Th at’s when life is full of 
delight. Like a picnic. You stroll along the trenches, the air’s brisk and 
the sun’s shining brightly,” one soldier noted. 
Winters were so cold that the lubricating grease in their guns froze 
solid. Th e quartermasters’ services had the hardest job. It was their 
toughest test, which they failed as a matter of course, since it was im-
possible to pass it. In winter digging trenches was hardly imaginable, 
and sleeping in them was preposterous. Many of those who managed 
to fall asleep never woke up. Th e long winter nights aggravated the 
suff ering, pain, fear, and dread. Th ose in the trenches only thought 
of how not to succumb to the cold and prayed that the enemy would 
attack at last, or that they would be sent out into combat.
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5. Landing operations
Th e landing operations associated with covering distances by sea, 
land, and air, and carried out jointly by naval, infantry, and (to a mod-
est extent) air forces, constituted a special kind of warfare. Landing op-
erations usually led to trench war. Th is was true of the biggest landing 
operation, in the Dardanelles, co-ordinated with the landing of Allied 
troops in Gallipoli. Th e Royal Marines, a British special unit for land-
ing tasks created in August 1914 and composed chiefl y of sailors, took 
part in the operation. Like other divisions, the Royal Marines were 
transported to the destination on amphibious assault carriers escorted 
by a fl eet of anti-torpedo monitor vessels. Monitors characterised by 
their shallow draught and good armour plating were ideal for such 
tasks. Minesweepers also participated in the operation. Th e defeat in 
the Dardanelles and Gallipoli made the Allies withdraw from conduct-
ing a couple of similar operations which had been planned. Th is was 
also due to an insuffi  cient number of ships, amphibs, and units like the 
Royal Marines. Th e British project to construct amphibs failed – the 
Admiralty found the drawing board designs unsatisfactory.
Far more operations were planned than carried out. Th e idea of 
a landing operation in the Dardanelles won the day over a plan for 
a Baltic landing operation which was to lead to Allied control of the 
Danish straits by a combined British and Russian naval force. It was 
associated with a  completely unrealistic plan for Russian forces to 
land in Pomerania and quickly march for Berlin. Another operation 
which never materialised was a British landing at Ostend in Belgium 
to disrupt German U-boat movements and to land British troops in 
the region of the Kiel Canal. If successful it could have changed the 
nature of the war, opening up a new front. Winston Churchill won-
dered whether the only option for British forces was shift ing barbed 
wire in Flanders, and answered the question for himself with the idea 
to land troops on the German coast. But the madcap concept was 
rejected at the preliminary stage. Th e Italian chief-of-staff  considered 
the idea of a  landing in the region of Trieste and Fiume, but there 
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were neither the material means nor the enterprise to try it. It was 
decided that the losses would be vast, with little prospect of success. 
Another major landing operation, albeit not on a  comparable 
scale with the Dardanelles in terms of forces involved or conse-
quences, was carried out by the Germans landing troops in the Bay 
of Riga. Code-named Operation Albion, its aim was to gain control 
of the ports and islands and was conducted on 12th–21st October 
1917. Tens of thousands of German soldiers and sailors, as well as 
100 aircraft , took part. Th e Germans destroyed the extensive barrier 
of naval mines and the Russian batteries, and sank a number of ships. 
It was an exceptionally opportune time for an assault, as the Russian 
forces were dispersed and demoralised, and their units were under 
the command of representatives of soldiers’ revolutionary commit-
tees. Within just a few days the attackers took four islands including 
the strategic Oesel and Moon, sustaining a minimum of loss. Th ey 
dubbed their success a blitzkrieg.
Other landing operations were not as complex as these two. Th e 
fi rst chronologically was the landing of British ground forces on 
the French coast in August 1914. It went smoothly and according 
to plan, since it was on Allied soil and the German navy was not 
interfering. Another unobstructed landing took place in November 
1914, of a British and Indian force in the Basra region off  the Per-
sian Gulf. Th ere were no Turkish forces in the area to impede a suc-
cessful landing. Another successful landing, by a small Russian force 
on the Persian coast, took place in September 1915. Th e plan was 
to launch an attack on the Turks, but its outcome was not success-
ful. Fully successful landings were accomplished by the French in 
the Levant in October 1918, when the Turkish army was already in 
a state of disintegration. Th e objective was to give France control of 
the region, which they hoped to annex. Towards the end of the war 
the American William Mitchell, supported by Commander-in-Chief 
John Pershing, put forward a plan to land a division and its weapons 
and equipment by air in Belgium. In view of the shortage of aircraft  
the operation was postponed to the spring of 1919. Th e idea itself was 
a harbinger of the air operations of World War Two.
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6. The war of the secret services
It was generally realised that the outcome of any war, and par-
ticularly a world war, depended on the use of a variety of means and 
types of services. Important tasks were assigned to the secret servic-
es, intelligence and counter-intelligence, including the collection of 
information on the enemy’s forces and his potential, disinformation 
activities, and countering enemy intelligence.
To obtain the information they needed on the enemy, all the bel-
ligerents availed themselves of the services of deserters and gleaned 
knowledge from prisoners-of-war, who were interrogated, but also had 
bugging devices recording their conversations. In 1916–1918 61% of 
the information the British secret services obtained on the move-
ment of enemy forces came from interrogating prisoners-of-war and 
deserters, and 18% came from procured documents. Th e use of radio 
bugging was widespread; telegrams were intercepted; the movement 
of forces was observed from immobilised balloons and from aircraft ; 
and homing pigeons were used. If it did not perish, a pigeon might 
have carried 50–60 thousand messages in the course of the war. But 
the adversary was vigilant and undertaking countermeasures, dam-
aging balloons, shooting down aircraft , training hawks to deal with 
pigeons and harassing pigeon owners. Th ere is a list of names of pi-
geon owners executed by the Germans for helping the Belgian resist-
ance with communication. Th e belligerent countries went as far as to 
issue pigeon licences. Th e Austro-Hungarian authorities bought pi-
geons from breeders, paying 1 crown for a bird. Th e French made the 
best use of pigeons; they recruited 130 thousand birds, 20 thousand 
of which perished. Th e Germans had even more – nearly 300 thou-
sand. Aft er the war a monument of a wounded pigeon was put up 
in Lille, in honour of the pigeon who carried the last message from 
Fort Vaux during the Battle of Verdun. He arrived at his destination 
and died of poison gas. Th e French decorated him with the Legion 
of Honour and had him stuff ed. In October 1918 another famous 
pigeon, in American service, dispatched information from besieged 
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American forces despite being wounded. He was given a posthumous 
distinction, stuff ed, and sent to Washington.
Important information was obtained thanks to the work of cryp-
tographers to break the enemy’s codes. Th roughout the war cryp-
tographers in the service of belligerent countries vied with each 
other over the encryption and decryption of each other’s messages: 
some strove to design the ultimate code, others to break it. And it 
was certainly not a marginal issue. Th e fact that the British discov-
ered the contents of German telegrams had a decisive impact on the 
United States’ decision to enter the war. Th anks to having cracked 
the Italian codes, Germany and Austria-Hungary scored a brilliant 
victory at Caporetto. “Th e enemy knew all our codes, even the most 
secret ones,” the Italian generals admitted helplessly. Austrian cryp-
tographers could read strictly confi dential Italian plans like a chil-
dren’s book. At the beginning of the war Russian intelligence saved 
its fi ft h army thanks to one of its offi  cers disguised in an Austrian 
uniform providing false information to the command of one of the 
Austro-Hungarian armies. Th e best cryptographers were in British 
service. Th ey were able to crack virtually any code, including the 
most secret ones, and learned in advance of the enemy’s intentions 
and potential.
Th anks to codes, important messages could be sent via newspa-
pers. Both belligerent parties were aware of this, and their secret ser-
vices assiduously went through all the classifi ed ads in the papers as 
well as soldiers’ letters. Even apparently innocent weather forecasts 
and matrimonial off ers could be encoded. “Swiss man, 35, perfect at 
book-keeping and correspondence, working for a year in a manage-
rial post in Vienna, excellent references” turned out to mean that the 
Austrian 35th infantry division was going to leave for Italy (“Swiss 
man” stood for “heading for Italy”), while “managerial post in Vi-
enna” meant the observer’s location. If there was no other way of 
getting a message across, agents would carry it just as in the fi lms and 
crime stories – in the heels of their shoes, inside watches, in suitcases 
with a false bottom, in wigs, umbrellas, ladies’ gloves, in suit collars, 
under the lining of a hat, or in texts written in an invisible ink. Th ey 
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also carried microfi lms made with cameras reminiscent of a watch. 
Th e microfi lms could be amplifi ed thirtyfold.
Another important task for the secret services was the surveil-
lance of communities regarded as hostile or disloyal, and individuals 
suspected of working for the enemy. Lists of persons suspected of 
treachery had been drawn up even before the war started. When it 
broke out, some of those suspected of espionage were imprisoned or 
ordered not to leave their place of residence. In Russia individuals 
from the German minority or with German-sounding names were 
dismissed from the army and administrative posts. A ban was put on 
the use of German in public places. Th e change of name of the capital 
city, from “St. Petersburg” to the more homely “Petrograd,” which 
took place on 31st August 1914, was symptomatic of the anti-Ger-
man obsession on the tide of patriotic feelings. Some Germans, who 
were Russian citizens, were deported to Germany and their property 
was confi scated, while larger numbers were interned and sent into 
distant parts of the Russian Empire. On several occasions the au-
thorities encouraged mobs to conduct pogroms, devastate German 
houses, shops, workshops, and factories. To save themselves from 
deportation and protect the family fortune accumulated over many 
generations, many Germans changed their name, adopting a Russian 
surname and converting from Lutheran Protestantism to the Rus-
sian Orthodox religion. Another large group of suspected persons 
were Jews, many of whom were indeed quite willing to work for the 
Central Powers as they hated tsarist Russia, which was notorious for 
pogroms of Jews and atrocities against them. Many of the Jews in 
Russia considered espionage on behalf of Germany respectable and 
rational. In Austria-Hungary the list of suspects included Russophile 
Ruthenians from East Galicia and the Bukovina, and later on Italians 
and Rumanians. Th e Austrian authorities were diffi  dent about the 
loyalty of the Czechs and Poles, and kept an eye on them. In Ger-
many the suspected groups were the Poles and the Francophone in-
habitants of Alsace and Lorraine. Additional security measures were 
taken against them, curtailing their activities and personal freedoms. 
Th e Italian secret services kept pacifi sts and left -wing groups under 
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surveillance, arresting some of them already in the fi rst days of the 
war. In Turkey the non-Turkish communities were under suspicion, 
especially the Christians. Already in the opening days of the war nu-
merous Greeks and Armenians, and smaller numbers of Jews and 
Arabs were arrested.
Citizens of foreign countries who happened to be on enemy terri-
tory when hostilities began found themselves in a diffi  cult position. 
Every one of them was treated as a potential spy. Usually no eff ort 
was made to verify such suspicions and all, or almost all citizens of 
enemy countries were told to leave, though there were exceptions. 
Some were interned and subsequently deported. Britain pursued the 
most liberal policy. When the war broke out, there were 35 thousand 
German and a  few thousand Austro-Hungarian citizens on British 
territory. For the secret services they were suspects; they were put 
under surveillance and subjected to repressive measures, but not 
listed for deportation. Nonetheless all citizens of enemy states had to 
register and as of October 1914 they could not change their surname. 
But there were exceptions to the rule. A sign of the atmosphere of 
war came in 1917, when the royal family changed its German name 
to the English name Windsor, which it still has today. 
Repressive measures against citizens of enemy states were also 
undertaken in immigration countries such as the British dominions 
and the USA. In Australia persons of German origin were put un-
der surveillance; later they were deprived of the right to vote, and 
3,500 were interned. Australian newspapers disseminated allegedly 
reliable information that German settlers in Australia were working 
for the German intelligence service. Th e Australian authorities want-
ed to incite hatred of Germans and encourage Australians to join in 
the war. Similar measures were adopted in New Zealand and Canada; 
in the latter several hundred Germans and smaller groups of Ukrain-
ians and Hungarians were arrested. 
Th ings were no diff erent in the USA. Nearly half the states banned 
the use of German in public, including the teaching of German in 
schools. Bars and restaurants had to remove “Frankfurter sausages” 
from their menus and replace them with “Liberty sausages,” which 
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were exactly the same product. German shepherd dogs met with 
reprisals, too: they were deprived of their hitherto name. Ameri-
cans with German roots became an object of special attention for 
the secret services. Th ey were accused of defeatism and espionage, 
and made to kiss the Stars and Stripes in public to prove their loy-
alty. Th ere were lynchings. Th ese activities were to make the war, 
which many Americans found strange and hard to understand, more 
popular and motivate them to take action. Th e American Protective 
League, which had a membership of a quarter of a million, played 
a signal role in the hunt for enemies.
In belligerent countries there were reprisals on works of art by 
citizens of hostile nations. At the request of the secret services the 
bookshop sale of the literary works of an enemy country could be 
suppressed, and copies withdrawn from lending facilities in public 
libraries. Th e works of Victor Hugo and Emile Zola were banned in 
Germany, and the works of Goethe and Hegel in France. Citizens’ 
organisations appealed for a  ban on the performance of music by 
composers from enemy countries, theatre productions of plays by 
dramatists from enemy states, and discouraged the reading of liter-
ary works by writers from hostile nations.
Citizens’ organisations were oft en the initiators of spy-hunting 
projects, which turned into a symbol of mass war psychosis. Th e in-
habitants of Europe, hitherto quiet citizens, succumbed to an obses-
sion with spies, and called upon their authorities to intern all for-
eigners as potential or actual spies. Th ere was no limit to the fantasies 
conjured up on the ubiquity of spies. People kept an eye on suspects, 
watching how they opened and closed their windows, whether they 
were not sending light signals. Apparently there were spies lurking at 
every street corner and virtually under every bed. Many an innocent 
individual was killed or arrested merely on the grounds of a denun-
ciation. Th e military, which had no qualms about severe retribution 
and was quick to hang suspects, received strong civilian support. Th e 
Germans in occupied Belgium, and the Austrians and Hungarians in 
Galicia and the Bukovina became notorious for excessive severity. In 
the latter case the Emperor Franz Joseph intervened. On 17th Septem-
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ber 1914 he issued a declaration that he did not want unwarranted 
arrests to push loyal subjects in a direction that was dangerous for 
Austria-Hungary.
Work had been going on since before the war to build up such 
an atmosphere. Newspapers and political commentators had been 
warning readers of alien infi ltration and reporting arrests; literary 
fi ction was full of spy stories. Journalists and novelists refl ected the 
paranoid fear of foreign espionage, while at the same time endorsing 
it as a genuine threat. William Le Queux’s renowned novel Th e Inva-
sion of 1910 tells the story of an invasion of the British Isles prepared 
by a host of German spies. In France books by Léon Daudet worked 
the same eff ect, which earned the epithet of “spy mania” for itself. In 
August 1914 millions of Frenchmen were led to believe that post-
ers advertising a well-known soup concentrate contained important 
secret information for Germany. A factor which contributed to this 
climate were the soldiers’ magazines warning against spies and post-
ers put up in barracks reading “Beware of spies!”
Citizens of neutral countries were put under special police surveil-
lance. Th e police were well aware that many a Spaniard, Dutchman, 
or Swede had been recruited by belligerent states. As citizens of neu-
tral countries they had unrestricted passage all over Europe working 
as company representatives. Some of the diplomats employed in the 
embassies, legations, and military or commercial attaché offi  ces of 
neutral countries had also been recruited. Th e secret services tried to 
control their correspondence. 
Neutral countries were a good base for the activities of belliger-
ent countries’ agents, whose task was to get the government of the 
neutral state to join their side of the war, or at least to pursue a policy 
of friendly neutrality. Th eir second job was to collect data on their 
host country’s economic and commercial relations with enemy states. 
Th irdly, they were to infi ltrate enemy spy networks. Th e best loca-
tion for such activities, traditionally the meeting-place for all sorts 
of rival intelligence organisations, was Switzerland. It was the ideal 
place for starting up spy aff airs, the headquarters of international es-
pionage. Th e chief belligerents availed themselves of the services of 
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Swiss politicians and agents (at a price, of course). Another good place 
for agents was Spain. Under the cover of a Spanish company German 
agents published two pacifi st magazines in French, La Paix and La 
Vérité, which were smuggled across the Pyrenees. Both sides’ agents 
observed shipping movements in Spanish ports and Spain’s exports 
and re-exports; they kept a  lookout for submarines entering Span-
ish ports, and paid the local press and journalists to infl uence public 
opinion. German agents like the promising young intelligence offi  cer 
Wilhelm Canaris were supplying arms to Moroccan insurgents fi ght-
ing against French forces. In Holland British agents were particularly 
active, under cover of bogus shipping companies in Rotterdam and 
other places. In the USA Franz von Papen, then German military at-
taché and future Chancellor of the Weimar Republic, pursued par-
ticularly intensive and ingenious espionage activities.
To make things more diffi  cult for spies in belligerent countries, 
soldiers’ and prisoners’-of-war letters, and telegrams and telegraphs 
were censored. Th e Germans, Austrians, and Russians had been 
censoring correspondence already before the war, setting up “black 
offi  ces” – discreet workplaces in post-offi  ces, where postal employ-
ees supervised by counter-intelligence men opened and read letters 
arriving from abroad. During the war in Vienna secret service staff  
checked half a million letters a month, and up to quarter of a mil-
lion in Budapest. By the end of 1917 ten and a half million telegrams 
had been inspected in Austria-Hungary, of which 43 thousand had 
been detained for a closer review, and 1,375 handed over to the po-
lice for an investigation. To carry out the task, the authorities needed 
a large group of linguists, so the armies established schools to train 
translators. By the spring of 1918 only on their Italian front the 
Austro-Hungarian forces were employing 220 offi  cers and 1,000 pri-
vate soldiers for language services. Naturally, they could only con-
trol a certain percentage of all the mail. In 1916 Britain’s Royal Mail 
handled 12.5 million letters a week; 2 billion items passed through 
the German Feldpost service in the course of the war. Passports were 
made obligatory on all border crossing points; and eff orts were made 
to limit travellers’ movements as much as possible by introducing 
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rigid controls. Travellers had to have special permits authorising 
them to travel. 
Another important task for the secret services was subversion and 
sabotage. Saboteurs destroyed, or tried to destroy warehouses, ships 
in ports, and telegraph lines; they disrupted the work of munitions 
factories, set fi re to factories and warehouses, damaged locomotives, 
spread livestock diseases, and poisoned wells. Both groups of Italian, 
and their adversary Austro-Hungarian saboteurs worked effi  ciently 
in the Adriatic ports, attacking naval and merchant vessels in dock. 
In 1915 the Benedetto Brin, an Italian battleship, was scuttled by 
Austro-Hungarian saboteurs. A sabotage network consisting of Ger-
man and Irish dockers set fi re to ships in American ports ready to 
sail with military equipment to Europe. German saboteurs in Britain 
and the USA organised strikes in ports and dockyards, set up pacifi st 
organisations, and destroyed installations in power stations and oil 
depots. One of the most spectacular sabotage operations was carried 
out by a British team at Ploieşti in Rumania. Th ey destroyed storage 
tanks containing 800 thousand tonnes of oil to prevent it from get-
ting into German hands. Subversion and sabotage were becoming 
more and more important, and colleges were set up to train sabo-
teurs, especially in the art of mine-setting.
Th e agents of belligerent states reached Poles, Czechs, Croats, 
Serbs, Irishmen, Finns, Lithuanians, Ukrainians, Indians, Persians, 
and Arabs, in attempts to instigate local uprisings against the incum-
bent state. Th ey also worked among their enemies, trying to diminish 
their will to resist and showing how pointless it was to continue fi ght-
ing. A special task was attributed to internationalist revolutionaries. 
Th e Allies were counting on German Communists in Germany and 
Austria, and the Germans on the Russian Bolsheviks.
Working for the secret service was dangerous, a kind of adventure 
sport. Agents risked their lives. If arrested they ended up in jail or on 
the gallows, only rarely were they exchanged for agents from the op-
posite side. When Carl Hans Lody, fi rst on the list of German spies 
held in London, was executed by fi ring squad in the Tower of London, 
they knew that there would be no mercy. During the spy hysteria of 
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the fi rst months of the war large numbers of real and presumed spies 
were arrested, and there was a similarly large number of convictions. 
By the end of 1915 the Viennese police had conducted 1,479 searches 
in the houses of persons suspected of contact with the enemy and 
arrested 1,069 persons charged with sedition, including 185 charged 
with espionage. Th e Hungarian police instigated inquiries against 
2,000 persons suspected of spying, of whom 1,506 were arrested, 5 
interned, and 20 deported – all before the end of 1915. During the 
whole of the war the Germans arrested 1,200 real or presumed Brit-
ish agents, 120 of whom were shot by fi ring squad. Most of the arrests 
occurred in the fi rst year of the war. Th e Russians were proud of their 
spy-catching successes. Still in the autumn of 1914  they discovered 
a spy ring working for Germany, which had probably been set up be-
fore the war. It was allegedly headed by Sergey Myasoyedov, a lieuten-
ant colonel of the gendarmerie and head of intelligence in the Rus-
sian 10th Army which the Germans had easily crushed. Myasoyedov 
was a handy scapegoat turning attention away from those responsible 
for the Russian defeat in East Prussia. He was arrested, sentenced to 
death, and executed in Warsaw on 10th March 1915. 
But as time went on there were fewer arrests of spies. Th e anti-spy 
hysteria petered out aft er the fi rst few weeks. And spies learned not to 
leave tell-tale signs of their activities, perfecting the art of conspiracy 
and caution. Th ey achieved better results at a cost of fewer losses. In 
1915 197 sentences were passed for espionage in Austria-Hungary, 
but only 12 in 1918. Nonetheless persons suspected of spying con-
tinued to be arrested and punished until the end of the war. Even on 
10th November 1918 four German spies in American uniforms were 
executed.
Repressive measures had been employed against spies even before 
the war. Undoubtedly, the most serious case in the history of counter-
espionage activities occurred in May 1913, and involved Colonel 
Alfred Victor Redl, chief-of-staff  of the 8th Corps of the Austro-
Hungarian army stationed in Prague, who turned out to be spying for 
Russia and France under the pseudonym Nikon Nizetas, transmitting 
strictly confi dential material. Redl was discovered. An inquiry was 
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conducted by Captain Maximilian Ronge. It turned out that he had 
been operating on his own. He was left  in his room with a  loaded 
revolver to end the aff air on his own. Th e Emperor took it badly, 
unable to come to terms with such an aff air happening in his army. 
Th e Redl aff air undermined relations between Vienna and Berlin for 
a time. However, confi dence was restored, Vienna resumed close co-
operation with Berlin, and intelligence and counter-intelligence was 
modernised and developed. Redl was a homosexual who followed an 
adventure-packed lifestyle and needed much more money to main-
tain his numerous lovers than his earnings provided. France and 
Russia decided jointly to foot his bills. Love letters to his male lovers 
were found in his room, along with a large collection of ladies’ under-
wear, which he put on for dates. Redl’s sexual orientation reinforced 
the belief that homosexuals were more likely to become traitors and 
therefore were not suitable for work in the secret services. Th e fact 
that the Austrian authorities wanted to focus on Redl’s sexual orien-
tation rather than on the documents he passed on also underpinned 
this belief. Redl’s story has fascinated writers, journalists and fi lm-
makers. In 1984 the Austrian actor Klaus Maria Brandauer played 
Redl in a  fi lm, and the well-known Austrian writer Stefan Zweig 
mentioned him in his book Die Welt von Gestern (English transla-
tion: Th e World of Yesterday). 
One of the tasks agents were expected to perform was to control 
popular newspapers by paying them to disseminate defeatism and 
a  sense of moral disarmament among readers. However, infi ltrated 
newspapers soon became exposed, as their adulterated contents 
would be quickly noticed by both secret services and readers, who 
boycotted such papers. One example was the French paper Le Journal, 
bought up by undercover German agents with the support of Louis 
Tourmel, a French parliamentary deputy who had his right to immu-
nity revoked and was arrested in 1916. He died in prison in January 
1919, a year aft er the execution of Paul Bolo Pasha, the Lyon journal-
ist who had bought up Le Journal with money advanced by Deutsche 
Bank. Th e German secret services also fi nanced the defeatist Le Bon-
net Rouge, which was soon exposed. Its chief editor died in jail in un-
77
clear circumstances. Louis Malvy, the French minister of internal af-
fairs, who had been his protector, was in trouble. However, the French 
parliament did not consider him guilty of treason. Nonetheless he lost 
his parliamentary immunity and was sentenced to 5 years’ deporta-
tion. In January 1918 there was another arrest: of the former prime 
minister Joseph Caillaux, a defeatist and supporter of a quick peace 
with Germany who had voiced his opposition to Georges Clem-
enceau’s policy. Yet another journalist who did harm to the French 
cause, this time on a fairly minor scale, was Ernest Judet, chief editor 
of the Parisian newspaper L’Eclair. Th e Allies attempted to take over 
German newspapers, too, but they were not successful and eventually 
acknowledged that it was too risky and not very eff ective. However, 
they did purchase the sympathy of individual journalists.
Women played an active part in the secret war, although they 
never accounted for more than 10% of all the agents of the belliger-
ent countries. Although few in number, nonetheless they were in-
valuable in view of the tasks they were required to perform, and also 
because they rarely came under suspicion. One of the top German 
agents was Klara Benedix. Th ere were networks with a  more than 
average female membership, such as the Belgian La Dame Blanche 
which co-operated with British intelligence, where women made up 
1/3 of the agents. Another spy ring with a high ratio of women was 
a Jewish network operating for the British in Palestine and known as 
NILI (a Jewish name, an acronym for the Hebrew phrase “Th e Glory 
of Israel will not lie”, 1 Samuel 15:29).
Th e most famous and certainly the most beautiful agent of the 
Great War was Margaretha Geertruida Zelle, Mata Hari (“Th e Eye 
of the Day”). On 12th February 1917 she was arrested by the French 
and executed at Vincennes on 15th October, but it has never been 
proved whether she was an agent, or maybe a  double agent. Did 
she work only for the Germans under the cryptonym H21, or did 
she also work for the French? She was 41 when she died. She was 
a dancer and courtesan, and she seduced men with her fl imsy, ex-
travagant costume, her sex appeal and erudition. Enamoured French 
offi  cers passed on information to her, which she then transmitted to 
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Germany. Her legend has been kept alive thanks to numerous fi lms 
and novels, and is still regarded as the prototype female secret agent 
gathering information in bed. In reality she was more of an adventur-
ess in pursuit of sensational experiences and treating her job more 
like a game, rather than a professional spy. She did not understand 
the mechanisms of out-and-out war. In 1916 the career of Gabrielle 
Petit, a fi rst-rate Belgian and British agent, came to the same end. She 
was executed by the Germans. Gender was no advantage in the event 
of exposure and arrest. But the work and fate of female agents went 
counter to the stereotypical image of women and contributed to an 
increase in their status with the male part of society.
7. Psychological warfare
Propaganda was an active participant of the world confl ict. Hans 
Th ieme, an eminent legal historian, dubbed war propaganda “the 
world war without weapons.” It was to help win the victory. It was hard 
for the recipients of propaganda to fi gure out what was true and what 
was false, if oft en the truth was represented as false and falsehood 
presented as true. In 1914 the belligerents realised that to win the war 
it was necessary to manipulate public opinion, although their propa-
ganda machines were not yet ready to operate on the scale expected 
of them. Th ey were only growing and experiencing growing pains in 
order to become more profi cient. Today it is hard to estimate their ef-
fectiveness, because we have no instrument to measure this, but we do 
know that since money was continually being put into propaganda, it 
must have been appreciated. Th e respective propaganda apparatuses 
played a salient role especially in the last year and a half of the war, 
mobilising their societies and soldiers, supporting the shared values 
and national unity, reinforcing the will to keep fi ghting “for the good 
cause,” which was the moral duty of all the citizens.
Depending on the nature and aim of its operations, and its ad-
dressees, propaganda used a variety of instruments: leafl ets, news-
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papers, posters. It also availed itself of fi lms and theatre plays, pup-
pet shows, and open-air performances. In the psychological war the 
crucial factors were the word and the image, and in America music 
and movement as well. Th e American supporters of the USA’s en-
try into war against Germany oft en organised street events with jazz 
bands, singing and dancing, alongside slogan-chanting. Sometimes 
they were attended by stars like Charlie Chaplin.
Rumour was an important ingredient. Th e ban on information 
spawned favourable conditions for ubiquitous gossiping. Some of the 
stories were spontaneous, others nurtured by the authorities. Hungry 
for news, people were prepared to believe anything. Stories heard on 
the grapevine triggered strong emotions and impacted on the imagi-
nation, which made them the source of visions completely divorced 
from the realities of war. Th ey made the world a product of the imag-
ination. One of the tales that circulated said that at night the Gurkhas 
and Sikhs serving in the British forces crept into enemy trenches, 
slit German throats and drank the blood. Th e Senegalese were rather 
similar, supposedly: since they were said to be cannibals they de-
voured their victims’ bodies. Th e Germans were no better, they were 
monsters and perverts, who apparently crushed the heads of French 
and Belgian babies with their heels and then turned the bodies into 
soap, grease, oil, or pigswill. Some swore they had seen Germans cru-
cifying Canadian prisoners-of-war, the Kaiser personally torturing 
small children, and his son arrested and imprisoned in the Tower of 
London. Others had seen Russians who had sailed from Archangel in 
1914 and arrived in Scotland, whence “in their snow-covered boots” 
they trudged to the Western front. Th is piece of blather got a place 
in the London papers, which made it look credible enough for Ger-
man intelligence in London to send home information “from reliable 
sources” that there were Russian units in Scotland. News of Russians 
fi ghting on the Western front went round in France, too.
Th e British created the most eff ective propaganda machine. Th ey 
were the fi rst to establish a central offi  ce for psychological warfare 
featuring the editors-in-chief of the main British newspapers and il-
lustrated magazines. It was in Britain that the fi rst ministry of propa-
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ganda was set up, in 1918, headed by the press magnate Lord North-
cliff e (Alfred Harmsworth, 1st Viscount Northcliff e). It was in London 
that the Allied command for psychological warfare was created, and 
the services hired of the most eminent men of letters like Sir Arthur 
Conan Doyle, John Galsworthy, Th omas Hardy, Rudyard Kipling. 
British propaganda also employed children’s writers and academics. 
Th e other belligerents did not set up such a coherent, centrally man-
aged system to wage the psychological war, although Germany had 
a propaganda agency already in 1914. Numerous institutions and as-
sociations took part in the creation of their propaganda, but at most 
they met to coordinate their activities only once in a while and it was 
hard to avoid the impression that their operations seemed chaotic 
and badly planned, despite eff orts by the military to coordinate them.
Th e press, especially the tabloids or yellow press, played an impor-
tant role, though its contribution was not as paramount as it would be 
in the Second World War, largely because research on manipulation 
and mass psychology were not so advanced yet and the techniques 
for the manoeuvring and fi ne adjustment of data to obtain the de-
sired eff ect were not so well known. Nonetheless the experts believed 
that the Great War could be recognised as the fi rst big media war in 
history. Th e demand for news grew prodigiously, burgeoning edition 
sizes of existing papers and triggering the emergence of new ones. By 
November 1918 editions of German newspapers had increased by 
69.9%, while Northcliff e’s Daily Mail rose from 800 thousand copies 
in 1914 to 1.5 million in 1916 and 1.8 million in 1918; and the Paris 
Le Matin rose from 1 million copies in 1914 to 1.6 million in 1918. 
But the press was not able to meet readers’ expectations, as military 
censorship was impeding or actually stopping journalists’ and pho-
tographers’ access to battlefi elds and authentic news. German censor-
ship was particularly pervasive. German journalists’ movements on 
the front were rigorously limited and controlled, and the texts they 
wrote subjected to strict scrutiny. Th e military had little or no under-
standing of the way the modern media and manipulation worked. 
Journalists had to wait for strictly regulated news bulletins compiled 
by the German army’s fi eld news agency to be handed down to them. 
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As a result, there were no accredited journalists at all on the spot to 
report the German 8th Army’s victory at Tannenberg in 1914. French 
journalists, too, had obstacles thrown in the way to military sources 
of information. Th e more insistent were told to consult the offi  cial 
bulletins and communiqués issued by high command, which one of 
them labelled “masterpieces of elusiveness.” French journalists were 
not allowed access to the front unless they obtained a special permit. 
But even then they were not permitted to report the real number 
of casualties, types of weapons, names of the generals etc. As with 
the Japanese, the belief was that “war is to be conducted quietly and 
anonymously.”
Th e British press had the most to say to its readers, as censor-
ship in Britain was relatively mild. It wasn’t even brought in offi  cially 
until April 1916. Nonetheless journalists accustomed to the stand-
ards of a free press were irritated by the curbs on press freedom and 
accused the government of “keeping them on a starvation diet.” In 
outcome of the criticism, as of May 1915 British journalists could 
freely travel to the front and write reports on the war. Th e traditions 
of a  free press won. But apart from that there was also a diff erent 
approach to information and propaganda on the part of the British 
military compared to their French or German counterparts. Th anks 
to this papers from neutral countries, including the USA, could be 
freely distributed in Britain, and therefore it was diffi  cult to cover up 
British losses and setbacks.
Th e press in belligerent countries frequently took its cue from the 
government and military authorities and either hushed up defeats 
or reported them as if they were victories. Th e Russian press nev-
er mentioned the defeats of 1915 and 1916 as such, only described 
them as exemplary, Kutuzov-style retreats. On the other hand it am-
plifi ed even small wins into spectacular victories, reducing Russian, 
and bumping up enemy losses. For the British press the economic 
blockade of Germany was honest, whereas the economic blockade 
imposed on Britain was absolutely unjustifi able. For Britons the 
bombardment of church towers was a sign of unparalleled barbarity, 
while for Germans it was a necessity dictated by the interest of their 
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soldiers. For the Allies the deployment of poison gas was a mark of 
barbarity, but for Germans a chance to bring the war to an end soon-
er and save lives. And so on and so forth.
Propaganda pamphlets were treated as signifi cant. In Britain large 
editions of “little red books” offi  cially known as Oxford pamphlets 
were issued by well-known commercial publishers. Th e series num-
bered 87 items, on subjects like Why We Are At War: Great Britain’s 
Case (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1914). One of the contributors to the 
series was the historian Arnold J. Toynbee. German-language pam-
phlets on German and Austrian atrocities were distributed by the 
Russians among prisoners-of-war.
Cinematography emerged as a  substantial medium for propa-
ganda. Although owing to censorship and wartime legislature, not 
many fi lms were made with direct reference to the war, nonetheless 
the cinematic repertoire was carefully sift ed to make it politically rel-
evant and functional in the service of the cause. In Britain only about 
10% of the fi lms shown in the cinemas addressed the subject of the 
war directly, and in France it was not much more. It was feared that 
too many war fi lms would discourage fi lmgoers from watching them. 
Th e biggest event in the world of cinema at the time was the screen-
ing of the full-length documentary, Th e Battle of the Somme, which 
brought a 20 million-strong audience to 4,500 British cinemas within 
six weeks. It was a veritable sensation, and also made an impression 
on fi lmgoers in neutral and (understandably) other Allied countries. 
On the other hand, Der magische Gürtel, a German fi lm on the suc-
cesses of the U-35 submarine which sank 23 vessels, was given a bad 
reception in neutral countries, and boycotted in occupied Belgium, 
which had 1,500 cinemas. Film chronicles of the war turned out to 
be more important for propaganda and more popular than feature 
fi lms. 600 fi lm chronicles were emitted only in France. In Germany 
between 1 and 1.5 million viewers watched a  fi lm chronicle once 
a week; and so did 3–4 million viewers in Italy (particularly on the 
war in the Alps). Italians, whose national cinematography was one of 
the world’s strongest at the time, made a lot of fi lms. Th e best-known 
Italian war fi lm was on the heroism and death of the British nurse 
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Edith Cavell. Film played a very special role in the USA in view of the 
impressive number of cinemas – 12 thousand picture-houses nation-
wide. Patriotic addresses were delivered during interludes between 
projections. In 1918 fi lms on war subjects accounted for 20% of the 
American production, most of it made towards the end of the war. 
Shoulder Arms, the famous Charlie Chaplin comedy on the war, en-
tered the cinemas a fortnight before the end of hostilities. However, 
by the end of the war attendance fi gures were dropping due to the 
risk of catching Spanish fl u.
Posters and postcards also claimed a place in the propaganda ef-
fort. Th e best-known was the British recruiting poster showing Lord 
Kitchener with the inscription “Your Country Needs You!” which 
was modelled on a scouts poster. It was emulated by Germans, Ital-
ians, Bulgarians, Greeks, and Americans. Th e last-mentioned printed 
over a million Uncle Sam posters designed by James Montgomery 
which, along with its British counterpart, is still referred to in mod-
ern advertising campaigns. An Australian recruitment poster had the 
inscription “Will you fi ght now or wait for this?” (showing Prussian 
soldiers holding civilians at gunpoint); and an Irish poster showing 
a soldier wrapped in a question mark was inscribed “An enquiry from 
the front. When are the other boys coming?” Th e best known and 
most appreciated individual in the business was the Dutch cartoon-
ist Louis Raemaekers, who worked for the British, publishing in Th e 
Times and in the American press. His cartoons of Kaiser Wilhelm as 
Satan and the Germans as barbarians gained global popularity. In 
Germany one of the most popular images was the postcard with the 
picture of the heir to the throne and an inscription reading “Only by 
relying on the sword will we acquire the place we deserve under the 
sun, for it will not be given us voluntarily.” Th ere were also the post-
cards commemorating the German Masurian Lakes victory. German 
postcards distributed among Russian soldiers recalled Bloody Sun-
day, the victims of the 1905 revolution, and encouraged Russians to 
desert. A favourite motif in German posters and postcards was the 
female avenger, a warrior woman with a sword or tornado. During 
the war the Germans published and distributed 9 million postcards, 
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cartoons, and other graphic works, many of them on themes drawn 
from popular culture. Austro-Hungarian postcards eulogised sol-
diers and predicted victory by presenting images of a loyal and bel-
licose Tyrolese or a group of cavalrymen. Th e Russian propaganda 
made frequent use of religious subjects and promoted the dynasty. 
Postcards showing the tsar and inscribed “Rule so that enemies will 
fear you” were sold on a mass scale. Other prints which performed 
a propaganda function included postage stamps and leafl ets dropped 
from balloons and aircraft . In June 1918 the Allies dropped 1.7 mil-
lion leafl ets from the sky on Germany and Austria-Hungary; in July 
it was 2.3 million; 4 million in August; and 5.4 million in October. 
However, there is controversy among the scholars as to their eff ec-
tiveness. Soldiers’ attitudes were aff ected more by hunger and the 
feeling that continuing the war was pointless than by leafl ets or med-
als and decorations awarded on a mass scale. Th ey were irritated by 
the sight of a general followed by his aides carrying baskets full of 
crosses of honour. Awards made on such a mass scale inevitably de-
valued the honours.
Industry produced, and shops or more oft en than not door-to-
door salesmen sold, war gadgets, fi gures of soldiers made of metal, 
china, wood, or textile, iron swords, miniature rifl es, war comics, and 
posters. And they did not forget about the children, for whom the 
psychological war industry manufactured board games and minia-
ture uniforms, especially sailor suits.
Personalities from the world of the arts – writers, playwrights, 
painters, graphic artists, art photographers – were committed to 
the propaganda eff ort. Most of them supported the war. Th ose who 
didn’t, were few in number and, like Paul Valéry or Marcel Proust 
in France, kept quiet about their dissent, in fear of being accused 
of treason. One of the best-known appeals in support of the Ger-
man war eff ort was signed by 1,347 German intellectuals. It was the 
same in Austria-Hungary. Th e infamous Haßgesang gegen England 
(Song of Hatred against England) was written by the German Jewish 
poet Ernst Lissauer, who later moved to Vienna. At the beginning of 
the war Sigmund Freud expressed his support for Austria-Hungary, 
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saying that he gave his entire libido for Austria, although later he 
distanced himself off  from the war, like Rainer Maria Rilke. In Bul-
garia as well the local writers and artists, like Ivan Vazov and Kiril 
Christov, voiced their support for the war. Alongside the writers and 
artists there were clergymen of various religions; religious iconog-
raphy was one of the popular modes of visual propaganda. Th is was 
true even of countries as secular as France, where the churches had 
been separated off  from the state since 1905. In all the belligerent 
countries priests and preachers attended the soldiers, from the open-
air religious ceremony to the blessing of collective graves and the 
memorial service. All the countries claimed that God was “on their 
side.” However, there were exceptions to the general rule. In Britain, 
for instance, the Archbishop of Canterbury, head of the Church of 
England, refused to allow the churches to be used to promote the war 
eff ort and army recruitment. Anglican churchmen who supported 
the war had to conduct such activities outside the churches.
Both sides applied tremendous zeal and commitment to the build-
ing up of a bad image of the enemy, attributing all the worst vices to 
him, presenting him in a malicious caricature, which was no surprise 
at all, for such are the standards of any war. Th e Allies were more ef-
fective in the psychological war of nerves: they came up with more 
examples of the barbarity, sadism, and singular cruelty of their en-
emy, whose soldiers – they wrote – were marked by the instinct of 
murderers, “new Huns.” Th e razing and destruction of Belgian towns 
and villages and the slaughter of their inhabitants, the destruction of 
the university library of Leuven (Louvain) and Rheims Cathedral, 
the devastation of Ypres, the Zeppelin raids over London and Paris, 
the violation of international law, the sinking of the Lusitania with 
94 children on board – these were all excellent opportunities for the 
devising and dissemination of an evil image. News of the execution 
of Edith Cavell, the nurse who helped British soldiers and Belgians 
who wanted to join the Belgian army escape from occupied Belgium 
(12th October 1915 in Brussels) shocked Allied and neutral countries. 
A British poster showing a wounded prisoner-of-war and a German 
nurse pouring water on the fl oor in front of him aft er he had asked for 
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water had a similar eff ect. German propaganda materials could not 
rely on such good source documentation. Th ey described the cruelty 
of the Russians to German prisoners-of-war and British brutality on 
the high seas; they recalled the Allied bombarding of German civil-
ian targets; and they stressed the fact that the war was being fought 
on behalf of cultural values; but their propaganda eff ects were mod-
est. In neutral countries the propaganda produced by the Central 
Powers was clearly losing to the Allied propaganda, not only in terms 
of information value, but also sophistication and visual impact.
Th e language of propaganda served to deepen or diminish the dif-
ferences separating belligerents, as the needs required. For instance, 
British propaganda blackened the image of the Germans, since as the 
beginning of the war relations between the two nations were not so 
hostile; at the same time it upgraded the image of the French. Th e 
Germans did likewise with respect to the British: in the language 
of German propaganda the British were an exceptionally treacher-
ous and deceitful nation. Th e typical German image of the Briton 
portrayed him with a cigar in his mouth, standing on a heap of skulls. 
Th e worst possible vices were attributed to the enemy, along with 
fundamental diff erences in what he ate, how he behaved, and even in 
how he performed the physiological functions. A French propagan-
da pamphlet claimed that the average German excreted more stool 
than the average Frenchman, and that it was more vile-smelling. For 
the Germans the English were a “villainous nation of shopkeepers,” 
their foreign secretary was “a common mongrel,” and King George V 
was “a traitor.” Enemies were given derogatory nicknames or repre-
sented as animals. Germans presented Frenchmen as vain cockerels 
and Russians as clumsy bears. Th e stereotypes were dusted and given 
a new shine. In the German and Austrian propaganda the Russian 
was a primitive yokel, a red-nosed drunkard with his gun slung on 
a rope and bast shoes on his feet; while in the Russian propaganda 
the German was a dull fl unky and a mindless glutton. Th e Austrians 
disseminated a suggestively repugnant image of Serbians and Monte-
negrans as contemptible, “worm-ridden barbarians” who never gave 
up since, as a cartoon put it, they could never fi nd a scrap of clean 
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linen for a white fl ag. Serbia was presented as “the canker of Europe,” 
a threat of infection for the entire continent. Th is was a ubiquitous 
epithet encountered in the Balkan propaganda. Th e Australian and 
Canadian propaganda warned their citizens of the “insidious Ger-
mans,” who were capable of “the worst villainy” and wanted to take 
over both of these British dominions. In Australia a map was put into 
circulation showing the country’s new name, “New Germany.” Ad-
elaide was to be renamed Hindenburg, Perth Tirpitzburg, and Mel-
bourne was to be called Zeppelinburg. Th e aim was to scare Austral-
ians into greater commitment to the Allied cause.
Battles, especially those which presented a clash of diff erent tradi-
tions and systems of values, provided a good source of material for 
patriotic propaganda. Th e Battles of Tannenberg, Gallipoli, Verdun, 
and Prunaru off ered the scope for smooth manipulation.
Tannenberg. In the German propaganda this battle was a fi ne ex-
ample of the defence of the Vaterland and the successful avenging of 
the Battle of Tannenberg/Grunwald of 1410. For the makers of the 
myth it did not matter that there were no Russians at Grunwald, but 
Poles and Lithuanians; what was important was that Slavs were de-
feated in the 1914 battle, which enabled the propagandists to reiter-
ate the myth of a perpetual war of German culture against barbarian 
Slavs. Paul von Hindenburg, its chief hero, basked in the cosy mythi-
cal creation of victory and grew into the champion of Germany over-
night, eliciting anxiety even in the envious Kaiser. Medallions bearing 
his signature and postcards with his photograph were manufactured 
and sold in large quantities. Barbers styled Hindenburg moustaches; 
monuments were erected in his honour and used as venues for pa-
triotic events; poetic tributes were paid to him. Th e German navy 
named a warship the Hindenburg, and the Silesian city of Zabrze had 
its name changed to Hindenburg. Tannenberg was associated with 
a  second heroic fi gure, Erich Ludendorff . Journalists reported that 
there was boundless rejoicing throughout Germany over Tannen-
berg. Th e names of von Hindenburg and Ludendorff  were on every-
one’s lips. Th roughout the war no other military or political leader 
came anywhere near the popularity they won with just one stroke.
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Gallipoli. In its mythology this battle had two victors: the Turks 
and the ANZAC forces. Th e latter transformed a military defeat into 
a  moral victory, and the vanquished into victors, celebrating their 
debut in war beyond the borders of their respective countries. For 
the Turks a cult developed around Gallipoli (Galibolu): it served as 
the founding myth for the Republic of Turkey and its father, Mustafa 
Kemal Atatürk, the only Turkish general who vanquished the Allies. 
Turkish propaganda recalled that the Ottoman Turks had occupied 
Gallipoli already in the 14th century, hence it was the fi rst sign of 
a Turkish presence in Europe.
Verdun. “Th e gate leading to Paradise on Earth is called Verdun,” 
the French dramatist Jean Richepin wrote with a fl ourish of pathos. 
In Carolingian times a symbol of the rivalry and clash between Gauls 
and Germans, Verdun turned into an epithet for the strength and 
determination of both sides. Th e Germans emphasised that the sacri-
fi ce had not been wasted; and the French said the same – that a with-
drawal would have meant moral defeat. Verdun was a subject of con-
tinuous debate and became the lynchpin of both sides’ propaganda. 
Th e contention over Verdun continued in postwar times, and was 
intended to – and did – attract the attention of the world’s media.
Prunaru. Th is battle turned into an outright symbol of the resist-
ance, daring, and bravery of the Rumanian army and people. On 28th 
November 1916 the Rumanian Second Roşiori Cavalry Regiment 
charged on a combination of German and Bulgarian forces and al-
though unsuccessful, gave Rumanians a  reason for national pride 
and glory. In the aft ermath Colonel Gheorghe Naumescu, their he-
roic commander, became a frequently invoked fi gure in the propa-
ganda and is still honoured in Rumania today.
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8. Arms and equipment
Th e ground forces of all the parties were made up chiefl y of infan-
try divisions. Apart from infantrymen proper, there were also artil-
lery units, engineers, telegraphy specialists, medics, cooks, and supply 
units. On both sides of the front the infantry had similar equipment. 
In August 1914 nearly all of the combat armies except for the French 
had camoufl age uniforms, though not all the soldiers had been issued 
with them. Th e German army had withdrawn its navy blue uniform 
in 1910, replacing it with the feldgrau (“fi eld grey”) version, a green-
ish-grey which blended in well against a background of smoke, mud, 
and the dingy colours of spring. Following the Boer Wars, the British 
army had given up it red uniform in favour of khaki (the word it-
self was a loan from Hindi and Urdu). Th e Austrian army exchanged 
its white uniform for greyish-blue hechtgrau (“pike grey”). Only the 
French kept the traditional uniforms that they had worn in 1870, in 
the belief that a ban on the wearing of red army trousers would be 
contrary to the French sense of taste and their military destiny, as the 
Echo de Paris observed. Red trousers were regarded as epitomising 
French honour and military glory. “Th e armies of Europe are chang-
ing their uniforms; fortunately we in France have more important 
things to do,” the Parisian Le Temps added. Frenchmen liked to refer 
to the words of their former minister of war: “Withdraw the red trou-
sers? Never! Th e red trousers are France!” In 1914 1,000 graduates 
of the elite Saint-Cyr military academy had vowed they would go 
to war, but only in their white-feathered bonnets. Nonetheless the 
proponents of camoufl age uniforms, including the Minister of War, 
Adolphe Messiny, were not sitting idle, thanks to which on 9th June 
1914 the Assemblée nationale passed an act making it compulsory 
for the army to introduce bleu horizon camoufl age uniforms. How-
ever, it was not until the bitter experience during the Great War that 
the French army actually donned bleu horizon. 
Th e armies of the poorer belligerents did not introduce camou-
fl age uniforms, either, due to shortage of funds. In any case many 
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Serbian and Montenegran soldiers had no uniform at all, unless it 
was war booty taken from an Austrian. Similarly, most of the men 
in the Turkish army had no uniforms. Turkey had only brought in 
an uniform in 1912 and had not fi tted out all of its soldiers, unlike 
Bulgaria, whose infantrymen served in uniforms styled on a  Rus-
sian prototype, and as of 1915 on the greyish-green German model. 
On the other hand, Bulgarian cavalry units were still decked out in 
brightly coloured, sometimes rather fl amboyant fi eld uniforms.
As a  rule soldiers marched in leather boots. Th e British and 
French had ankle-length shoes with puttees, while the Germans had 
calf-length boots. Not all Russian soldiers, and fewer still Serbians 
and Turks, had leather footwear. Instead they wore homemade bast 
shoes, and oft en in combat they had the civvies in which they had 
been mobilised.
At the beginning of the war Russian, French, and Turkish soldiers 
had no helmets, and hence the huge casualties. Th e Russians, for 
instance, had fl at peaked caps. Th e experience of the war enforced 
a change. Th e fi rst to react were the French, who started off  wearing 
the coloured képis – stunners during parades on the Champs Elysées, 
but a source of tragedy on the front. Th ey soon began to manufacture 
helmets weighing 765 g and modelled on the Adrian plumed head-
gear of the Paris fi remen. Th e Russians copied the French design, 
and slowly started issuing helmets even before the February Revolu-
tion. Th e Italians and Rumanians had their own models, but they 
harked back to the French shape. In 1915 the British started equip-
ping their men with “tin hats” – the Brodie Mark 1, a shallow helmet 
with a large rim and weighing 980 g. Th e Australians and Canadians 
followed suit, and the Americans used a similar design. Th e Germans 
set off  to war in leather helmets with a metal pickelhaube peak. Only 
their cuirassiers had metal helmets. But the pickelhaube helmets were 
heavy and not much use. Th ey off ered no protection against the sun 
and tended to slip down the soldier’s face when he was shooting. 
So in 1916 the German army started issuing the Stahlhelm M 1916, 
a deep, massive helmet with a characteristic rim round the back to 
protect the neck. It weighed 1,200 g and is generally associated with 
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the Second World War. Th e fi rst to be equipped with these helmets in 
a camoufl aging colour were the stormtroopers. As of 1917 the Austro-
Hungarian army started issuing identical helmets.
Soldiers carried, or rather lugged gear weighing 30 kg or even 
35  kg, consisting of a  rifl e, bayonet, hand grenades, an entrench-
ing tool, a knife, grease-box for their weapons, and a rope to clean 
their rifl es with, a food tin containing their iron ration – 1 or 2 tins of 
meat, 2 tins of vegetables, 2 packets of biscuits, ground coff ee, a bot-
tle of spirits and a bottle of water, chocolate, tobacco, a needle and 
thread, bandages and plasters, matches, postcards and writing paper, 
a sweater, shirts, socks, and a groundsheet/military cape nicknamed 
“the hero’s coffi  n,” because very oft en it was used to wrap the bodies of 
the fallen, and their identity disc. On the main belt of their braces they 
carried 3 to 6 pouches, each with 60 to 120 bullets. Th is was the gear of 
the soldiers of the best equipped armies. In 1917 the British brought 
in one of the best backpacks. Its maximum weight was 27 kg, and in-
stead of heavy leather straps it had lighter and far handier fi bre tapes.
Th e gear had to be arranged to distribute the weight a soldier had 
to carry on his back evenly, so as not to hamper his movement exces-
sively. “Carrying your home on your back is no joke,” soldiers com-
mented. Th ey were not allowed to use their iron ration without their 
commander’s consent, on pain of court-martial. During the war they 
were issued with additional hand grenades, gas-masks, white bands 
for use during combat at night, while patrols of the foreground were 
given shields and armour. Some soldiers carried musket shells as well 
as a pickaxe, crowbar, or a shovel. So you can hardly deny they did 
look like Christmas trees.
Offi  cers did not carry heavy backpacks. Th e essential components 
of their equipment were their fi eld-glass, maps, notes, and docu-
ments carried in a leather bag. Instead of a rifl e they had a pistol or 
a Nagant, Luger P.08 Parabellum, Colt, Smith & Wesson, or Mauser 
revolver. Th ey had batons for signalling orders, and watches, neces-
sary to synchronise attacks. Cavalrymen were equipped with smaller 
and lighter backpacks. Apart from guns for 15–25 bullets they had 
swords and steel lances, which turned out to be of not much use.
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Th e semi-automatic infantry rifl es had similar properties, weight, 
and range. All that they diff ered in was the name. Th ey were manu-
ally operated, bolt-action and magazine-fed, with 5–10 rounds of am-
munition in their magazine. Th ey had ranges of 2,500–3,500 m, but 
were accurate up to 1,000 m. Th e most common calibres were 7.62 
mm, 8 mm, or 7.92 mm. An experienced soldier could fi re up to 12 
shots a minute. Some rifl es had a slightly longer range than others, but 
were more sensitive to contamination and bad maintenance. Some, 
like the 5-cartridge Mausers, could be loaded faster than others like 
Lebels. Some like the Lee-Enfi eld had an unfailing bolt-action system; 
others like the Mosin and Mannlicher were not so reliable. To shoot 
a soldier fi rst had to unlock his rifl e; next a round would be inserted 
in the chamber; then the soldier closed up the lock and the rifl e was 
ready to fi re. A soldier’s shooting skills and the quality of his training 
turned out to be more important than the quality of his rifl e. French 
and German soldiers were the best shots, the former using 1886/1893 
Lebels, the latter the 1898 Mauser (Gewehr 98). British soldiers were 
armed with the 1895 Lee-Enfi eld Mark III with a 10-cartridge maga-
zine. Russians had 1891 Mosins, always with a bayonet fi tted on (it 
was impractical to keep it in its pouch). Americans used the Spring-
fi eld (a modifi ed Mauser); and Austrians and Bulgarians had light-
weight Mannlichers (M1888/ 1890/ 1895), which only weighed 3.65 
kg. Experts diff er in their opinions as to which was the best rifl e in the 
First World War, and the way they rank them depends on the criteria 
taken into account. In the course of the war manufacturers modern-
ised their products, for instance the chamber on the 1916 model of 
the Lebel (M16 Berthier) changed from 8-round to 5-round, and it 
was faster-loading, shorter, lighter, and more convenient than previ-
ous models. Sniper rifl es fi tted with a telescopic sight were introduced 
for hidden marksmen.
Both infantry and cavalry divisions were armed with fast-fi ring 
machine guns – one of the most sinister types of weapons in the war. 
Th e machine gun had been invented by the American-born Hiram 
Maxim, and fi rst used by the British in the late 1880s against the Mah-
dist Uprising in Sudan, and later during the Boer Wars. Th ese confl icts 
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confi rmed the advantages of the machine gun both as a defensive and 
as an off ensive weapon. Th e striking force of a single machine gun was 
comparable to that of a whole battalion during the Napoleonic Wars, 
and fi red 400–600 rounds a minute. Th e British used M1915 Lewises; 
the Russians had 7.62 mm Maxims fed from a 250-round canvas belt, 
supported on a circular base and fi tted with a protective shield. Th e 
Germans used similar machine guns – “devil’s brushes” – mounted 
on a four-legged base. Th e French started with old St. Etiennes, which 
in 1915 they replaced with the much more effi  cient 8 mm calibre, air-
cooled M1914 Hotchkisses. Water-cooled machine guns, such as the 
Russian and Austrian ones, produced clouds of water vapour, disclos-
ing their location and helping the enemy to destroy them. Despite the 
cooling, they could get so hot that they would lose their calibre and 
soldiers would be burned. Th eir disadvantage was their weight, up to 
50 or even 60 kg. Th e Austrian water-cooled M 07/12 Schwarzlose 
needed lubricated ammunition, and had an attached lubricator fi tted 
with a pump, which was a considerable inconvenience. Th e Italians 
used the Fiat-Revelli, which was modelled on the Maxims; the Turks 
used German m-guns. Th e Americans used British and French mod-
els at fi rst, and introduced their own Browning, which had an excel-
lent quality, in late September 1918.
Light machine guns (LMGs) and hand-held machine guns came 
into service during the war. Not all of them proved successful, some 
like the French 20-round M1915 Chauchat were prone to frequent 
stoppages. Th e British Lewis (in use as of 1917), and the German 
Bergman (in service as of 1915) were slightly better, but designers 
continued to work on improvements. Th e outcome was the Ger-
man MG 15, also known as the 08/15, which was simple to oper-
ate, fast-fi ring, lightweight (21 kg), and required only 1 soldier to 
handle it. In started to be issued as army equipment in 1917, chiefl y 
to stormtrooper units. Th e Germans also manufactured the Parabel-
lum LMG, which was used from aircraft  and airships; as well as the 
fast-shooting, lightweight Mauser with a 10-round magazine. When 
a modifying butt was fi tted it could be used like a rifl e with a machine 
gun’s hit rate.
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Th e machine guns in service were not perfect yet. Th ey oft en 
jammed due to overheating and poor cooling, the ammunition belts 
not being checked properly, the barrels being clogged up with im-
purities. Even thought they had the reputation of being deadly, they 
were not always eff ective and accurate enough. Infantrymen attack-
ing zigzag fashion in a crouching posture could dodge machine gun 
fi re fairly easily.
Th e infantry’s fi repower was supported by the artillery, the es-
sential weapons of which were light, fast-shooting, grooved, breech-
loading artillery guns characterised by a  high resistance to wear 
and fi tted with special butts. Th e French had the best guns, the re-
nowned fl at-trajectory 75 mm Schneiders. Aft er being fi red, they 
automatically returned to their initial position. Th ey could shoot up 
to 12 rounds a minute to distances of up to 5–6 km, and only 9 men 
were needed to operate them. Th eir fi repower was over tenfold the 
power of Napoleon’s guns. Th ey could keep up with marching infan-
try, and turned out to be excellent for manoeuvre war, but less so for 
trench war. Th ey were the basic equipment in French, Polish, Czech-
oslovak, and Rumanian artillery units until the Second World War. 
Th e Italians purchased a  licence for the 75s and gradually brought 
them in to replace their own, not very successful 65 mm guns. Other 
advantages of the 75s were their protective shield and fairly small 
size. Th e German equipment included 77 mm guns, which were not 
as good as their 76.2 mm French and Russian (Putilovsky) counter-
parts. Th e Germans were aware of this and worked hard to construct 
a new lightweight gun, which they started to employ in 1916. Artil-
lery guns fi red scatterable mines and shrapnel which disintegrated in 
fl ight into small pieces, but their eff ectiveness depended not only on 
the equipment and quality of the projectiles, but also on wind speed. 
Medium-calibre guns were also part of the artillery equipment, and 
the Germans had the best models, 105, 120, and 150 mm calibres, 
which were fast-fi ring relatively easy to operate. Th ey also has a big 
220 mm howitzer with a range of 9–10 km. Th e French did not have 
good long-barrelled, 155 mm artillery until 1916, and 105 mm cali-
bres until the autumn of 1914. Th e Škoda 100 mm and 149 mm how-
itzers in the Austro-Hungarian equipment were not bad, but one 
of the drawbacks of the latter type was the weight. Th ey had to be 
dismantled for transportation. Th e Russians had good but not very 
mobile howitzers, the Krupp 122 mm model, which they had started 
using in 1909. Th e British had 84 mm, 120 mm, and 127 mm guns, 
and 114 mm howitzers. Th e guns made a lot of noise when they were 
fi red, so gunners had their ears stopped up with cotton-wool or spe-
cial ear-stoppers, and as a  safeguard they had their mouths open 
when a shell was fi red.
Th ere were also mortars, guns with a short, smooth barrel. Th ey 
were muzzle-loaded and sent out projectiles on a  steep parabolic 
path, usually over a short distance. Th e armies were equipped with 
mortars of various calibres: small, of the order of 60–80 mm, and 
large, 211mm, 220–320 mm and larger. Th e biggest were not very 
mobile due to weight and size. As of 1915 the French were producing 
good 240 mm, 260, 270 mm, and 370 mm mortars, which were later 
deployed by the American forces. Th e Italians used 280 mm mortars 
which were regarded as good. Th e armies of the Central Powers had 
305 mm Škoda mortars. Th ey had to be dismantled for transporta-
tion, and on reaching their destination the 9 parts were reassembled 
on a special base fi lled with rails. Th ey weighed 32 tonnes, and had 
a maximum range of 11,800 m (eff ective range 8,000 m). Th ey were 
pulled on the rails by special Austro-Daimler four-wheel drive vehi-
cles, designed by the distinguished automotive engineer Ferdinand 
Porsche. Th e crews operating these systems wore goggles and thick 
protective covers over their eyes and mouths; gunners would lie 
down fl at on the ground waiting for the mortar to be fi red, which 
would give rise to a  tremor felt a  dozen kilometres or more away, 
shattering windows within a radius of several hundred metres. Mor-
tars were fi red using an electric wire ignition device at a distance of 
300 m away from the gun. Th e Italians had mortars of this calibre, 
too, but needed a whole day to set them up. Th ey were transported on 
carriers the height of a two-storey house pulled by huge lorries. Th ey 
were not very mobile and if there was a need to retreat fell easy prey 
to victorious assailants.
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Th e Germans used 420 mm mortars which the French called Big 
Bertha – a name which has entered history, aft er Bertha Krupp, the 
wife of Gustav Krupp. Th is mortar needed a  crew of 200 men. “It 
was such a colossal gun that we just couldn’t believe our eyes,” a wit-
ness wrote, “Th is monster dismantled into two pieces was pulled by 
36 horses… the road trembled.” It weighed 90 tonnes and once an 
hour released a projectile 10 m long and weighing 800–930 kg, over 
a distance of 14.5 km. It took 6 hours to mount it on a special con-
crete platform several metres thick, and a crane was used to load the 
projectile. Th e shock wave that emerged when it was fi red was pow-
erful enough to topple buildings and smash windows within a radius 
of 5–6 km.
Th e Germans also had a huge, 128-tonne super-gun which they 
used in 1918 to bombard Paris from a distance of 120 km away. Th ey 
had been working on its construction since 1916. Th ey had 6 speci-
mens, but used only 3 to bombard Paris. Every 15 minutes it shot 
a 1,000 kg projectile. It was transported by rail. Towards the end of the 
war these guns were destroyed. Th e French mistook it for Big Bertha, 
but in fact it was not identical with the mortar. It was not very eff ec-
tive, especially as its barrel had to be changed aft er about 20 shots.
When aircraft  started to appear in the skies, the commands de-
cided to have anti-aircraft  guns constructed and produced. Some of 
these new weapons were transported on carriers. By the end of the 
war the equipment of the German army included small anti-tank 
guns. Mortars and special trench mortars were implemented to de-
stroy trenches. Th e fl amethrower which the Germans fi rst used in 
1915 turned out to be a formidable weapon despite its unreliability. 
Th e Allies lodged a  protest against its application, claiming that it 
violated the Hague Convention of 1907 which prohibited the em-
ployment of “arms, projectiles, or material calculated to cause unnec-
essary suff ering” (Art.23e). But the Germans were not in the slight-
est worried by this. Th e device consisted of a  cylinder containing 
petrol and a steel tube through which compressed gaseous fuel was 
pumped in. It was usually employed for the destruction of concrete 
bunkers and defensive structures. However, it was only serviceable 
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in the right weather conditions – a sunny day and wind blowing in 
the direction of the enemy. Soldiers were scared of having to handle 
it, as it frequently broke down, causing injury or even death. It was 
as dangerous as operating a mortar when a shell hit it. If that hap-
pened the soldier turned into a human torch. It is hardly surprising 
that people were terrifi ed of them. Towards the end of the war the 
Germans deployed fl amethrowers in combat in forests, as presented 
on fi lm in the famous “Lost Battalion” (1919). Th e Allies had similar 
weapons, but they were used on a small scale, chiefl y for the removal 
of dead bodies from battlefi elds.
Poison gas was another sinister symbol of the Great War. Signato-
ries of the 1899 Hague Declaration had undertaken to “abstain from 
the use of projectiles the sole object of which is the diff usion of as-
phyxiating or deleterious gases.” Th e Hague Convention of 1907 (Art. 
23) expressly prohibited the use of “poison or poisoned weapons” in 
combat. But when war broke out, both the Allies and the Germans 
set about producing poison gas. Th e latter were the fi rst to employ it. 
In the autumn of 1914 Fritz Haber, a German chemist of Jewish ori-
gin from Breslau (now Wrocław), who was awarded the Nobel prize 
for chemistry in 1918, came up with the idea of fi lling shells with 
chlorine gas. Aft er the war he contributed to work on Zyklon B. Ger-
man command gave the go-ahead for research on gas bombs and 
later argued that the Hague Convention did not apply to the diff usion 
of volatile substances. Th ey (and certain historians following in their 
footsteps) claimed that poison gas was a humanitarian weapon, since 
it caused death without the loss of blood. In fact, poison gas was one 
of the most dreadful types of weapon. Even some German offi  cers 
considered it “dishonourable” and “repugnant.” “I must admit that 
the task of poisoning the enemy like rats disgusted me,” wrote Gen-
eral Berthold von Deimling, commander of the XV Corps. Public 
opinion regarded poison gas as a violation of the rules of war. None 
of the means of warfare was as controversial and met with such wide-
spread opposition as poison gas.
Soldiers were lying along the road, exhausted and gasping for 
breath. Th ere was yellow mucus dribbling from their mouths, their 
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faces were blue and full of despair. Th at’s how a British offi  cer de-
scribed the eff ects of gas poisoning, having witnessed its fi rst appli-
cation at Ypres. He examined them and administered fi rst aid. He 
wanted to go straight to the Germans and throttle them, pay them 
back for their devilish deed. Sudden death was better than that ter-
rible suff ering. German soldiers put 6,000 40-kg cans of gas pro-
duced by IG Farben in conduits dug at a fairly shallow depth into the 
ground along the trench line. Th e entire operation was carried out by 
a special poison gas unit, and the cans were manufactured by Bayer, 
the well-known company from Leverkusen. Th e date of the attack 
was put off  several times to get the required wind direction. Th e Al-
lies knew there would be a gas attack, but ignored it. At 6 p.m. on 22nd 
April 1915 the fi rst poison gas was released from the pressure vessels 
along 6 km of the front and fl oated in the direction of the Allied lines. 
Aft er a while a massive cloud of whitish-yellow chlorine gas hit them 
at a speed of 2–3 m per second. Since chlorine is two and a half times 
heavier than air it reached those who were in the trenches and those 
hidden in shelters. Suddenly people were running amok across the 
fi elds, as if they had completely lost their senses. Th e cloud of gas 
cut down everything in its path, including the vegetation. Th e men 
were blinded, they were coughing and panting, they were blue in the 
face. Th at’s how witnesses remembered a sight that nearly made their 
hearts stop. Of the 15 thousand soldiers exposed to the poison gas, 
nearly a  quarter died in long and terrible agony. Th e gas attacked 
and disintegrated the lungs, slowly leading to painful death. Another 
witness observed the blackened faces; coats and shirts torn at the 
throat in a  last desperate attempt to catch a breath of air; some al-
ready lying motionless, others kicking madly in their death throes, 
dying the most terrible death the observer had ever seen. Other vic-
tims lost their sight, had trouble with breathing, their faces remained 
disfi gured for the rest of their lives, permanent burn marks were 
left  on their bodies. Th e Germans were elated; Haber was declared 
a national hero, but his wife Clara was so shocked by the eff ects of 
the gas that she committed suicide. But Haber was not very worried 
by that. Th e Chief of the German General Staff  Erich von Falken-
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hayn, who had earlier had his misgivings as to the outcome Haber 
had predicted, was pleased.
On 31st May 1915 at Bolimów near Skierniewice in the Kingdom 
of Poland (the western part of the Russian partitional zone of Poland) 
the Germans conducted the biggest poison gas attack on the Eastern 
front. Th ey used 264 tonnes of liquid chlorine, which they released 
from 12 thousand cans. About 11 thousand Russian soldiers were 
killed. Haber personally inspected the attack. In his opinion, in war 
science and technology should serve the fatherland, to minimise the 
casualties of its own soldiers, and maximise enemy casualties. “Men 
in their death throes crawled about on all fours, ripping up their 
clothes as if berserk. One lay with his fi ngers dug into the ground, 
another next to him with the irises of his eyes wide open. In his eyes 
lurked dread of the unknown. Th e wheezing, poisoned breath of the 
moribund spoke of the immense pain they were suff ering,” wrote 
Max Wild, a German offi  cer. Th e injured, dying of asphyxiation, with 
eyes bleeding and lungs burned right through, were being taken to 
Warsaw. “What barbarity supported by science,” Princess Lubomir-
ska commented as it happened.
In subsequent years more and more pain-inducing and deadly 
poison gases were used many times on all the fronts, but they were 
not as eff ective as they had been originally because gas masks and 
other safeguards had been brought in. Gas attacks were used to create 
havoc in enemy defences. Th e last time gas was employed was by the 
British on the Western front in mid-October 1918. A gas attack made 
Adolf Hitler lose his sight for a time.
Production of the components needed to manufacture gas rose 
at a  dramatic rate. By the end of the war the Germans were pro-
ducing 1,000 tonnes of gas a  month; the French over 500 tonnes; 
and the British nearly 3,000. Apart from chlorine more dangerous 
poisonous substances were produced, phosgene and phosphorus va-
pour, and the most lethal of all – mustard gas, also known as yperite 
because it was fi rst deployed by the Germans in the Th ird Battle 
of Ypres in 1917. Mustard gas attacked all the moist tissues in the 
body and killed the careless, because it did not evaporate for weeks, 
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causing wounds which did not heal and blindness. A total of 63 poi-
son gases – causing irritation, paralysis, or burns – were deployed 
during the war. Nonetheless the introduction of poison gas did not 
mark a breakthrough, as the Allies were quick to follow suit. Moreo-
ver, a change in wind direction could make the gas cloud return and 
cause injuries in the despatching army. Th is was the fate of 2,000 
British soldiers at Loos on 15th September 1915, killed by their own 
gas; and of German soldiers on 15th July 1918, when a gas cloud they 
had emitted turned back in their direction, breaking their attack and 
allowing the French to counter-attack. Th irdly gas masks and other 
protective devices mitigated the eff ects, although there still remained 
a residual toll of casualties. Before gas masks were introduced, there 
were spontaneous attempts to create protective devices, such as the 
Black Veil Respirator, a veil-like sack with eye slits and a chemically 
treated mouth-pad. British women responded to a press appeal by 
handing in 100 thousand wedding veils within a few days to make 
respirators, and thousands more in the following weeks. Later Hypo 
helmet respirators (the British Smoke Hood) were introduced. Th ey 
contained a chemically treated cotton mouth-pad, soaked in a solu-
tion of sodium hyposulphite, washing soda, and glycerine, to absorb 
and neutralise pollutants, preventing their inhalation. However, 
the eff ect lasted for a  few minutes until the absorbing substances 
were saturated and the chemical reaction subsided. Attackers uti-
lised this fact and sent out a series of gas waves at intervals. Th e fi rst 
masks were crude, made of a piece of rubber fi tted with goggles and 
a mouthpiece with a fi lter for breathing. But they were inconvenient 
and so primitive that they could cause death by asphyxiation. As 
time went on developments were made, with impregnated textiles 
to cover the face and non-breakable glass for the eyepieces. Even 
horses were protected against gas attacks by having their fodder-
bags put on.
Gas masks annoyed and irritated the soldiers. Many hated them. 
Th ey made breathing diffi  cult and hampered vision and mobility. 
Th ey forced soldiers to learn to live in the gas environment (as the 
Canadian historian Tim Cook put it) and in the rhythm of the danse 
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macabre. In outcome, despite the protective measures, throughout 
the whole of the war between 25 and 91 thousand soldiers died due 
to gas. Th e fatalities were not as great as those caused by artillery fi re, 
but it was gas that determined the view of the Great War as a cul-
tural phenomenon, the stamp of downfall for civilisation and of Eu-
ropean barbarity. Stuck in a gas mask, a soldier was merely a puppet 
deprived of personality, a symbol of alienation. Stumbling about in 
their snout-ended, glass-eyed gas masks, soldiers had forfeited their 
human shape. Roland Dorgelès, a  French novelist, dubbed the gas 
mask “the pig snout which represented the war’s true face.”
Both sides set up chemical units to conduct gas attacks. Labora-
tories were established in the rear to work on new types of lethal 
charges, as well as on preventive devices which would be more ef-
fective than existing ones. In 1917 the ingenious Germans besieging 
Riga fi red gas-fi lled shells, which were independent of atmospheric 
conditions. Th e Russian defenders were blinded by the smoke and 
choked, and artillery fi re did the rest. Th e Germans secured victory. 
Henceforth gas-fi lled shells were used more and more oft en on all 
fronts.
Another important symbol of the Great War was the tank. Ma-
chines protected life, and machine-power was standing in for hu-
mans. By applying human brainpower there would be less bloodshed 
and the extent of the carnage would be reduced. Th at was what Win-
ston Churchill, a great enthusiast of armoured vehicles, said in the 
British parliament on 5th March 1917. No doubt his confi dence in the 
tank, that it could be the breakthrough leading to the breach of the 
front, launched the ultimately successful project to design and con-
struct tanks. Th e organiser of the tank corps was Major General Sir 
Ernest Swinton, originator of the idea to mount an armoured plat-
form on a caterpillar undercarriage. Churchill broke the resistance 
of the offi  cers and politicians who were against the idea of what they 
called “monstrosities,” although the fi rst appearance of tanks on the 
Somme in September 1916 did not endorse their proponents’ opti-
mism. Sir William Robertson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff , 
was diffi  dent and called tanks a rather desperate invention.
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Th e decision to start design studies for the tank was made in Jan-
uary 1915, once it was known that trench war and its barbed-wire 
front were a formidable challenge, and that the confl ict would not be 
resolved soon. Th e term “tank” was derived from the name for a wa-
ter cistern, and that’s what the tank looked like. Th e British wanted to 
keep the work on it secret from enemy intelligence. Th e fi rst model 
was called the Mark I. By 1917 the upgraded Mark IVs were in action 
at Cambrai. In 1918 the next generation, the Mark V, was introduced. 
It could carry 25 infantrymen apart from its crew of 9. A tank’s weap-
ons depended on whether it was male or female: the former had two 
57 mm guns, and the latter had 6 machine guns. Th ey weighed 20–
30 tons and were 10 m long head to tail. Th eir shape was meant to 
facilitate negotiating craters, trenches, and barbed wire. Th ey carried 
fascines, bundles of brushwood to fi ll up trenches. In compliance 
with the military doctrine behind them, tanks attacked in waves. 
Th eir operators expected them to be eff ective if used on a mass scale, 
hundreds of them in one sweep.
Th e fi rst tanks had a speed of 1.5 kmph, the later models 6.5 and 
7 kmph. Th ey could only move forward. Th eir job was to destroy 
barbed wire and obstacles, and to provide cover against enemy fi re 
for infantrymen moving forward. Th eir eff ectiveness was restricted 
by their imperfect motors and lack of radio communication. Tank 
crews used homing pigeons with messages to command. Tank com-
ponents were transported by train to the battlefi eld and assembled 
near the front. Th ey did not cover a long distance between successive 
fuel stops – they used up 6 litres of fuel for every kilometre! Crews 
could spend a maximum of 2–3 hours inside a tank due to the heat. 
Cases of fainting or carbon monoxide poisoning from the fumes 
were frequent. Smoke and fumes made communication between 
crew members diffi  cult.
Th e French took to tanks and the Schneider-Creusot works set 
about their production. Th e fi rst large-scale deployment of tanks by 
the French was on 6th April 1917, but they failed fi rstly because they 
were too heavy and not versatile enough, and secondly because their 
fuel tank, which was situated in the front, was easy to destroy. Th e 
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French military authorities turned to Renault, which made good use 
of the opportunity and produced the R-T 17, a slightly faster, more 
mobile, and safer vehicle than the original ones. R-T  17s weighed 
5 tonnes and had a 37 mm gun. Th ey became the basis of the French 
tank units. However, despite eff orts, no joint Allied model was pro-
duced, owing to the continuing resentment and rivalry between Lon-
don and Paris.
Th e Americans came to like tanks. General John Joseph Persh-
ing was a tank enthusiast. Th e Americans set up a tank committee 
which they put on the Allied agenda for joint projects in late 1917. In 
the meantime, until 1918 US tank units were equipped with British 
and French vehicles. Th e offi  cer appointed to organise the American 
tank units was Captain (subsequently Colonel) George P. Patton, re-
nowned for his later victories during the Second World War.
On the other hand, tanks failed to win the approval of the Ger-
mans and Austrians. Although there was no dearth of German of-
fi cers enthusiastic about tanks, the fi nal decision was that in view of 
the shortage of manpower, raw materials, and steel Germany would 
not be able to produce enough tanks to make them viable in the fi eld. 
Th e plan to put up 10 tank battalions by the end of April 1918 was 
halted. In fact the Germans did construct the A7 V, but they deemed 
it too clumsy, diffi  cult to manoeuvre and, like the Allies’ tanks, very 
slow. It was armed with a gun and 6 machine guns, and had a crew 
of 18. In March 1918 it made its debut at St. Quentin and took part 
in combat on 24th April, but was not successful. Instead the Germans 
concentrated on anti-tank defence. At fi rst the tanks took them by 
surprise, but gradually they learned how to deal with them. Th ey de-
ployed guns against them, and later 37 mm anti-tank guns and anti-
tank rifl es.
Armoured cars appeared on the battlefi elds at the very start of the 
war, but they did not play a major role. Th e Belgians were the fi rst 
to use armoured cars, which they equipped with machine guns and 
sent out against the German cavalry. Armoured cars proved useful in 
this application, but they were no good for breaching the front owing 
to their rubber wheels and insuffi  cient armour and arms. Th ey were 
used only for reconnaissance, and made just a modest contribution 
to the war. Th ere were also armoured trains, equipped with cannon 
and machine guns. Th ey were like mobile fortresses and were used to 
cover concentrations of forces, and occasionally to support attacks. 
When the need arose they were deployed to transport arms and am-
munition, and to evacuate the wounded.
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III. A Soldier’s Lot
Th e thoughts on the mind of soldiers going off  to the war were 
how to win, how to survive to the end, not to be wounded or taken 
prisoner. Most were not thinking of deserting, at least not in the ini-
tial phase of the war. But there were not many lucky enough not to be 
injured, fall ill, or be taken prisoner.
1. The wounded
Th e statistics for the wounded were far higher than for those 
who were killed. In the German army to the end of 1915 the fi gures 
for the dead (killed or dead of their wounds) were 628 thousand; while 
the fi gures for the wounded were 1,595 thousand. By November 1918 
the numbers injured in all the armies exceeded 20 million. In Britain 
there were 27 thousand veterans receiving invalid pensions still in 
1980. Medical staff  tried to help soldiers recover as fast as possible, so 
that they could return to the front. Th e numbers serving in a division 
depended on the rate at which convalescents returned to the front, 
which in turn determined the outcome of combat. In the German 
forces 52% of injured offi  cers, and 44.7% of injured men recovered 
enough to resume service; in the British army the fi gure for offi  c-
ers and men averaged about 45%. Many of those injured more than 
once returned to the front. Th e record-holder was Bernard Freyberg, 
a Briton resident in New Zealand, injured 9 times. He was a hero, too, 
and in 1917 became a general (a temporary brigadier-general) at the 
age of 27, the youngest in the rank in the Allied armies. Most injuries 
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were sustained in outcome of artillery or infantry fi re, with a  cer-
tain contribution from air raids, poison gas, and fl amethrowers. Only 
1% of the wounds sustained on the Western and Alpine fronts were 
caused by combat with bayonets or knives. Injuries could also be, and 
were caused by attempts to cross obstacles in the fi eld – mud, rivers, 
trenches, barbed wire, or in winter were due to low temperatures.
Grenades and shrapnel caused open head and body wounds, po-
tentially leading to permanent disability. Th e injured included sol-
diers who had lost a leg, an arm, both legs and arms, soldiers who 
had developed psychiatric disorders, gone blind, had spinal injuries, 
and ones with mutilated faces, sometimes to such an extent that they 
did not have the courage to return home to their family and place 
of origin. In November 1918 the last-mentioned were estimated at 
280 thousand, most of whom spent the rest of their lives in mirror-
less welfare homes isolated off  from the rest of society. In 1921 in 
France veterans with disfi gured faces set up an association which had 
a membership of 10 thousand still in 1953. An orderly from London 
described one of them and the problems he had, writing that he was 
perfectly aware of his appearance. You knew that he knew you knew 
that a  careless glance could make him suff er… Could any woman 
approach such a  monster without showing repugnance? Wouldn’t 
children run in fear? Societies were not prepared for such a number 
of disabled and war invalids. Alongside numerous instances of sym-
pathy and assistance invalids met with aversion and even hatred for 
obliging others to maintain them. Sometimes hospitals turned them 
out into the street. Th e disabled were in the vanguard of the consci-
entious objectors. Th ey were the ones who supported the anti-war 
movements – as far as their physical condition permitted – and unit-
ed to defend their right to respect and a decent life. Th e fi rst congress 
of the maimed and war invalids was held in the Grand Palais in Paris 
on 11th November 1917. Over 100 associations represented over 100 
thousand members. It was a similar story in other countries. In Ger-
many the fi rst national discussion was held in Berlin in April 1915. 
Th e disabled elicited debate in the press and the parliaments on the 
means and manner of assistance they expected. Th ey were staunchly 
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backed by the churches and trade unions, thanks to which national 
organisations were created to aid invalids, fi nanced by the state and 
from donations and public collections.
Doctors, especially surgeons and orthopaedic specialists, were 
able to help some of the disabled, providing those who had had am-
putations with artifi cial limbs. However, the prosthetic devices were 
not very operative and constantly reminded invalids of their pain and 
disability. Nonetheless, the joint eff orts of doctors and designers ad-
vanced the quality and effi  ciency of artifi cial limbs, which improved 
with time. Th ere was much slower progress in reconstructive surgery, 
which is more complex. On the whole the prospects of improvement 
for those with disfi gured faces were bleak, although there were doc-
tors who embarked on facial surgery. But such attempts were few and 
far between, with few specialists and few volunteers willing to submit 
to an experimental operation. Usually they were issued with a mask 
to conceal their disfi gurement.
Progress was observed in the hospitals. Th e disinfection of sur-
gical instruments became more regular, there was improvement in 
the prevention of gangrene, blood transfusions were carried out, skin 
was disinfected, and devices containing magnets were used to extract 
pieces of metal from the body. Th e treatment of the consequences 
of gas poisoning – ophthalmic disorders, skin diseases, burns, and 
blistered lungs – was a tremendous challenge. Th ese conditions were 
previously unknown to the medical profession, a  new experience 
both for patients and doctors, who were left  helpless. Other challeng-
es were posed by the eff ects of warfare in winter conditions, such as 
frostbite and photokeratitis (snow blindness).
Th e wounded were evacuated from the fi eld by orderlies, but 
owing to the natural obstacles and the narrowness of the trenches 
this was not always possible. Witnesses of the Battle of the Somme 
wrote that for a few days cries for help could be heard from no-man’s 
land, but no help was forthcoming. Finally the calls died down – 
the wounded had died of loss of blood, exhaustion, or dehydration. 
Similar observations were made at Verdun. “Anyone who hasn’t seen 
the wounded deprived of assistance, emitting the shriek of death 
108
and drinking their urine to quench their thirst… has not seen war,” 
a French soldier wrote.
On evacuation the wounded were taken to a  medical dressing 
station, but they could not count on fast and good-quality aid due 
to the long queues waiting for attention. For many this was tanta-
mount to a death sentence. Aft er a gruesome clash nurses were ex-
tremely busy and sometimes fainted from being overworked. It was 
the same with doctors. Even though thousands of civilian doctors 
had been mobilised, there were never enough, and this applied to all 
the armies. In 1914 in Germany there had been 30,031 physicians 
(including 700  women doctors) in medical practice, and although 
80% of them were called up, on the front the shortfall amounted to 
20–30%. 1,819 German doctors died during the war from injuries or 
diseases, and 2,218 were wounded. Th ere was a shortage of hospitals. 
Th e biggest shortages were in Serbia and Turkey, and the quality of 
the medical services there were far from perfect, despite assistance 
from wealthier, allied or other countries’ medical staff . Out of all the 
combatants, Serbians and soldiers of the Turkish army had the least 
chance of recovery, and the prospects for wounded Bulgarians and 
Rumanians were not much better.
Th e plans commands had made before the war had taken neither 
the extent of the calamity nor the numbers in need into account. Th e 
scale and nature of the war caught the planners by surprise. In the 
fi rst weeks of the war the commands of all the armies concentrated 
on enhancing the quality of medical services, improving manage-
ment and staff  training, and expanding the medical services, includ-
ing the nursing and auxiliary medical corps. One of the fi rst units of 
this type to be sent out was the British organisation Queen Alexan-
dra’s Imperial Military Nursing Service. Th e wives and daughters of 
kings and aristocrats set examples of self-sacrifi cing and dedicated 
service, to encourage other women from affl  uent homes to join them. 
Th is was nothing extraordinary – women from the wealthy classes 
had always been involved in charity work for those in need. What 
was special was the scale of the aid dispensed and the numbers dis-
pensing it. Daisy Hochberg, Princess von Pless, wrote that she was 
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glad and happy to be on a medical train, working as a nurse in charge 
of the carriage accommodating an operating theatre and 8 other car-
riages, and looking aft er the 80 patients hospitalised in them. Th e 
war and her endeavour to bring them relief from pain allowed her to 
forget her own problems. Another lady who thought of her service in 
a similar way was Eleonore Reuss zu Köstritz, the intrepid consort of 
King Ferdinand of Bulgaria, who was said to have “a special gift  for 
relieving suff ering.” Th e Queen of the Belgians was yet another de-
voted carer, a paragon of fortitude, sensitivity, and responsibility; and 
so, too, was the Tsarina Alexandra Feodorovna. Th e Tsarina turned 
the royal palaces of Russia into hospitals and encouraged her older 
daughters to work in them, though not for long. When her persever-
ance ran out, she returned to her palaces.
For centuries European womenfolk had been perceived as con-
siderate and valiant nurses, and this idea persisted during the Great 
War. Serving as a  nurse with a  Red Cross armband fi tted the tra-
ditional image of femininity. Th e prevalent belief was that women 
should always be ready to help, treating wartime service in the hospi-
tals as a laudable patriotic duty. Th at was their usual motive. In eff ect 
the brave and arduous service women rendered in the hospitals, and 
the death of many of them while on duty contributed to a rise in the 
status of women as such and of the nursing profession.
Th e Polish Nobel prizewinner Marie Curie-Skłodowska earned 
a  special place for herself among the female volunteers dispensing 
medical services. In France Mme Curie organised a mobile X-ray sta-
tion enabling medical staff  to locate a bullet or shrapnel in a wounded 
soldier’s body and to diagnose fractures. When the war broke out, the 
French army had only one X-ray ambulance, but thanks to the eff orts 
of Mme Curie, by the end of the war there was a fl eet of 20 ambu-
lances and 200 sets of X-ray equipment. Sometimes she herself drove 
one of the ambulances, which were dubbed les petites Curies (“little 
Curies”). In 1917–1918 one million and a hundred thousand X-rays 
were taken in them. 150 women radiologists were trained in the Paris 
Radium Institute; however, they were not aware of the long-term ef-
fects of radiation and as a  result their health suff ered. Marie Curie 
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also trained a group of American radiologists. She left  a record of her 
wartime experiences in her book La radiologie et la guerre (Radiology 
in War). Th e other countries also had X-ray services.
Girls and young women were trained and sent to work in the hos-
pitals, though not all of them were prepared mentally and emotionally 
for the tasks ahead of them. Some withdrew, terrifi ed by what they saw 
and what was expected of them. Only the bravest and most resilient 
persisted. “I think you would faint overwhelmed by fear if you saw 
what the poor nurses have to do. Th ey apply surgical drains and wash 
wounds that are so big and horrible that you tremble with fear, and you 
can only admire them for their perseverance. Th ey dig out pieces of 
metal from the bodies of wounded soldiers. I assure you that the word 
‘responsibility’ has acquired a new meaning here,” one of them wrote. 
Th e fi rst women doctors, including surgeons, worked in the war hos-
pitals, arousing a stir and surprise. Only aft er some time were they ad-
mitted to these duties. “It’s true! She’s operating!” was the response to 
the surgical activities of Elsie Inglis, the “Lady with the Lamp,” a wom-
an doctor and surgeon from Edinburgh who left  an admirable record 
in the annals of medicine working on the fronts in Serbia and Russia, 
where she died in 1917.
Private individuals, wealthy bankers, industrialists, and aristo-
crats helped to organise and fi nance military hospitals. Polish fami-
lies – the Tyszkiewicz, Lubomirski, Sapieha, Sanguszko, and Kronen-
berg – were founders. Frenchmen and Britons organised hospitals in 
Serbia and Greece, and Germans set up hospitals in Turkey. Th ere 
were also benefactors from neutral countries. Dutch and Swedish 
patrons tended to establish hospitals in the Central Power countries; 
and Americans in France and Britain. By April 1917 the Americans 
had set up 17 admirably equipped hospitals in France, with a thou-
sand beds and a fl eet of 200 ambulances. In Paris alone there were 
110 young American doctors, surgeons, and senior medical students 
from Harvard working on a voluntary basis. Two British suff ragettes, 
Flora Sandes and Evelina Haverfi eld, went to Serbia, where there was 
a dire shortage of medical staff , to work as nurses. Th ey founded the 
Hon. Evelina Haverfi eld’s and Sergeant-Major Flora Sandes’ Fund 
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for Promoting Comforts for Serbian Soldiers and Prisoners. Th ere 
were 600 British doctors, nurses, and orderlies working in Serbian 
military and civilian hospitals (including 14 Scottish Women’s Hos-
pitals). Serbian soldiers and civilians recalled their highly profession-
al services with the utmost gratitude. Th e French set up their own 
hospital network in Serbia and Greece, with 100 doctors working in 
them. Even more French doctors went to Rumania and set up hospi-
tals there, equipping them with top-quality apparatus. Th e assistance 
provided by the Allies was disinterested to a certain extent, but they 
also wanted Serbian and Rumanian convalescents to recover as fast 
as possible and return to the trenches.
Usually the military authorities set up their hospitals in univer-
sity buildings, schools, courthouses, warehouses, Nissen huts, and 
even in factories and palaces. Th e quality of their equipment varied 
over a broad range. Alongside those which were comfortable and had 
all the necessary apparatus there were also hospitals that were short 
on everything: heating, hot water, pain-killing drugs, medical staff , 
and goodwill, with wounded men in wards overcrowded to bursting 
point, where soiled dressings were collected up, sorted, washed, and 
recycled.
On receiving fi rst aid the wounded were sent to a  fi eld hospital. 
Th ose who doctors decided were in need of hospitalisation and spe-
cialist operations were sent to hospital trains. However, oft en they had 
to wait days at the railway station before they could board, as the de-
mand for transportation was growing all the time, trains and tracks 
more and more overexploited, while units being taken to the front, 
arms and ammunition took priority over everything else.
Hospital trains could carry 200–400 wounded men. During the 
intensive fi ghting at Verdun the wounded were taken to hospitals in 
Paris at a  rate of about 2–3 thousand a  day. In the fi ghting on the 
outskirts of Przemyśl in the autumn of 1914 seven long hospital 
trains passed through the city every day. But not all of these mobile 
hospitals had good sanitary conditions. Instead of having beds, the 
wounded were put into freight cars used for horses and cattle, and 
bedded on foetid, worm-infested straw. Many died on the way from 
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infections, gangrene, contagious diseases, dysentery, typhus. Th e dead 
were removed from the train at the nearest station, but not before 
everything that was of any value was pilfered from their clothing. 
Th is was practised despite chaplains’ appeals and warnings from the 
authorities that such behaviour would be severely punished. “Trains 
full of wounded men pass through Olkusz (near Kraków). When we 
hear them groaning and see blood dripping out over the steps of the 
railway cars we feel really sorry for them, for all that human misery,” 
wrote a Polish witness. From the station the wounded were taken to 
hospital – in Vienna and Prague by tram, 8 men on stretchers to a car-
riage. In Prague 289 thousand were despatched to hospital in this way! 
But things weren’t so good everywhere. Sometimes on arrival at their 
destination the wounded were left  at the station for several days, wait-
ing for transport. Th is happened in Warsaw in the autumn of 1914. 
Th ousands of wounded soldiers who had received some treatment in 
the Russian fi eld hospitals were left  stranded at the terminal station of 
the Warsaw-to-Vienna railway, waiting to be taken to hospital. Many 
died there before the eyes of bystanders. Th ere were not enough vehi-
cles to take them to hospital, not enough beds in the hospitals, man-
agement was ineffi  cient. “At the station there was a dreadful sight: the 
platforms were full of wounded lying on the ground with no straw, 
in dirt and excrement, in the cold and rain, rending the air with their 
heart-breaking cries or miserable pleas, ‘For God’s sake, tell them to 
dress our wounds,’” a witness wrote.
Wounded Allied soldiers were evacuated from Gallipoli in yet an-
other way. Th ey were fi rst brought to medical dressing stations and 
clinics located on the beaches and in tunnels in the hills. Next they 
were taken by boats and barges up to ships, some of which were hos-
pital ships. But the majority were brought by sea to British hospitals 
in Egypt and Cyprus. 
Th ose who had a  lot of luck and a  strong constitution, walked 
out of the hospitals and went back to the front. Innumerable conva-
lescence homes were set up to help them recuperate. Usually con-
valescents were fed well and entertained by singers and musicians. 
Th ey had free theatre and music hall tickets. Th ey could use libraries 
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and reading rooms, attend talks on health and hygiene, and those 
who were illiterate could attend reading and writing classes. Th e 
fi ttest went sightseeing with volunteers. Educational societies col-
lected books and magazines and sent them to hospitals and conva-
lescence homes. Some of the convalescents were sent to holiday re-
sorts, usually in the mountains. But there were others – the disabled, 
the blinded, those confi ned to a wheelchair – who never returned to 
the front. Th ey were sent to training centres, where they were taught 
a new profession, and prepared to return to civilian life and earning 
a living. Th e authorities hoped that these men would be employed in 
factories producing goods for the army, which would prevent them 
from being a burden to society and the state. Th e scale of the aid 
dispensed to war invalids, and the methods used, were a completely 
new experience produced by the war.
2. Diseases and epidemics
Th e medical stations and hospitals to which sick soldiers were 
sent, received visits from senior offi  cers and politicians, both of 
whom knew that one of the factors on which their army’s success 
depended was the rate and eff ectiveness of hospitalisation. Th ey also 
knew that the number of hospitalised soldiers depended on the ef-
fi ciency of preventive measures. Th e better the prevention, the fewer 
would fall ill. Most attention was given to the prevention of epidem-
ics of infectious diseases.
In trench conditions, with cold and permanent damp or water-
logging, it was easy to get rheumatism, trench foot, bladder disor-
ders, infl ammatory bowel disease, diarrhoea, pneumonia or tuber-
culosis, which only developed gradually. In the permanently cold 
and damp conditions of Flanders trench diseases sometimes claimed 
more victims than artillery fi re. Soldiers were so debilitated and ex-
hausted by the war that there was a particularly high sickness rate in 
1918, albeit the fi gures must have included typical shirkers, malin-
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gerers feigning illness. From March to August 1918 there were over 
a million names on the German army’s sick list. A high incidence 
of sickness, a consequence of diffi  culties with adapting to European 
climatic conditions, was observed in the British dominion forces. In 
1917 the sickness rate in Australian forces was 144 for every thou-
sand soldiers; the corresponding fi gure for Canadian forces was 158; 
and 34 in the British forces, with just a slightly higher fi gure in the 
French army. But according to estimates, the soldiers at the top of 
the table for sickness were the Turks. Malaria, cholera, and typhus 
wreaked immense havoc. Diseases caused seven times more fatalities 
in the Turkish army than combat. German and Allied soldiers were 
at particular risk from diseases prevalent in hot climates, in spite of 
adhering to the rules of hygiene, being vaccinated under medical su-
pervision, and taking the antimalarial drug quinine. Cholera killed 
the German Field Marshal Colmar von der Goltz (19th April 1916) 
in Mesopotamia. Th e Russians fi ghting in the Caucasus and Middle 
East also encouraged their soldiers to be wary, and distributed leaf-
lets in places where there was a risk, especially near wells, warning 
them not to drink water that had not been boiled because of cholera.
Typhus, a  consequence of dirty hands and lack of hygiene, was 
a serious danger. Robert Koch’s and Rudolf Virchow’s research had 
proved the inverse correlation between hygiene and disease. Th e 
more dirt and insanitary conditions, the fewer preventive measures 
taken, the better the prospects for typhus. Th at is why the greatest 
number of cases was reported on the Eastern, Turkish, and Balkan 
fronts. Typhus made a salient contribution to the defeat of the Ser-
bian army in 1915, depriving it of the potential to carry out the attack 
it had planned. Casualties due to disease exceeded those caused by 
enemy fi re. In the Balkans and Near East typhus and other diseases 
such as malaria exerted a fundamental but unwanted impact on the 
progress of the war.
On all fronts typhus thrived thanks to lice. At the beginning of 
the war soldiers who became lice-ridden were embarrassed and kept 
quiet about it. But once they realised how dangerous lice were for 
their health, they demanded prophylaxis. On the Western front ty-
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phus did not develop into an epidemic thanks to a preventive cam-
paign and the observance of the rules of hygiene. Chemicals were 
used for louse control, and the procedure was called “immunisation.” 
Soldiers leaving the trenches for the rear passed through a delousing 
establishment and bath-house, where they learned the benefi cial ef-
fects of soap, water, and a special chemical reagent. Th eir uniforms 
and personal belongings were disinfected or burned. Th ose going 
on leave received the same treatment, which was recorded in their 
paybooks. Lice-ridden Russian soldiers taken prisoner were quaran-
tined, washed, scrubbed, and deloused before they were allowed into 
a POW camp.
Lice infestation became a problem for soldiers of the Central Pow-
ers on the Eastern front. It was serious enough for Prince Wilhelm 
von Hohenzollern to put a letter addressed to the public in the press, 
appealing for donations for the lice-infested. He wrote, “Our forces 
in the East are overwhelmed by a plague of worms, carriers of dis-
eases, especially typhus. To overcome this threat, and particularly to 
stop the spread of disease we must have baths and disinfection for 
soldiers’ clothing available, and that costs a  lot of money.” But the 
substance that turned out to be the best remedy for lice was the poi-
son gas.
Th e belligerent countries introduced mass vaccination pro-
grammes for soldiers, prisoners-of-war, and civilians to stop infec-
tious diseases. In 1914–1919 200 million vaccines were administered 
in Germany alone. Th e overall results of this gigantic eff ort by thou-
sands were benefi cial. No epidemics broke out on the Western front. 
Moreover, intensive research carried out on the sources of infectious 
diseases brought several important achievements. British scientists 
produced an eff ective vaccine against dysentery, and in 1915 the 
French produced an anti-typhoid vaccine, bringing down the mor-
tality rate.
One of the biggest challenges the medical services had to face were 
psychiatric disorders. Th e fi gures for psychiatric complaints rose 
dramatically. Hundreds of thousands in all the armies put together – 
80 thousand in Britain, 159 thousand Americans, and 270 thousand 
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in Germany – are estimated to have come out of the war with severe 
psychiatric disorders. In fact, the German statistics should be even 
higher, since 600 thousand Germans had to be hospitalised owing 
to “diseases of the nervous system.” Some were withdrawn from the 
front. Initially psychiatric patients were generally taken for malinger-
ers, fakers, loafers, or even deserters and traitors, and even by the end 
of the war that’s what many an offi  cer thought of them. In addition, 
there was a  tendency to regard homosexuals as slouches, cowards, 
and potential spies. It was widely held that punishment was what 
they deserved, not sympathy. Defi ned as “the crime of unnatural for-
nication,” homosexual practices were usually punished by degrada-
tion and imprisonment.
Misdiagnosed psychiatric cases sometimes led to a tragic fi nale, 
when the patient was court-martialled for treason and executed in 
the full majesty of the law. Doctors’ limited knowledge of psychiatric 
disorders could not be of much help to military courts. Th e prob-
lem had still not been resolved when the war fi nished. Usually the 
symptoms of psychiatric disorders evoked by the experience of war, 
although highly diverse, were lumped together and labelled “war 
neurosis,” “névrose de guerre,” or “Kriegsneurose.” British psychia-
trists adopted the term “shell shock” aft er an article published in the 
prestigious medical journal Th e Lancet in February 1915. One of the 
psychiatric disorders given a name of its own was “barbed wire psy-
chosis.” Soldiers suff ering from it could not be induced, even by pun-
ishments, to leave the trenches and attack across the barbed wire.
Th e heated debate on the origins of psychiatric disorders did not 
bring a  conclusive answer. Sigmund Freud and the psychoanalysts 
associated neurosis with sexuality, while the clinical psychiatrists saw 
it as connected with neurological disorders. Th e psychiatrists tended 
to support the theory that “war neurosis” was the result of a perma-
nent state of stress due to the experience of the war and its atrocities, 
risk of death, injury, and helplessness. Others, including Austrian 
psychiatrists, saw a connection between neurotic disposition and low 
social status, or “inferior” nationality, and they tried to show that it 
occurred chiefl y in non-Germans and the uneducated. Nonetheless 
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proof that it was the war that was the chief source of psychiatric dis-
orders was at hand on all the fronts. Aft er combat soldiers were ob-
served to have faces that were “scared stiff .” “Th ey lost their senses.” 
Some went torpid, others sank into depression, still others into pro-
found anxiety states caused by extreme horror. Others got diarrhoea 
at the sight of a battlefi eld. Many of those who could not cope with 
their distress took their lives. One of them was the Austrian Expres-
sionist poet Georg Trakl, who committed suicide in 1914 in Kraków, 
and was buried there.
Th e most common symptoms of “war neurosis” were hallucina-
tions, an unusually neurotic condition, aggressiveness or apathy, 
paralysis, amnesia, loss of bowel and bladder control, nervous tics, 
insomnia, chronic headaches, and nightmares. No-one really knew 
how and where to treat psychiatric patients. Nonetheless the authori-
ties decided to establish psychiatric wards. Th e therapy administered 
was hypnosis, tranquillisers and narcotic drugs, as well as ECT (elec-
troconvulsive therapy), which oft en led to cruelty and abuse. Some 
patients subjected to ECT died, and aft er the war there were legal 
proceedings in several countries concerning such cases.
Venereal diseases were among the most common ailments, as in 
any war. Th ey were embarrassing, hence prevention and treatment 
was problematic. Th ey were referred to as the “war diseases,” albeit 
some conscripts and volunteers were already infected with VD when 
they enlisted. For the young French, English, German, or Czech 
workers who were called up visits to a brothel were commonplace. It 
was estimated that about 50% of the British soldiers who were diag-
nosed with VD had caught it while still in Britain. Th e rest got it in 
France, even though they were warned about excessive drinking and 
women. Apparently half of the 3,907 registered prostitutes in Paris 
were suff ering from VD. Access to them was easy: the French gut-
ter press advertised their addresses for soldiers looking for a “god-
mother.” As a  result in 1916 about 19.2% of the patients admitted 
to British military hospitals in France were suff ering from VD. Th e 
corresponding fi gure for the entire period of the war was 27%. A to-
tal of 416,891 cases were diagnosed. In 1915 VD was confi rmed 
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in 22% of the Canadian soldiers. But some British conscripts got 
themselves infected deliberately to avoid being sent to the front, as 
medical examinations revealed. Th is was a common practice in all 
the armies. Some who caught VD lost their sight because of it.
A widespread opinion shared by soldiers of diverse armies was 
that they deserved life’s pleasures, even though they might be haz-
ardous. For this reason military bases were surrounded by a ring of 
cheap joints, palaces of pleasure, and brothels. Popular music hall 
songs claimed that there was a girl for every soldier: let them enjoy 
life while they can, for who knows which of them will return home. 
And that was the clinching argument – they might never return 
home, so why deny themselves the pleasures of Life?
Both the Allies and their adversaries keenly observed the growing 
number of infections. Th e commands introduced prevention cam-
paigns. Army doctors warned soldiers of the dangers of casual inter-
course, and of sexual intercourse in general. Th ey conjured up scary 
stories of soldiers who caught VD and the consequences they suf-
fered. “I dread looking at the symptoms of gonorrhoea,” one soldier 
confi ded, “I think that if that ever happened to me, I’d probably kill 
myself.” Army commands inspected the brothels and set up licensed 
bawdy houses for soldiers only. Th e men queued up for them, just 
as to the latrines, the only diff erence being that in the brothels there 
were military police on guard. By 1917 there were 137 soldiers’ houses 
of pleasure in 35 French towns. In March 1917 the British authorities 
prohibited the use of public brothels for soldiers and set up licensed 
ones. Th ey also imposed severe penalties for girls who infected sol-
diers. Th e Austro-Hungarian authorities did likewise. In the winter 
of 1916 on the initiative of General Karl Bardoff , chief-of-staff  of 
the Second Army stationed in Russia, they set up licensed houses of 
pleasure, which brought down the incidence of sexually transmitted 
diseases. Sometimes condoms were issued to soldiers going on leave. 
Th e Empress Zita protested against the “soldiers’ houses of pleasure,” 
but that did not make military command change their mind. Th ere 
were protests, not only in Austria, from clergymen and moralists, 
too, who saw this as moral and religious decline. Th e German mili-
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tary authorities followed suit, treating the matter as a necessary evil. 
Th e army recruited and registered the girls, who were regularly ex-
amined by army doctors. Th e army also regulated the price of sexual 
services. By the second half of the war all the armies had appointed 
military police and sanitary offi  cers to oversee their soldiers’ “houses 
of licence.” Th e increasingly restrictive policy was due to the more 
and more aggravating consequences of sexually transmitted diseases, 
but it turned out to be eff ective. In all the armies the rigours were not 
relaxed until the autumn of 1918, which made the contracting of VD 
easier. American soldiers on their way to France were warned not to 
indulge in intercourse and discouraged from visiting the houses of 
pleasure. But the ones who were the main victims of VD were not 
the soldiers, but civilians who availed themselves of the services of 
infected women.
3. The killed
I have described the tragedy of the thousands of wounded who 
died before help arrived. While this is true, we must bear in mind 
that thanks to progress in medicine only 8% of the American soldiers 
who were wounded died, whereas the fi gure was 44% still in the Civil 
War. Th ere was an improvement in the proportion of the dead to 
the sick. During the Napoleonic Wars for every soldier killed there 
were usually 5–7 fatalities due to disease; whereas in 1914–1917 on 
the Western front the ratio was reversed: 1 death due to disease to 
15 killed in battle. Only in the Middle and Near East and in the Sa-
lonica area was the ratio the inverse.
Th e large numbers of soldiers killed every day was a consequence 
of the new technologies of killing and the strategy of attrition both 
sides had implemented. Th e lives of a whole generation were sacri-
fi ced in the battle for a  few kilometres along the front; every metre 
cost hundreds of lives. “Th e front rotted with corpses,” “death facto-
ry,” “the slaughterhouse of Europe,” “the lunatic asylum,” “bloodbath” 
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were the comments. Th e worst was that the determination of the units 
engaged in combat and the commitment of their soldiers started to be 
measured in terms of the numbers killed, and offi  cers whose compa-
nies or battalions sustained relatively few casualties were suspected of 
malingering. Th e death of thousands ceased to be a cause for anguish. 
People soon got accustomed to it. Winston Churchill wrote to his wife 
Clementine that death was no longer shocking nor surprising, it was 
just natural, ordinary, something that could happen to anyone any 
time. Th e sight of mangled bodies hanging on barbed wire, the stench 
of decomposing corpses, the stink of the trenches became everyday 
experiences. In any case soldiers needed to adapt to such a war and 
be reconciled with it if they were to keep their sanity. A French sol-
dier described the gory details of the death of his friend. His face was 
burned off , one piece of shrapnel entered the skull behind the ear, an-
other ripped up the belly and broke the spine. You could see the spinal 
cord fl oating in a red mass. Th e right leg was shattered to above knee 
level. Th e worst was that the victim was still alive for a few minutes. 
Th ere were thousands of similar, or even more drastic descriptions. 
Th e battlefi elds were not venues for the duels of heroes but sites of 
atrocity and suff ering. No wonder that many years later veterans were 
still being haunted by nightmares of the war.
Understandably, the death of their loved one was extremely dis-
tressful for families. Th ey were informed by telegram with the same 
wording that read that their relative was a valiant and good soldier, 
that he was loved by his comrades, that he had done his duty well, 
that he had died like a hero on the fi eld of glory, that he had fought 
“for King and Country,” “für Gott, Kaiser, und Vaterland,” “pour la 
République.” Th e texts were what the families expected. Th e words 
about heroism were theatrical clichés. In reality soldiers were killed 
by shellfi re. Th ey never saw their killers, who never knew their vic-
tims. Death would oft en come “like a hurricane,” they wrote, for it was 
death wreaked by the ritual of artillery fi re and snipers on the prowl. 
Still in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 a soldier could see enemy 
guns pointed straight at him, but no longer in the Great War. Before 
he could experience the presence of the enemy in his own trenches – 
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if he ever got the chance – he experienced the consequences of shell-
fi re, poison gas, the whizz and barrage of bullets, the groans of the 
wounded. An anonymous cog in a great army, he was just a manhan-
dled tool. Technology had triumphed over human ingenuity on the 
battlefi eld, making for a  depersonalised war. Th e rifl eman and 
the artilleryman did not consider the person they were to shoot, but 
the accuracy of the shot.
Death notices were sent out within 10–14 days, while information 
that a  soldier was missing was despatched much later, sometimes 
several months later. Th e correspondence was handled by the unit’s 
offi  cers or the regimental offi  ce. Th e names of those who were killed 
or had died of wounds were published in the press, which secured 
a high level of readership. Th e Germans published lists of the dead 
every day except Mondays. Sometimes a deceased man’s personal be-
longings were returned to the family, but this never became the rule. 
Th e items which were returned most oft en included photographs, 
crosses, holy pictures and scapulars. Sometimes soldiers took the 
personal belongings of enemy soldiers who had been killed, treating 
them as a sort of trophy which they sent home to show that they were 
making a signifi cant contribution to the war. Germans found watch-
es on dead Englishmen, and gold and iron crosses which had been 
taken from German soldiers. Th ey admired the British mid-calf lace-
up boots, while British soldiers liked the German rubber galoshes for 
protection against mud and water. It was natural to consider enemy 
equipment, uniforms, coats, and shoes better. Some families lost two, 
or even three sons. One Frenchwoman died heartbroken on losing 
three sons. General Edouard de Castelnau, the hero of Verdun, also 
lost three sons.
Th e dead included those who were killed, those who died of their 
wounds, and those declared missing. In the several battles at Ypres, in 
which about a million lives were lost, 42 thousand British men could 
not be identifi ed. Only one-third of those who fell in the fi ghting for 
Fort Douaumont were identifi ed. Artillery shells ripped up bodies 
literally in pieces, so it was hard to identify the fallen. It was hard 
to tell whether a given soldier had been killed, had deserted, or was 
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missing. Th e dead fell into the pits and craters made by the shells and 
were covered with mud, hence bodies could not be found. French 
and Belgian farmers still come across the bones of soldiers from the 
Great War in their fi elds. In 2004 the frozen bodies of three Austro-
Hungarian soldiers were discovered at an altitude of 3,400 m in the 
Alps, at the foot of Punta San Matteo, and were given a funeral with 
military honours.
Th e colossal number of dead meant that not all of them could be 
buried. Oft en soldiers had to bury their mates or remnants of their 
mates near, or sometimes in the trenches, or put the bodies into sand-
bags and inter them in local graveyards. Not much could be done to 
preserve a fallen soldier’s identity, which made identifi cation diffi  cult 
or impossible later. Rarely were soldiers buried with military hon-
ours. Th e custom was most frequently observed in the British army, 
where soldiers organised funeral cortèges, carrying their guns upside 
down. Th ose who died in hospital were buried in mass graves or in 
their family graveyard. A custom developed, especially in France and 
Germany, for a standard text or occasional verse to be inscribed on 
soldiers’ gravestones instead of an individual epitaph.
Sometimes the dead would be laid in provisional roadside graves 
near crosses or holy statues, which were regarded as hallowed ground. 
Later they were exhumed and reinterred in military cemeteries. To 
prevent epidemics quicklime was put in the graves. Families claimed 
the right to bury their relatives where they thought most suitable and 
protested against the exhumations. Even while the war was still on 
families journeyed to the front in search of their son’s, husband’s, or 
brother’s grave, despite the prohibition on such travel. It was an old 
tradition going back at least to the Napoleonic Wars. Aft er the war 
a civic campaign was organised in France and Belgium by the fami-
lies of the fallen, who demanded the right to have their relatives re-
turned for burial in the hallowed ground of local graveyards and next 
to their kindred.
Usually in the European military cemeteries burials were con-
ducted with no segregation according to nationality into “them” and 
“us,” in line with the tradition of European culture. Death and burial 
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reconciled the antagonists. Th ere was no spatial segregation, either, 
so as not to spoil the aesthetics. Only members of the Judaic religion 
were buried in the nearest Jewish graveyard. Similarly, in Russia and 
the Balkans Moslems were buried in Islamic graveyards, though this 
was not a hard and fast rule. Th e exception was France, where all the 
fallen were buried in one plot, regardless of race or creed. In 1915 the 
French government decided to establish an archipelago of cemeter-
ies, which would include burial places for British soldiers, but a year 
later the authorities in London decided to set up separate cemeteries 
for their own. At fi rst the British founded the National Committee for 
the Care of Soldiers’ Graves with the Prince of Wales as its president, 
changing its name in 1917 to the Imperial War Graves Commission 
(and much later to the Commonwealth War Graves Commission), 
since soldiers from the Dominions were buried there as well. Th e 
Committee decided that soldiers should be buried as near as pos-
sible to the place where they died. Gravestones were being transport-
ed from Britain to France already during the war, and at a  rate of 
4 thousand a week in 1920–1923. No information was inscribed on 
the headstones on decorations, race, or religion: all were equal in the 
face of death. Other countries adopted the same principles.
Th e Italians built beautiful cemeteries, some in the form of mau-
soleums. Th ey, too, established a  state institution to organise and 
construct places of last repose for their fallen soldiers. Th e Ameri-
cans did not want their boys to lie far away from home and made 
arrangements for transport to America. Nonetheless, about 30% of 
the Americans who fell stayed in the European cemeteries. In the 
interwar period the US authorities fi nanced the travel of families to 
pay their respects at their relatives’ graveside. Th e Belgians decided 
to exhume all their dead from small and circumstantial places of bur-
ial and reinter them in a central cemetery at Langermarck, specially 
built on a scale comparable to the cemetery at Verdun. In December 
1915 the Ninth Department for War Graves started its operations in 
the Austro-Hungarian Ministry of War. A special group was set up 
under its auspices to look for suitable locations for military cemeter-
ies, design their layouts and arrange them. First-rate artists, painters, 
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graphic artists, sculptors, photographers, architects and landscape 
planners, such as the Slovak architect Dušan Jurkovič and the Polish 
painter Wojciech Kossak, were commissioned. Many of these cem-
eteries are a veritable work of art, a picturesque if sad landmark on 
the cultural horizon. In Western Galicia alone, which is now part of 
Poland, 378 war cemeteries and burial plots were established while 
the war was still going on, and more were created aft er 1919. Th ere 
are now 403 of these graveyards, meticulously looked aft er and con-
served. On the fence of one of them there is an inscription which 
says, “Our names have been extinguished, but our deeds continue 
to shine.” A  special unit in the Department for War Graves (the 
Evidenz-Gruppe) was created to keep records of the fallen, search for 
those declared missing, and identify bodies.
Th e Russians, too, were involved in the organisation of war graves, 
though not as assiduously as the others. Th e Alexandrian Committee 
conducted its operations from the very beginning of the war, identi-
fying the fallen, designing and organising cemeteries. Th e Germans 
had a  central war graves commission (Volksbund Deutsche Kriegs-
gräberfürsorge, founded in 1919), as well as separate organisations 
in the various regions and cities of Germany. Th ey had an effi  cient 
identifi cation system, thanks to which the overwhelming majority 
of the German dead could be identifi ed. Every German soldier had 
a metal dog-tag or one with his personal data on parchment enclosed 
in a special box.
In Europe the creation of war cemeteries was fi nanced by the state 
with additional funds coming from private individuals and institu-
tions. Th ey were designed in a similar way. Th e guidelines issued by 
the Allies as well as Germany and Austria-Hungary recommended 
simple landscape design. Th ere were wooden, metal or stone crosses. 
Sometimes the names of the fallen would be inscribed in a golden 
mosaic script. Th ere would be an earthwork and stone wall around 
a war cemetery, with a ring of oaks and birches for additional fenc-
ing, particularly where there were collective graves in the shape of 
a mound or tumulus. Some war cemeteries had chapels or, in Alpine 
areas, churches erected on them, with memorial tablets inside.
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Th ere was also the question of commemorating and honouring 
the unidentifi ed fallen. Th is was done by the creation of tombs of the 
unknown soldier – a new phenomenon in European culture. Th e fi rst 
of these monuments went up in Paris under the Arc de Triomphe, 
and in Westminster Abbey in London – places which signifi ed the 
highest tribute. Only the Germans, Austrians, and Hungarians – the 
losers – had problems with commemorating their unknown. War 
graves and cemeteries off ered a means of commemoration, just as 
special ceremonies did, to mark the anniversary of a battle, the be-
ginning or end of the war. Th e poem “In Flanders Fields,” written 
by the Canadian John McCrae to commemorate a  friend’s funeral 
made the poppy a symbol of the war and those who fell in it. In Brit-
ain Remembrance Sunday, popularly known as Poppy Day, has been 
held every year since 1921 on the Sunday nearest to 11th November, 
with the custom of laying wreaths of red poppies on the graves of 
the fallen.
4. Prisoners-of-war
On all the fronts a total of 8.4 million soldiers became prisoners-
of-war, 3.9 million in Allied POW camps, and 4.5 million held by the 
Central Powers. Th e Hague Convention gave a defi nition, though in 
very broad terms, of how POWs were to be treated. Th ey were to be 
isolated off  to prevent them from returning to the battlefi eld. Offi  c-
ers were to be separated off  from the men. Offi  cers were given better 
conditions than rank-and-fi le. Th e predicament of POWs was shown 
in a true-to-life manner in the once famous French fi lm “La Grande 
Illusion” (1937). Belligerent states conferred with each other on the 
territory of neutral countries on the exchange of prisoners-of-war. As 
of March 1917 POWs who had gone blind, had amputations or disfi g-
ured faces were exchanged. Holding them only meant costs, as there 
was no risk of them returning to the fi eld due to their disability. As of 
May 1917 POWs with psychiatric disorders, and from July those with 
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“barbed wire syndrome” were exchanged on the same grounds. As of 
December 1917, on the grounds of the Berne agreements, those over 
48 and those in detention for 18 months or over were exchanged – 
a total of about 1 million POWs to the end of the war.
Tens of thousands are estimated to have escaped from captivity. 
To make escape more diffi  cult, detaining authorities gave orders 
for POWs’ trouser buttons to be removed. Nonetheless, by April 
1916  12,440 POWs including General Lavr Kornilov had escaped 
from Austro-Hungarian detention camps. One of those who tried 
to escape from German captivity was Captain Charles de Gaulle. He 
made 5 unsuccessful attempts. In the camp at Ingolstadt he met the 
young Russian offi  cer Mikhail Tukhachevsky, future Marshal of the 
Soviet Union, and the French air force ace Roland Garros.
Th e largest number of POWs, 3.0–3.6 million, came from the Rus-
sian army. Until January 1917 for every 100 Russian soldiers who 
were killed, there were 200 who surrendered. Th e ratio for the Brit-
ish army was 20 to 100; 24 to 100 for the French army; and 26 to 
100 for the German army. POW camps were inspected by the Inter-
national Prisoners of War Agency (established by the International 
Red Cross) and the plenipotentiaries of the governments of neutral 
countries, the USA (until April 1917), Spain, and Sweden. However, 
the inspectors were not always admitted. In any case their critical 
remarks did not have to be respected. Th e inspectors observed the 
quality of the food, the sanitary conditions, and in the Turkish camps 
the brutality of the guards and the violence they exercised, especially 
on Indian prisoners. Indian soldiers had a notorious reputation for 
killing Turkish POWs. Arabian insurgents were infamous for rob-
bing POWs and letting them loose naked in the scorching hot de-
sert. In general POWs received parcels from home with food, warm 
clothing, and medicine, and had money sent to them and paid out by 
a bank, thanks to which they could buy extra food. Austrian, Hun-
garian, and German POWs detained in Russia could go to Sweden 
to convalesce, on a doctor’s recommendation. But the biggest prob-
lem was the shortage of food. In 1917 one of the Polish POWs (for-
mer soldiers of the Russian army) detained in Hungary complained, 
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“We have been starving for three weeks. We have been told to join 
the Polish Legions, a  Polish army. No-one has been allowed to go 
home, and we don’t know how it will all end, except that we are dy-
ing of hunger.” As regards food and sanitary conditions, the POWs 
in France and Germany were best off ; conditions were not so good 
in the Russian, Hungarian, and Italian camps; and the worst were in 
the Turkish camps. 70% of the British and Indian POWs in Turk-
ish captivity died from thirst, hunger, disease, the heat, and sand-
storms on the way from Mesopotamia to camps in Central Turkey, 
in what became known as the March of Death. Th e graveyards in the 
vicinity of POW camps testifi ed to the scale of the problems: POWs 
emaciated by malnutrition were easy prey to diseases. Only 60% of 
those who reached a camp in Central Turkey survived to the end of 
the war. 750 thousand POWs are estimated to have died in camps in 
various countries. Apart from Turkey, the mortality rate was highest 
in Serbia (25%), Rumania (23%), and Russia (17.5%). In France and 
Germany it was no more than a few per cent, and most POWs held 
in those countries were liberated at the end of the war.
POWs were forced to work, doing a variety of jobs on the principle 
of food for work. Th ey were employed in mines and munitions facto-
ries; building fortifi cations and digging trenches, corridors and tun-
nels; they transported food and ammunition; repaired electricity and 
railway lines, roads and bridges; they built cemeteries. In Germany 
65 thousand French forced labourers built the Hindenburg Line. Ear-
lier 15 thousand Russian POWs had constructed German fortifi ca-
tions near Verdun. In February 1917 POWs accounted for 60% of the 
workforce in the Russian iron ore mines and 30% in the steelworks. 
In 1915–1916 about 25–40 thousand POWs died on the construction 
of the Murmansk railway. Th ere were many deaths among the Turk-
ish POWs working for the British in the Near East. Russian POWs 
in Austria-Hungary were employed on the construction of roads and 
tunnels in the Alps. Many of them died as evidenced by numerous 
Orthodox Christian roadside crosses and icons. 
Many of those digging trenches or building shelters died from 
friendly (their compatriots’) fi re. POWs sent letters to the Interna-
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tional Red Cross to protest at their treatment; Allied soldiers held in 
Germany even tried to stage strikes, which were brutally put down. 
POWs complained that their country had forgotten them. A growing 
sense of alienation and camp claustrophobia vexed them. Th e predic-
ament of POWs never became part of their nation’s collective mem-
ory of the war, perhaps because there were no spectacular escapes of 
the kind which could excite journalists, writers, or fi lm-makers. Th e 
way they spent their aft ernoons and evenings – playing cards, chess, 
draughts, or basketball, attending lectures given by their learned col-
leagues, or reading newspapers – was not particularly exciting.
Sometimes certain groups of POWs enjoyed privileges, for exam-
ple captive Serbs and Czechs held in Russian camps; likewise Poles 
and Czechs in French and Italian detention. Some were off ered their 
freedom, if they joined the armies of their captors. In January 1915 
an Adriatic legion was set up of Serbian soldiers held in Russia, 
alongside a  Czech company (Česká družina; later reorganised into 
the Czechoslovak Rifl e Brigade, and then the Czechoslovak Corps in 
Russia). A division of Czech POWs and deserters was established in 
Italy, and a Czechoslovak legion was created in France. Polish POWs 
in France enlisted in a Polish army under the command of General 
Józef Haller; and aft er the February Revolution Poles held in Russia 
created Polish corps and regiments.
5. Deserters and mutinies
Th ere were also camps – diff erent ones – for deserters and muti-
neers. Both groups were severely punished, in some cases with the 
death penalty. Th e military authorities realised what a bad eff ect de-
serters and mutineers would have on the morale of the rest of their 
soldiers. Punishments were particularly severe in Italy because of 
the scale of the phenomenon. In 1915 66 Italian deserters faced the 
fi ring squad, 167 in 1916, and 359  in 1917. In that year the Ital-
ian authorities introduced draconian measures to restore discipline, 
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such as the execution of every tenth soldier in units which mutinied. 
By the end of the war they had executed over 1,000 soldiers. But 
these measures were not eff ective. On the contrary, it turned thou-
sands of Italians against their country and army. Deserters and mu-
tineers deemed less culpable were placed in detention camps and set 
to hard labour in overalls with the word “deserter” printed on them. 
In the British army there were 361 executions, and 48 in the German 
army. Many more were convicted in those countries, but usually the 
death sentence was commuted to long-term imprisonment. Some 
sentenced to life imprisonment in Germany were liberated by the 
Allies… in 1945.
In the fi rst two years of the war the number of deserters in the 
various armies was not so large, and only marginal on the Western 
front, where the soldiers were motivated to fi ght for their nation 
and country. Not surprisingly, the propaganda campaigns encour-
aging desertion were not very eff ective. Desertion crops up in the 
plot of Pădurea spânzuraților, (Gallows Bird Forest), a novel by the 
Rumanian writer Liviu Rebreanu. Nonetheless desertion did oc-
cur. In 1915 soldiers from two French battalions marched out of the 
trenches singing the Internationale. Similar incidents happened in 
the Austro-Hungarian army.
A higher rate of desertion was observed in the Russian and Turk-
ish army. According to estimates around 450–500 thousand had de-
serted from the Turkish army by November 1918, and 1.5 million 
from the Russian army by the end of 1916. Th e desertion rate rose 
in Russia aft er the February Revolution. Russian soldiers did not 
have a strong sense of identity with their country, and still less with 
their nation, but they did feel a bond with their monarch and fought 
well as long as they were watched and punished for insubordination. 
Once the father fi gure – the tsar – had been removed and discipline 
became lax, Russian soldiers no longer saw the need to fi ght. Th e 
well-disciplined army dwindled down into a  bunch of marauders 
and deserters. Not surprisingly, about 900 thousand deserted in the 
course of 1917, before November. Bolshevik agitators encouraged 
them to desert, and many a deserter joined the Bolshevik Party.
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Th e revolutions in Russia and the protracted war stimulated de-
sertion and mutiny in all the armies. Courts-martial had plenty of 
work on their hands. Th ere were mass desertions from the Bulgarian 
and Rumanian armies. In the second half of 1918 desertion became 
a  serious problem in the Austro-Hungarian forces. Some deserted 
in search of food, others because they could no longer see any sense 
in fi ghting. In August 1918 the number that had deserted from the 
Austro-Hungarian army was estimated at 100 thousand; by the end 
of September it had risen to 250 thousand; to reach 400 thousand in 
late October – 5%–8% of the Austro-Hungarian forces. Usually the 
deserters were soldiers who never returned from leave, hence meas-
ures were taken to curtail leave. Fairly large numbers of deserters 
got to Switzerland, where they even set up a deserters’ union. Pre-
ventive measures failed in view of the scale of desertion; the severe 
regulations were eff ectively suspended. Th ose who were convicted 
had their sentences suspended or mitigated. Courts handed down 
sentences of hard labour instead of the death penalty. Some malin-
gered as soon as they were called up. Whenever that happened, gen-
darmes would visit the malingerer’s parents with a warning that if 
their son did not report to barracks the father would be called up. 
Usually deserters would hide in the woods and set up dangerous 
criminal groups known as “green bands.” Th ey earned their living by 
robbing civilians. Th ere were also numerous gangs of this type on the 
prowl in Italy, Rumania, and Bulgaria. In the summer and autumn of 
1918 the high rate of desertion had an eff ect on deteriorating condi-
tions in the German army. 10% of the German soldiers absconded 
while being repatriated from Russia. Many of those who stayed in 
the army joined covert strikes, in other words carried out orders in 
a lazy manner. Th eir numbers are estimated to have risen to a million 
by the autumn of 1918.
Th e history of the First World War also has organised or sponta-
neous mutinies of whole units on record, such as the mutiny in the 
Austro-Hungarian navy at Kotor in January 1918, although they were 
not as widespread as desertion. One of the more serious mutinies as 
regards scale occurred in France in the spring of 1917. Th e one in 
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Russia in 1917 led to the February Revolution. Similarly in Germany 
the naval mutinies in early November 1918 precipitated the uprising 
known as the November Revolution. Th e mutinies that occurred in 
the other armies were not so large.
In late April and May 1917 some battalions, regiments, and divi-
sions in France refused to carry out orders. Th e incident coincided 
with the breakdown of the Nivelle Off ensive, which had been badly 
planned, and conducted even worse. “We’ve had enough killed,” the 
mutineers chanted. One of the units marched through several towns 
baaing like sheep led to slaughter. Mutinies did not have a decisively 
political undercurrent, although the February Revolution in Russia 
and the emergence of soldiers’ councils left  its impression on the im-
agination. With certain exceptions mutineers did not call for peace 
immediately, although they wanted peace on French terms. Signs 
of insubordination were recorded in nearly half the divisions of the 
French army, but the soldiers who defi ed and were ready to fi ght 
against the authorities are estimated to have numbered 25–30 thou-
sand. Th ey intended to seize control of a  number of trains, attack 
Paris, and overthrow the government. But they had no leaders, and 
were in the minority. Th ey spent too much time arguing and drink-
ing wine to take eff ective action. When they sobered up they found 
themselves in jail.
To deal with the mutineers Marshal Philippe Pétain, the new 
French Commander-in-Chief, applied the traditional carrot-and-
stick method. He extended soldiers’ leave and gave them a pay rise, 
improved the quality of their meals, increased war widows’ and or-
phans’ pensions, made military administration more effi  cient, and 
won the soldiers’ trust. He ordered offi  cers to organise regular con-
ferences for the men to tell them why France was fi ghting. On the 
other hand, he had no qualms about imposing reprisals. He ordered 
the arrest of 5 ringleaders out of every company that had engaged in 
the mutiny. In the course of 1917 the courts handed down 554 death 
sentences, but only 48 were carried out. It was decided that exces-
sively severe measures would be counter-productive since, as Pétain 
said, “all the soldiers are ours.” Reprieves were granted to the lead-
ers of the Senegalese division. French socialists stood up staunchly 
to defend the mutineers, whom they saw as apostles of democracy 
and freedom. Left -wingers called for the setting up of revolutionary 
councils based on the Russian model. “Soldiers are in a permanent 
state of agitation which is being exacerbated by the press, full of re-
ports on the events in Russia,” General Louis Franchet d’Espèrey as-
sessed the situation.
By mid-June the excitement had started to subside, and Pétain as-
sessed that in October 1917 the crisis was over. Th ere was a return 
to discipline and military order, which lasted to the end of the war, 
for the French war machine, including provisions, the war economy, 
the political system, and the communications infrastructure, worked 
well. What had happened in the spring of 1917 were incidents of mu-
tiny, but not of revolution, unlike the situation in Russia, and later 
in Germany and Austria-Hungary. Th e French had once again con-
fi rmed their commitment to their republican country, their state, and 
their proud nation.
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IV. The Civilians’ War
1. The war economy
Th e belligerents were not planning to introduce major changes in 
their economy, as they expected the war to end soon. However, aft er 
a few weeks the state authorities decided that a switch to a wartime 
economy was the order of the day. Some civilians were to don uni-
forms and march off  to the front, while others were to transform into 
“soldiers behind the front” or “soldiers on the home front.” A sup-
porting base had to be created and geared to work for the front, pro-
viding it with human and material resources on a hitherto unimagi-
nable scale.
In the First World War the boundary between the front and its 
hinterland, as it was known from earlier wars, was completely ob-
scured due to the colossal scale on which belligerent countries mo-
bilised their resources, which called for an absolutely co-ordinated 
eff ort on the part of the military and the civilians. Th is was achieved 
sooner in France than in Britain; much faster in Germany than in 
Austria-Hungary; and at the slowest rate in Turkey. In the Allied 
countries the mobilisation of civilians worked well until the very end; 
but in the Central Powers by the summer of 1918 it was encountering 
formidable obstacles which foretold the impending disaster.
To introduce the rules of a  wartime economy and make them 
viable, the authorities had to put civilian administration and civil-
ians under military control and military courts, which handed down 
summary sentences with no right of appeal. Internment laws and 
regulations were introduced, and on their grounds individuals sus-
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pected of sympathising with the enemy and citizens of foreign states 
were interned. Suspected persons were put under surveillance, or 
they could be arrested, interned, or even executed. Drastic instances 
occurred chiefl y on occupied territories and areas bordering on the 
front. Restrictions were put on rights and freedoms such as the free-
dom to travel, the right to privacy in the home and its inviolability, 
the right to assemble, organise strikes and protests, and set up trade 
unions; or they could even be suspended for the duration of the war. 
Other restrictive measures which were introduced included censor-
ship, the control of correspondence, and phone tapping. Publication 
in “enemy languages” was banned. Th e scale of these restrictions 
varied from country to country and changed with time; it was big-
ger in Austria-Hungary than in France, and bigger in Germany than 
in Britain. Parliaments conferred special powers on their respective 
governments for the duration of the war. Th e purpose of all these 
measures was to increase the state’s domestic security and the effi  -
ciency of its war economy, and thanks to them the state was able to 
extend the level of its interference in production, the supply of raw 
materials, and the food and agricultural market.
In Britain, Germany, and other countries the state subsidised 
farmers and supervised imports. Even in the USA with its reputation 
for economic freedom in 1917 a war economy was imposed for food. 
A fundamental input to this decision came from the lively and ingen-
ious Herbert Hoover, serving as head of U.S. Food Administration. 
It was presumably on his initiative that a campaign was launched to 
make Americans realise that their “food was fi ghting,” with slogans 
like “Food will win the war” and “Food is ammunition – don’t waste 
it.” But despite such special eff orts food production fell, not only in 
the USA but in all the countries. In Europe this was due to the scale 
of requisitioning, the slaughter of animals due to lack of fodder, the 
devastation of crops and pastures in areas along the front, shortage 
of agricultural labourers, a cessation in the use of artifi cial fertilisers 
due to the application of the chemicals in the war industries, and 
the mobilisation of horses – a fact which was particularly vexing and 
regrettable, for most of the animals mobilised never returned to their 
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owners and work on the land. 8 million horses died! In outcome, 
41% of the prewar cereal yield was harvested in Austria in 1918, and 
56.8% in Hungary.
State interference went even further in industry. Industrial plants 
changed their product range as fast as possible, from civilian to mili-
tary goods. Many private businesses were taken over by the state or 
put under state control. Th e extent of this phenomenon was relatively 
small in Italy, where industrial mobilisation was left  to the private 
sector; but larger in Germany. In Turkey the few factories engaged in 
military production were eff ectively controlled by German military 
consultants and managers. In Russia state interference in industrial 
production was extensive enough to warrant the opinion that a “war-
time socialism” had been established. In 1916 the famous Putilov and 
Obukhov works were nationalised, and the fuel and energy market 
was put under control.
Th e centralisation of power, and the prioritisation of military over 
civilian authorities, and of the executive over the legislative authori-
ties was an inevitable step. New government institutions, or joint 
government and private institutions had to be created to carry out 
wartime objectives. Th e imperial powers had to fi nd the means to 
mobilise their colonial manpower and material resources. In Italy the 
number of ministries went up from 12 to 22. 75 special committees 
with a membership chiefl y of businessmen were set up in the British 
Ministry of Munitions, where Winston Churchill was minister as of 
1917. Th e situation was similar in the USA and the other countries: 
everywhere special committees and commissions were appointed to 
plan production and manage orders.
Th e state imposed its production plan on private, co-operative, 
and state-owned companies, compelling them to produce specifi c 
goods at a fi xed price. Popular politicians, including Socialists such 
as the French Minister of Armaments Albert Th omas, who enjoyed 
the confi dence of the working class, were appointed to the national 
committees and commissions. Th omas raised the level of work-
ers’ participation in factory management. As a  result the volume 
of arms production rose dramatically in all the countries, while ci-
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vilian production diminished, or even in some sectors disappeared 
altogether. Despite the increase in arms production, the overall level 
of industrial production fell. Th e causes of this were wartime dev-
astation, requisitions, embargoes, shortages of capital, and – most 
importantly – shortages of raw materials and labour. In Germany 
industrial production in 1918 fell to 57% of its level in 1913; in Bul-
garia the corresponding fi gure (for January 1918) was 65%; and in 
Turkey 53% (for July 1918). In Hungary the extraction of coal fell 
to 79.8% of its prewar level, and steel production dropped to half its 
prewar level.
Th e state had to be powerful enough to monitor and control trans-
port. Th e army had the categorical priority on the railways. Passenger 
services were reduced to a minimum, and a permit had to be obtained 
for travel. Th e state supervised the production, repair and mainte-
nance of rolling stock. Nevertheless it was unable to guarantee the 
replaceability of damaged stock. In the summer of 1918 in Austria-
Hungary one-third out of a total 14 thousand engines was being re-
paired. Th e transportation of infantry divisions from Galicia to Italy, 
which used to take 4 days in 1915, rose to 14 days in 1918. Th e state 
was the initiator and constructor of railway lines, especially in the 
area around the front, bridges, and macadamised roads. Th e Bri-
tish built a railway line from Egypt to Jerusalem. Th e Germans built 
bridges, railway lines, and roads in the Kingdom of Poland, Lithu-
ania, and Ukraine for more effi  cient management of the land they 
had occupied and faster transportation of troops across it.
State interventionism meant that the authorities controlled about 
30–40% of the gross national product, and this was true even of Brit-
ain, with its free market conditions. Th e state represented by its of-
fi cials soon came to love this. Th e omnipotence of the state, defended 
on the grounds of the needs of the war, did not always guarantee 
effi  cient management.
Th e role of the state rose in the neutral countries of Europe, too, 
which took the opportunity to quickly develop and modernise their 
armies and transform at least part of their economies from civilian 
to wartime. Th ey were worried they might be attacked by one of the 
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belligerent coalitions. Th e state authorities of neutral countries had 
to handle the problem of reconciling political neutrality with lucra-
tive trade with both blocs.
An astronomical sum of money was needed for the war, which cost 
far more that the planners had foreseen. Th e war of 1870/1871 had 
cost Germany 7 million marks a day. In the autumn of 1914 Germa-
ny’s daily war expenditure was 36 million marks; and by 1918 it had 
risen to 146 million. War funds were collected relentlessly; a larger 
and larger portion of the national budget was set aside for the war, 
and the parliaments of the various belligerent countries passed the 
requisite legislation already in the fi rst days of the war. Th e percent-
age of the German budget assigned to the war was 25% in 1914, 33% 
in 1916, and 53% in 1918. Britain’s war budget rose from ₤91 million 
in 1913 to ₤1.956 billion in 1918, making up 80% of the national 
budget at 52% of its GDP. Some of this money came directly from 
the pockets of the people. Belligerent states introduced war loans, is-
sued war bonds, printed more banknotes, and issued special stamps 
and postcards with the portrait of George V, Bismarck or von Hin-
denburg. Germany practically did not raise taxes, unlike Britain and 
the USA, which brought in a tax on luxury goods, high stock mar-
ket profi ts, and extraordinary income. People trusted their countries, 
and so war loan campaigns such as the ones in France, the United 
States, and Germany, which off ered a good return in interest, were 
usually successful, but they soon made the state the debtor of its citi-
zens. Th e national debt rose several times – most of all in Germany, 
which did not have easy access to international loans. In 1913 Ger-
many’s national debt amounted to 5.4 billion marks, but by 1918 it 
had risen to 156.1 billion marks. People treated the purchase of war 
bonds as a sign of their civic solidarity with the troops, so they did 
not protest and paid up, in accordance with the press slogan, “Lend 
your money to your nation.” A country’s citizens made up a nation 
that was aware of its national objectives and capable of heroic eff ort 
and self-sacrifi ce. Germany issued 9 war loans; Austria-Hungary is-
sued 8; Russia 6; Italy and the USA 5 each; France 4: and Britain 3. 
Russia did the least well, for the people of Russia did not trust their 
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government and dragged their feet over buying war bonds and loans. 
Th e Russian authorities decided to print more banknotes, which 
were not backed by any assets whatsoever. As a result prices soared 
and there was high infl ation.
By February 1917 the number of banknotes in circulation in Rus-
sia had risen by 600%. Th e corresponding fi gures for France and 
Germany were 100% and 200% respectively. In August 1914 Britain 
left  the gold standard and the Treasury issued £300 million of paper 
banknotes, without the backing of gold. In late July 1914 the Russian 
government suspended the exchangeability of the rouble for gold. By 
January 1917 only 16.2% of the Russian banknotes were backed in 
gold. Th e corresponding fi gure for France in 1918 was 21.5%. Th e 
other countries did likewise, calling their citizens to exchange their 
gold for paper money. In point of fact they had no option. In March 
1917 the Reichsbank appealed to the people of Germany to deposit 
their gold to reduce the gold defi cit. Th ere was a fairly good response, 
at least much better than the one elicited by the disastrous Russian 
issue of “liberty bonds” following the February Revolution. Russians 
were distrustful of the revolutionary government and were afraid to 
buy, fearing they would never see their money again, or if they did it 
would be next to worthless because of infl ation.
All the belligerent countries found themselves in a diffi  cult situ-
ation. Th e value of their currency was falling; their revenues, gold 
reserves, and the currency reserves in their central banks had fallen, 
too. Russia was in the worst situation, with a serious defi cit only par-
tially covered by foreign and domestic loans. In addition it lost more 
revenue when a prohibition was imposed on the production and sale 
of alcohol, which had supplied one-quarter of Russia’s revenues in 
1913. Despite the prohibition Russians were drinking twice as much 
as before the war. Bootlegging was a common practice; various raw 
materials including fermented bread were used to produce moon-
shine. On the other hand, in America the consumption of alcohol 
dropped when prohibition was imposed. Americans were disciplined 
citizens and could show solidarity with their country: being a teeto-
taller was tantamount to being a good patriot.
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Foreign loans were an important source of fi nance. In the fi rst years 
of the war Britain was the biggest creditor, becoming the coalition’s 
banker. By 1st April 1917 the war loans, which the Allies had advanced 
to one another, amounted to a total of $4.3 billion, of which 88% came 
from Britain. However, the needs were so great that even the resource-
ful Britons had to solicit loans from the American banks. Earlier 
France had tried to secure an American loan, but this proved diffi  cult, 
as the agreement between the French government and J.P. Morgan’s 
Bank was quashed by President Woodrow Wilson and his Secretary 
of the Treasury, who protested that money was the worst form of con-
traband. By refusing the loan Wilson had hoped that the belligerents 
would sit down to negotiate a  peace treaty sooner, ending what he 
considered senseless slaughter. However, the French and their Ameri-
can partners did not leave the matter at that, and a few months later 
came up with a new legal interpretation, claiming that the loan could 
be advanced through private American banks without infringing the 
United States’ neutrality. In October 1915 Morgan’s advanced a loan 
of $500 million to the French government, regardless of protests by 
Germany and the pro-German press in America. For Paris it was a tre-
mendous success. Morgan’s didn’t grumble, either: the commission on 
the transaction was 1–2%. Th e French paid in gold, foreign currency, 
and shares and bonds. By the end of March 1917 they had been ad-
vanced a loan of $1.071 billion. America loaned a total of $2.3 billion 
to all the Allies, serving as their banker, arsenal, and bread-basket. Th e 
American loans enhanced the status of the USA, making it a fi nancial 
superpower, and turning Wall Street into the world’s second fi nan-
cial centre alongside the City of London. Th e Allies became America’s 
debtors, and in the autumn of 1918 found themselves on the brink of 
fi nancial disaster, encumbered by a huge public debt.
Formally the American banks did not grant loans to the Central 
Powers, who did not apply for American loans. Instead they had 
loans through the Swiss, Swedish, and Dutch banks, some of which 
were in fact transfers from American banks.
Notwithstanding the various measures to secure funds, the belli-
gerent states were unavoidably heading for a currency crisis. Not only 
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states and their citizens suff ered, but also cities and regions which is-
sued surrogate money to meet their liabilities. Private businessmen 
and agriculturalists did the same to pay their employees’ wages. Sur-
rogate money oft en carried the issuer’s promise to redeem the bill 
aft er the war. Usually surrogate money was a paper bill, but occasion-
ally it took the form of counters made of tin, iron, or pottery.
Th e growth of wartime production was determined by the transfer 
of the labour force from civilian to military production, which meant 
that the proportion of the workforce employed in military production 
was growing all the time. In August 1914 only 24% of the total indus-
trial workforce in Russia was in military production, but by 1917 it 
had risen to 76%. In Italy it rose from 20% in 1915 to 64% in 1918. In 
Germany the war industry employed 1.5 million workers in 1914, and 
3.5 million in 1918. Only in Britain and the USA less than 50% of the 
workforce was engaged in the war industry, chiefl y because the soldiers 
of these two countries were supplied with French equipment.
Another challenge was how to manage the labour force to make 
production rise due to increasing productivity, not numbers em-
ployed. For this reason the authorities militarised the job market. 
Some of the workers employed in the munitions industry were put 
under military rule and barracked. Strikes and other forms of work-
ers’ protests were banned. Th e German authorities went the furthest 
in such restrictions on labour relations, which was taken as a  sign 
that the war had become “total,” a clash between nations and their 
economies. Walther Rathenau, the chairman of AEG, was put in 
charge of the mobilisation of the workforce and war production, an 
offi  ce he held until March 1915, establishing wartime companies. Th e 
following year the German authorities went even further to facilitate 
the implementation of von Hindenburg’s breakneck plan of 31st Au-
gust 1916, which envisaged an increase in equipment for the war by 
one-third, and in ammunition by a half, alongside an increase in the 
number of divisions, all in the space of a few months. To achieve it, 
some of the German workers were sent back to the factories from 
the front. In addition, on the grounds of the Auxiliary Service Act 
(Hilfsdienstgesetz) of 5th December 1916 all men between the ages of 
141
16 and 60, as well as childless married women, and women and girls 
engaged in “useless activities” were obliged to work for the front and 
perform auxiliary military service. In eff ect it meant mandatory em-
ployment, accompanied by longer working hours and shorter holi-
days. In the following year those who had not been called up for mili-
tary service were assigned to specifi c factories where they had to stay, 
just like serfs obliged to till their lord’s land. Th ey could not change 
their job without the consent of the authorities. Not only in Germany 
was there ready employment for the young and for old-age pension-
ers. Th e arrangements in other countries were similar, though per-
haps not as far-reaching. Militarisation improved productivity very 
substantially, especially as it was accompanied with improvements in 
the organisation of labour.
Th e numbers of female employees rose as well. Posters appeared 
on the walls of towns and villages urging women to take up a job in 
a munitions factory and “be doing their bit.” Another poster rally-
ing British women to work said “On her their lives depend. Women 
munition workers. Enrol at once.” Women’s organisations demanded 
the right to work for women as well, though the women who took 
up a job probably did so more out of material exigencies and poverty 
at home than due to the fi ne propaganda slogans, and despite the 
fact that their pay was 50–60% of the pay men on the same job took 
home. At any rate the men were not pleased with the feminisation 
of what had been men’s jobs hitherto. In some factories men’s trade 
unions adopted resolutions banning women from employment. Th ey 
did so not out of male chauvinism, the belief that only a man could 
support a family, but out of fear that women would take their jobs 
and then they would be sent to the front. Working men argued that 
the employment of women reduced their capacity for procreation, 
while of course the country needed new citizens. American trade 
unionists were none too friendly to their female colleagues at work, 
either. Th ey accused working women of immorality and taking up 
a job for dishonest or trivial reasons, such as wanting to buy trinkets 
or useless items. In eff ect working women were more discriminated 
against than coloured (male) workers.
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Th e winner in the tussle between men and women was the state, 
which cut production costs by reducing women’s pay and denying 
them social security, treating them as cheaper and less demanding 
workers. Th e prospect of mass female employment was a threat in the 
hands of the state and industrialists against recalcitrant male workers 
liable to stage protests and strikes.
Although female employment rose very substantially in terms of 
numbers, it would not be true to say that women took all or almost all 
of the men’s jobs. In Australia the percentage of female labour in in-
dustry rose from 24% in 1914 to 37% in the autumn of 1918; in Brit-
ain the respective fi gures were 26.1% to 36.1%, in Germany 22% to 
35%, in France 27% to 40%, and in Russia 27% to 43%. Th e largest 
increment was in services, though it was also considerable in indus-
try. Before the war 2.5 thousand women were employed in Krupp’s 
munitions plants; by 1918 the fi gure had risen to 28 thousand. In the 
French Renault car works there had been 190 women employees in 
1914; by 1918 there were 6,770. All countries witnessed a consider-
able feminisation in occupations such as secretaries, shop assistants, 
teachers, and nurses, but women lawyers or engineers were rare. In 
April 1916 the Germans compelled 20 thousand Frenchwomen from 
occupied Lille to take up employment. By employing Frenchwomen 
the German authorities wanted to convey the message to German 
women that they were being spared.
Prisoners-of-war and deserters were also sent to work in the war 
industries. Th e colonial empires made use of the resources in their 
colonies and dominions, setting up auxiliary corps consisting of na-
tive Africans, who were deployed directly on the front or in the rear 
lines. Workers for labour corps were contracted from semi-dependent 
countries such as Siam, Egypt, China, or neighbouring states. Th e 
French contracted 200 thousand Spaniards, 190 thousand Chinese, 
100 thousand Algerians, and 50 thousand workers from Indo-China. 
On their days off  the Asians and Africans appeared in the streets, 
arousing understandable curiosity with their diff erent culture, and 
sometimes there were incidents of racial tension. Th e press devoted 
a considerable amount of attention to this issue. Th e most irritating 
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situations occurred when African workers and soldiers visited broth-
els. Th ere were voices in the press that Africans should not be admit-
ted, as it was “a contamination of the white race.” Fights broke out, 
and there were even murders. Despite the unsatisfactory experience 
of relations with French people, some of the Chinese and Vietnam-
ese stayed in France illegally aft er 1918. Similarly in Britain, some 
of the workers recruited from India and the African colonies never 
returned home and settled in Britain. And that is how the arduous 
growth and development of multiracial and multicultural societies 
started in Western Europe. Th e tradition of migration from the colo-
nies to Western Europe dates back to the Great War.
Th e inhabitants of occupied territories were forced to work. Th ere 
were even street round-ups, and the Germans specialised in this. So 
street round-ups were not a Second World War invention. Th eir vic-
tims were Belgians, Poles, and Frenchmen. Th e Germans deported 
them for work in their factories and farms, and on the construction 
of the Hindenburg Line. A total of 120 thousand Belgians, 600 thou-
sand Poles, and 100 thousand Frenchmen were rounded up for forced 
labour on behalf of Germany. Th ey were employed in civilian work-
forces, and were issued with distinctive uniforms.
Once a source of fi nancing and a workforce had been procured, 
the belligerent states had to obtain the raw materials necessary for 
the production of armaments. To make the process effi  cient they es-
tablished government committees and departments, endowing them 
with a broad range of prerogatives. Th e needs were so huge that it was 
extremely diffi  cult, and sometimes impossible, to keep producers 
supplied. Prohibitions were imposed on the export of raw materials 
needed for the war. Raw materials were to be used economically, and 
the production of surrogate industrial commodities was introduced. 
Industrial laboratories worked at their full capacity, and the scientists 
and engineers employed in them searched for new types and kinds 
of raw materials. In many cases the experimentation and research led 
to invaluable discoveries and inventions, thereby prolonging the war. 
Th e greatest achievers in this respect were the Germans, who were af-
fected by an import blockade. Th ey developed a technology to obtain 
144
nitrogen from the atmosphere, which relieved them of the need to 
import saltpetre for the production of ammunition. Th ey also devel-
oped methods to obtain sulphur from gypsum, and glycerine from 
sugar. Synthetic oils, lubricants, and rubber were produced. Flax and 
hemp replaced cotton; fi bre and textiles were also obtained from net-
tles, reeds, hops, willow-bark and human hair. Artifi cial cotton, arti-
fi cial silk, and paper yarn were manufactured.
Th ere was large-scale requisitioning on occupied territories. Th e 
goods and commodities subject to requisitioning included church 
bells, copper roofi ng, kitchen utensils, tin and brass objects, under-
wear and warm clothing. Campaigns were organised to collect raw 
materials, scrapyards were set up to collect metal. Th ere were col-
lections of old clothes and fabric remnants, a  task usually done by 
women. In 1916 the German Women’s Self-Assistance Union ap-
pealed to women not to waste any commodity – not to burn paper, 
not to throw away pieces of rope, sack, or empty tins. Th ese materials 
were to be collected and recycled, as were rubber, scraps of leather, 
used pen-nibs and stamps, bottles, jugs, cigar butts, stearin, bottle 
corks and tops, and fruit pips. All these materials could be recycled 
for industrial production, German women were told. Another poster 
urged them to collect women’s hair: every school ran a  collection 
centre. Th e campaign did not forget about children, either; schools 
took part in it.
Th e Allied countries were not obliged to resort to such campaigns, 
at least not on such a scale, as they were in a better position over raw 
materials. Th ey could buy as much as they needed of raw materials, 
semi-manufactured and readymade goods overseas, from the USA, 
Latin America, Australia, South Africa, or Indo-China. Th e countries 
which were least developed industrially such as Turkey and Bulgaria 
experienced the greatest problems. In the latter part of 1918 Bulgar-
ian industry was working only at 20% of its capacity due to shortages 
of raw materials, and the situation in Turkey was not much better. 
But manufacturers in neutral countries complained about the short-
age of raw materials as well: they had to pay a heavy price for the 
naval blockade and war at sea.
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2. Military occupation and resistance
Th e fi rst countries to be occupied by the German Reich were 
Luxemburg and Belgium. Th e former did not experience many un-
pleasant consequences of occupation; the government of Luxemburg 
was allowed to stay in power and the only sign of occupation was 
discreet German control of the railway lines. Belgium fared much 
worse. In the fi rst few weeks the invaders applied a policy of intimi-
dation, repression, and collective responsibility. Th ey took hostages 
and in a few places conducted public executions of prominent mem-
bers of society such as priests and representatives of the educated 
class. By the end of 1914 they had killed over 5,200 persons. From 
the very fi rst days the Belgians put up active and passive resistance. 
In 1914 there were armed resistance groups (franc-tireurs, or vrijs-
chutter) who made sudden attacks against the Germans and if caught 
were treated as war criminals. Th e invaders retaliated by burning 
towns and villages. In 1914 Helmuth von Moltke, the German Chief 
of the General Staff , wrote to his Austrian colleague General Franz 
Conrad von Hötzendorf admitting that the Germans were certainly 
being brutal in their march across Belgium, but that they were fi ght-
ing for their life. Th e war forced hundreds of thousands of Belgian 
refugees to fl ee, to Holland, France, and England. To prevent their 
escape the Germans put up live wires on the border between Bel-
gium and Holland. Belgium was left  totally devastated by the war 
and requisitioning, economic exploitation, and acts of sabotage. In 
1919 85% of its industrial plants remained shut down. Still in 1929 
Belgium’s gross national income was lower than it had been in 1913. 
To subdue Belgium, the Germans incited the ethnic tension between 
the Flemings and the Walloons. On 21st March 1917 the Germans set 
about separating off  the Flemish-speaking administrative authori-
ties from the French-speaking (Walloon) authorities, and in January 
1918 declared the Flemish part of the country an independent entity 
with its capital in Brussels. On 22nd June the Flemish Council lodged 
a petition for the recognition of a free Flanders as an allied state of 
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Germany. However, the Germans did not take any further decisions 
on the future of Belgium before the end of the war, but one thing was 
certain: if the Central Powers had won, there would have been no 
room on the map of Europe for an independent Belgium within its 
historical borders.
Th e Germans were only slightly milder in occupied France, al-
though there, too, they burned down villages and executed hostages 
on pretexts such as Frenchmen killing Germans from Alsace and 
Lorraine in 1914. As in Belgium, they imposed a military and an eco-
nomic (civilian) command on the French territories they occupied. 
Th ey exploited French steelworks and mines, taking over coalfi elds 
and industrial plants which in 1913 had produced 50% of France’s 
coal, 64% of its iron, and 58% of its steel. A rule imposing mandatory 
labour on French and Belgian workers was introduced; and under 
German occupation industrial plants were forced to produce what-
ever the German authorities specifi ed at prices fi xed by the Germans: 
it was a form of compulsory duty or tribute to be paid to the invader. 
A change of time to “German time,” which diff ered by 1 hour from 
French time, was symbolic of the occupation. Incidentally, the Ger-
mans also imposed “German time” in the Kingdom of Poland (the 
western part of the Russian partition of Poland) when they occu-
pied it. Another symbol of German occupation in France was the 
enforced barracking of French labourers in work camps, from which 
every day they were made to march to work.
German occupation of territories in Eastern and Western Europe 
eff ectively continued until the end of hostilities. On the other hand, 
Russian occupation of Habsburg lands was comparatively short-
lived. By the end of 1914 almost all of two of the Austrian crown 
lands, Galicia and Bucovina, were under Russian occupation. Th is 
situation lasted for about 8–12 months. Th e Russian authorities de-
clared the eastern part of Galicia and Bucovina Russian territories 
and incorporated them into the Romanov empire. Repressive meas-
ures were imposed against the patriotic Ukrainian and Polish com-
munities, and Austrian administrative units were abolished one by 
one. Some of the Ukrainian politicians, such as Mykhailo Hrushevsky 
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and Archbishop Andrey Sheptytsky, head of the Ukrainian Uniate 
(Greek Catholic) Church, were deported to Russia. On 22nd Septem-
ber 1914 Count Georgiy Bobrinsky, the wartime governor-general of 
these territories, took over the administration in Lemberg (Russian 
Lvov; Polish Lwów; now Lviv, Ukraine), ordered the replacement of 
Polish with Russian as the offi  cial language, and the introduction of 
Russian law and constitutional order. Th ree Russian-style gubernyas 
were established with regional capitals in Lwów, Stanisławów (now 
Ivano-Frankivsk, Ukraine), and Tarnopol (now Ternopil, Ukraine). 
Th e Russian occupying authorities treated pro-Russian Ruthenian 
communities as a  privileged group. Galician Russophiles were led 
by the Carpatho-Russian Liberation Committee presided over by 
Vladimir (Volodymyr) Dudykevych, which endeavoured to convert 
the Uniates (Greek Catholics, viz. Eastern-rite Christians in com-
munion with Rome) to the “true Russian Orthodox religion.” In ef-
fect over 100 parishes converted. Russian Orthodox priests arrived in 
Galicia, now known as Galichina, to convert the Uniates. Th e Russian 
generals did not fi nd this clerical invasion a welcome development at 
all. Th e brutal conversion drive and religious persecution was a boon 
for the propaganda of the Central Powers, and an embarrassment for 
London and Paris.
However, on the recovery of East Galicia in 1915, the Habsburg au-
thorities pursued an even crueller and more remorseless policy with 
respect to the Ukrainian/Ruthenian and Polish population than the 
Russians, sniffi  ng out treason and collaboration, meting out punish-
ment to suspects, imposing a harsh military regime and suspending 
political rights. Th ey brought in an oppressive level of taxation; con-
fi scated church bells and other metal items, especially copper, brass, 
and tin; and impounded foodstuff s from the peasants. Th ey dismissed 
many of the administrative offi  cers, and imprisoned those suspected 
of being pro-Russian. Polish and Ukrainian politicians lodged protests 
in Vienna. Th e local authorities of some towns in Galicia resigned in 
protest. Th e fi rst to suff er from the severe repressive measures were 
the Russophile groups. Th ousands were sent to concentration camps. 
Th e Th alerhof camp in Styria earned a notorious reputation. A reign 
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of terror was the Austrian way of ensuring that the local population 
would remain loyal if the Russians tried to return.
For a  few weeks Russian forces occupied East Prussia. Th e Ger-
mans evacuated the German, Masurian, and Polish population. On 
27th August 1914 the Russians took Allenstein (now Olsztyn, Poland). 
Initially they were commendably disciplined. Th ere was not much 
looting or damage, they did not burn villages and towns, and paid 
for food. Offi  cers warned their men they would be executed for mo-
lesting women or for pillaging and violence. Th ere were instances of 
punishment – soldiers being publicly fl ogged with 50 or 100 strokes 
of the whip, which of course showed that there were some infringe-
ments of the rules and instructions. On the other hand, severe pun-
ishments were imposed on local Germans and Masurians suspected 
of spying for Germany. Th ere were summary executions without trial 
of forest rangers. Th e Russians put to death a total of 1,620 civilians. 
Th e local Jews left  a bad impression on German memories; some of 
them were alleged to have encouraged the Russians to loot German 
homes, whereupon they would buy up the stolen goods. Russian pol-
icy changed during the retreat: they no longer spared anyone or any-
thing, so as not to allow any resources to fall into the hands of the en-
emy, leaving the pursuing Germans with a stretch of scorched earth. 
Th ey destroyed 34 thousand buildings, looted 100 thousand homes, 
stole 135 thousand horses, 250 thousand cattle, 200 thousand pigs, 
and deported 13 thousand Germans to Siberia. Taking into account 
the short period of occupation of a  fairly small territory, the losses 
were quite considerable.
Th e local population also had their part in the pillaging. Germans 
took the opportunity to rob their German neighbours. Th e inhabit-
ants of Galicia, Bucovina, Rumania, Serbia, and the Italian and Slo-
venian Alps did likewise – it was standard practice under wartime 
occupation. Of course not all civilians used violence against their fel-
lows; there were also thousands of examples of admirable behaviour 
and attitudes of solidarity.
Th e Austrians, Hungarians, Germans, and Bulgarians imposed ex-
tremely severe regulations in occupied Serbia and Montenegro, and 
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at the same time started an unrelenting process of economic exploita-
tion. Especially the Austro-Hungarian authorities became notorious 
for their severity. At the very outset they imprisoned 1,200 Serbian 
political leaders. In the course of the following years they barracked 
150 thousand Serbs in prisons and concentration camps. 20 thou-
sand inmates died of the exhausting, mercilessly exacted labour they 
were forced to do. Th e Bulgarians were not so harsh on the territories 
they occupied, which they considered ancient Bulgarian lands. Th ey 
stopped at arresting Serbs known for anti-Bulgarian views. A large 
proportion of the population regarded Bulgarian rule as friendly. 
Th e Serbs and Montenegrans in areas under Austro-Hungarian rule 
never reconciled themselves to occupation and put up staunch re-
sistance, forming armed resistance groups which were particularly 
active in Montenegro in what is sometimes referred to as the secret 
uprising. Resistance groups attacked and assassinated Austro-Hun-
garian agents, policemen, gendarmes, and offi  cers. In no other occu-
pied country was resistance so strong. Th e Serbs and Montenegrans 
were determined to recover their independence. Towards the end 
of the war Montenegran insurgents ousted the Austro-Hungarians 
from the capital Cetinje.
Th e German occupation of the Kingdom of Poland left  a dread-
ful impression in the memories of millions of Poles. It could hardly 
be called anything else but the most extreme, unrelenting, and ef-
fi ciently carried out economic exploitation. In their over three years 
of occupation the Germans and Austrians carried off  12.3 million 
quintals (100 kg, approximately a  hundredweight) of cereals and 
5.5 quintals of potatoes, partly under the guise of enforced wartime 
contributions. But at the same time the Austro-Hungarian and Ger-
man regimes were predictable, albeit harsh; the laws they introduced 
were generally observed, within the bounds of wartime conditions. 
To start with the Germans established a Passamt – a passport offi  ce 
which issued passports and travel permits to civilians allowing them 
to travel within designated areas. Russian passports were exchanged 
for German and Austro-Hungarian numbered documents with the 
holder’s photograph. Both occupying forces rounded up civilians in 
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the streets and imprisoned them in detention camps behind barbed 
wire. But at the same time they tolerated Polish cultural, educational, 
and economic associations and institutions.
Stalwart military and civilian resistance would become a hallmark 
of the Second World War. During the First World War the scale of re-
sistance was modest, and eff ectively limited to Belgium, Serbia, and 
Montenegro. Th e fact that the Central Powers allowed the nations of 
East-Central Europe to exercise the political freedoms and dropped 
hints on the prospect of independence within a German Mitteleuropa 
was an obstacle to the growth of clandestine resistance movements. 
Nonetheless, such movements did arise, for instance in Poland, but 
they had to wait until the end of the war for their time to come for 
political activity.
3. Everyday life
During the war you could observe two diff erent pictures of every-
day life. Contemporary photographs give a good record of this. On 
some photos you see people leading the same affl  uent life they had 
before the war; on others there are poor, forsaken people, dying of 
disease or starvation, standing in endless bread queues. Which of 
these pictures is true? Well, both are. Many inhabitants of Rome or 
Paris were serenely having coff ee in the cafés as they had been doing 
for years, chatting over ice-cream, fl irting, and orchestras were play-
ing merry music-hall songs. Th e only tell-tale sign that a  war was 
going on was that alcoholic drinks, which were prohibited during the 
war, were served in coff ee cups. In London and Berlin there were full 
houses in the theatres, music halls, opera houses, cinemas, and night 
clubs; spectators watched sports events. Gambling continued to go 
on in the casinos, and the fashionable foxtrot continued to be danced 
in the dance-halls. Crowds of visitors were milling around in the spas 
and holiday resorts, and their memories of the war were quite unlike 
those that the poor remembered. State authorities launched appeals 
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for temperance and moderation, and in Vienna from July to Novem-
ber 1916 there was a “seriousness campaign” intended to curtail en-
tertainment.
But this was just one side of everyday life during the war. Th ere 
was another. For of course the war economy could not fail to make 
a  negative impact on consumer goods and the quality of life. Al-
though rationing was brought in for food and manufactured goods, 
some products were not available in the shops, and queues became 
symptomatic of the war. In Germany ration cards were brought in at 
the beginning of 1915, initially for bread, fats, milk, and meat. Ra-
tioning became an everyday reality pretty soon in Austria-Hungary, 
too. However, in Britain there was no rationing until 1918, when cou-
pons were introduced for meat, butter, vegetable oil, and sugar, on 
a surge of panic on the market, but in general the British authorities 
eschewed food rationing, which they regarded as an infringement of 
the free market. In Paris bread rationing was introduced in Febru-
ary 1918, and four months later in the whole of France. Th e supply 
of foodstuff s and consumer goods was better in the Allied countries 
than in the Central Powers, who were hard pressed by the eff ects of 
the sea blockade. In Germany and Austria food and butchers’ shops 
were closed for several days a month by order of the local authori-
ties. Scuffl  es and fi ghting were a common occurrence outside shops. 
Th e worst supplied were the shops in northern Germany. Th ere were 
also queues for articles of personal hygiene. Soap was in short sup-
ply. People washed their bodies, and laundered their clothes less fre-
quently, which inevitably led to a lower level of hygiene and hence 
diminished resistance to bacteria and viruses. Th e worst off  were the 
poor. Th e well-off  had their servants queue up for them, and could 
aff ord to top up their provisions on the black market. However, rising 
prices made the biggest diff erence (in relative terms) to the budgets 
of the rich, who really had to pay much more than before to get ex-
pensive goods. Queues and rationing were the order of the day even 
in neutral countries like Switzerland, where ration coupons were in-
troduced for meat, bread, sugar, and fl our, and no meat was sold on 
two days in the week. Neutral countries were spared the direct eff ects 
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of the war, but they did feel its consequences, particularly as a result 
of the sea blockade.
Th e worst time was the winter of 1916 to 1917, when offi  cial ra-
tions in Germany, Austria-Hungary, and the countries they occupied 
fell to half the nutritional value needed by the human body. Th e poor 
fed on pigweed and turnips, which earned the nickname “Hinden-
burg’s delicacy” or “Prussian pineapples,” and the period was called 
“the turnip winter” (Kohlrüberwinter). In the spring of 1917 the Ger-
man potato ration was cut to one-quarter of the average consumed in 
1913. Butter disappeared altogether, and the heavy wartime bran (or 
in fact chaff ) bread was eaten with a substance called jam but with 
a fl avour not very reminiscent of real jam. In the last six months of 
1918 things were even worse. Meat rations in Germany fell to 12% of 
the average consumed in 1913; butter went down to 28%; vegetable 
fats and oils dropped to 17%; lard to 7%; and potato rations were 94% 
of the average consumed before the war. However, there were hardly 
any signs of starvation in the streets; the German authorities were sys-
tematic, meticulous, and eff ective in their interventions in food pro-
vision. For example, on 25th March 1917 the municipal authorities of 
Berlin issued a regulation imposing limits on cake-baking, banning 
the use of yeast and baking powder, and ruled that fl our could not 
make up more than 10% of the ingredients by weight. For a few weeks 
there was a complete ban on cake-baking.
Th e situation was catastrophic in the cities of Russia. Owing to 
chaos, corruption, and ineffi  cient administrative authorities the har-
vest was being left  to rot in the fi elds, or devoured by rodents in the 
granaries, but not reaching the towns, especially the cities, the inhab-
itants of which were the worst aff ected by the war. City dwellers were 
the segment of Russian society most dissatisfi ed with the war and the 
way it was being managed. Th e worst off  were the cities in the north, 
where the sight of paupers standing for hours in bread queues in sub-
zero temperatures was common already by the winter of 1916. In 
October 1915 Petrograd was being supplied a daily quota of 116 train 
carriages of food instead of the prewar average of 405. And it only 
got worse as time went on. Th ere was a shortage of rolling stock, and 
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the freight trains purchased from the USA were left  to rust in the rail 
depot at Vladivostok. In eff ect, in cities like Petrograd and Moscow 
gigantic queues were ubiquitous. People queued up for everything. 
In 1917 housewives in Petrograd spent an average of 40 hours a week 
in queues, and not always managed to buy something. Th e people of 
Russia could not understand how it had happened that their country – 
known prior to 1914 as Europe’s bread basket – was now starving.
What measures were taken to deal with the shortages? First and 
foremost, substitute goods were put on the consumer market. Ger-
many devised the greatest number of ersatz goods: the very name 
came from German and was assimilated by many languages. Germa-
ny put 11 thousand ersatz goods on the market, including 837 kinds 
of meatless sausages and 511 ersatz coff ees. “Tea” was brewed from 
dried fruit; leather shoes were replaced by wooden clogs; carbide 
lamps took over from paraffi  n (kerosene) lamps; and soap-making 
became a cottage industry. When bread started to be in short supply 
in Scandinavia and Switzerland, bakers and housewives produced 
rice cakes, which would be eaten with jam. Th e reason why so many 
ersatz products could emerge was that the chemical industry, par-
ticularly in the production of foodstuff s, had been briskly develop-
ing before the war, especially in Germany. During the war research 
continued, leading to even faster growth in the natural sciences. 
Secondly, people grew their own produce in their gardens, vegetable 
patches, and allotments. One British lord could not understand why 
he should convert his tennis court into a vegetable garden, as the offi  -
cial appeal had urged. In their gardens or yards people kept domestic 
animals – chickens, goats, rabbits – to supplement the food allow-
ance. Th e slump in alcohol consumption meant that more money 
from family budgets could be spent on more urgent needs.
Th irdly, the black market soft ened the eff ects of the shortfall, al-
though heavy fi nes were imposed on black marketeers. In January 
1917 a “pillory decree” was issued in Austria, whereby the names of 
illegal traders were made public. Th e First World War was a veritable 
breeding ground for the black market. If they were to survive people 
were forced to sidestep the offi  cial allowances and resort to unoffi  -
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cial food supplies from the countryside, of goods not available in the 
shops. As time went on, black market prices soared, at least in some 
countries like Russia or Bulgaria. In Serbia, Turkey, Bulgaria, Greece, 
and Rumania the black market did not cause such a stir thanks to the 
long tradition of law evasion, but it was a shock in law-abiding Ger-
many and Austria. Th e black market was not so important in France, 
and still less in Britain, where the shops were better supplied. Black 
markets also sprouted in neutral countries which were doing well on 
the war, but were not always able to satisfy the demand for goods in 
short supply. Th e war disrupted Europe’s economic network, hence 
neutral countries, economically linked up with belligerents, could 
not help feeling these eff ects of the war.
To aff ord the black market, those on more modest incomes had 
to sell their valuables and household goods. Th e market was fl ooded 
with off ers of watches, irons, kitchen utensils, china, furniture, jewel-
lery, pictures, cooking pots, clothes, underwear, and shoes for sale. 
Th e large supply caused a reduction in their value, which made peo-
ple sell more stuff . Who bought these things? Th ose who had done 
well on the war, especially a broad assortment of racketeers and wide 
boys. Sometimes these things went for a song; food was highly val-
ued, not luxury goods. Farmers, who made money by providing the 
produce in short supply, were among the buyers. Wartime exigencies 
brought about a transfer of goods from the towns to the country.
Another worry for thousands was heating fuel, or rather shortage 
of fuel. Most countries had considerable problems with fuel supply, 
which aggravated with time. Th e worst were the winters of 1916–1917 
and 1917–1918. Th e inhabitants of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and 
the lands in the east they occupied had the biggest problems. Buying 
coal from a coal depot was next to impossible, as many miners were 
out on the front instead of at their jobs. Although in Belgium, Germa-
ny, and Austria there was still quite a lot of coal on the spoil tips from 
prewar times, no rolling stock was at hand to transport it. Another 
serious obstacle to rail transport was caused by the winters. Th e severe 
cold damaged tracks and rolling stock, and blizzards prevented move-
ment. Th e waterways could not be used for inland transport, either, as 
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they were frozen over. During the last two winters of the war deaths 
due to the cold weather were fairly common in Germany, Bohemia, 
Austria, Bulgaria, and Turkey. To make up for fuel shortages, people 
resorted to the forests for fi rewood. Whole families would set off  on 
such expeditions, even though forest rangers tried to prevent illegal 
lumbering. In towns desperate inhabitants cut down the trees in parks 
and squares. In winter, owing to the fuel shortage the authorities or-
dered the heating systems to be switched off  in schools and factories, 
which gave workers unexpected days off , and children enjoyed extra-
long winter holidays. Th e drive to save fuel and energy resources, as 
well as wartime regulations meant that towns were not lit up at night, 
cars had headlights switched off , and windows were blacked out.
Infl ation – a new phenomenon, completely unknown before the 
war, now emerged. People anxiously wondered about the limit to the 
continual rise in prices. But it was impossible to establish such a lim-
it. Th e nearer the end of the war, the more aggravating the galloping 
prices. Th e costs of the war were bigger and bigger, and it was hard 
to balance income and expenditure, for private households as well 
as for the state. During the war the global price index rose only by 
227% in Britain thanks to rigorous price control; in France it jumped 
by 340%; in Germany by 415%; in Italy by 409%. In Russia it went 
up to 238% by June 1916, 398% by December of that year, and to 
600% by June 1918. Hungary fi nished the war with infl ation at a stag-
gering 977%, whereas in June 1918 it had only been 382%. In Paris 
a kilogramme loaf of bread had cost 40 centimes in 1913, and 1 franc 
and 25 centimes in 1918; while the corresponding prices for a kilo of 
sugar were 75 centimes, and 3 francs and 25 centimes.
Under wartime conditions a fall in the standard of living was in-
evitable, but some professions did not feel the pinch, and some even 
benefi ted. In Britain the winners were the unskilled labourers, who 
took over jobs and wages hitherto held by skilled workers. Th ey 
also gained because the introduction of tax reductions forced fac-
tory owners to establish staff  canteens. Likewise in France blue-collar 
wages did not go down very much, or in fact rose in real terms. Th ere 
was a general shortage of workers on the job market, thus employees 
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were in a good position to demand and obtain pay rises. In outcome 
incomes in working-class families increased. But they increased 
also thanks to the fact that there were jobs for the unemployed and 
for women. Th e groups which gained the most were the miners, 
steelworkers, and employees of munitions factories. Wages and the 
standard of living were subject to the constant attention of the trade 
unions, which negotiated the conditions of employment and pay, and 
participated in arbitration.
Th e working class of Italy fared worse: on the whole its standard 
of living went down, and wage rises did not keep up with infl ation. In 
Italy blue-collar workers bore the brunt of the war. Th e situation was 
even worse in Germany. Millions experienced a fall in their standard 
of living, especially under the gruelling Hindenburg plan, which near-
ly led to famine. To the end of the war real wages fell by 73% compared 
to 1913. People said that young civilians starved to death before they 
could be called up to the front. 300 thousand “unnecessary deaths” 
of young people between 15 and 19 were recorded from November 
1916 to October 1918. Th ese fi gures were for young recruits who were 
incapable of carrying out orders on the front due to malnutrition. In 
Russia workers’ pay doubled in the period up to the Bolshevik up-
heaval, but prices went up four times or more in the same time. On 
the other hand, peasant farmers gained on infl ation, selling their pro-
duce for much more than in 1913. Some could aff ord to buy land and 
goods regarded as luxury items. In France and Britain, too, farmers’ 
incomes improved thanks to rising food prices, enhanced effi  ciency, 
and an increase in areas under cultivation. Th anks to this they could 
invest more in their farms, repair and improve their facilities etc. In all 
the countries the most aff ected by the war were the middle and upper 
classes. Admittedly, their standard of living was still high, but not as 
high as before the war. Real income fell for senior administrative and 
bank staff  – in Germany, Austria, and Bohemia by 47–70%. Th e drop 
was not so high in the Allied countries. In addition, the richer and 
more patriotic lost out on buying up government bonds.
Th e crime rate and violations of the stringent wartime regula-
tions went up. Counterfeit food coupons were put into circulation; 
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stolen goods included food, heating fuel and food coupons; prices 
were pushed up beyond the statutory limits. By the end of the war in 
Greece the number of fake ration cards was several times more than 
of authentic ones, which inevitably led to a depreciation in their value 
and did not solve any problems. Th e Greeks were outright winners in 
the art of forgery, although in the Balkans they had stiff  competition. 
But even in Germany the crime rate rose, and this included coun-
terfeiting ration cards. For instance in Breslau (now Wrocław) the 
crime rate trebled by 1916 (albeit from a low initial level). Although 
the perpetrators were mostly boys and young men, there was also an 
alarming increase in female crime by girls under 18 and women in 
the 19–21 age group. In some regions it was up by 50%, or even 90%. 
On the other hand, the number of reported crimes committed by 
women over 30 fell. Many demoralised young people faced prosecu-
tion – for forgery, vandalism, wilful damage of property, aggressive 
vagrancy and begging. Restrictions were put on their admission to 
taverns and bars. In many countries the authorities appealed to home 
owners to lock up, padlock, or even bolt their properties if they were 
going away.
During the war far fewer people travelled, especially abroad. At 
the border travellers were controlled fastidiously and in a humiliating 
way, the aim being to discourage them from going on a voyage again. 
Domestic travel was not much better, though. Th ose who wanted to 
go on a  journey by rail needed a  valid ticket and a  travel permit, 
and by the end of the war also a large sum of money, as ticket prices 
had spiralled. Only in Britain were there no restrictions on travel and 
fares went up only moderately. In 1918 it was no longer safe to travel 
by rail, and still less to venture on the roads. Th ere were groups of 
armed criminals everywhere, ready to attack road users and even to 
stop trains. Th e worst situation was in Russia and the Balkans. With 
a slump in morale and falling religious standards, housebreaking and 
rising violence on the roads and streets were inevitable, especially as 
the power of the state, police, and army had fallen. Soldiers no longer 
wanted to fi ght, and were even less inclined to run around the woods 
and fi elds chasing bands of thieves made up of deserters.
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4. In sickness and in health. Charity
Wartime conditions, malnutrition, and devastation could not 
but have resulted in a  lower level of hygiene, a decline in wellness, 
loss of weight and resistance to disease. Th ere was a fall in birth rate 
and total fertility rate due to the fact that the men were away on the 
front, but also because of the women’s inherently stressful lifestyle, 
the queues, the food shortage, and their employment in the factories. 
Th e drop in fertility rate was larger in Germany than in Britain. In 
1917, the worst year of the war, doctors in Germany, Italy, Austria, 
and Hungary observed that due to stress, poverty, and weight loss 
some women ceased to menstruate. Research carried out in many 
cities showed that their inhabitants had lost from a  few percent to 
over 20% in weight. Weight loss was lowest in Britain. Th e calorifi c 
value of meals went down by 20–30%. In many cities in the Central 
Powers the malnutrition rate went up, unlike the situation in Britain, 
where there was a fall in malnutrition thanks to the introduction of 
successful social schemes. In eff ect, the rise in the mortality rate was 
higher in Germany than in Britain.
What central and local government authorities feared most was 
the outbreak of epidemics, which could bring down the battle-
worthiness of their armies. Hence they made a  special eff ort to in-
troduce preventive measures, with educational and poster campaigns, 
talks and lectures on the dangers of infectious diseases. Schools, 
churches, and academics were invited to join such campaigns. Infor-
mation was disseminated on infectious diseases and what precautions 
to take to avoid catching them. Th e list of dangerous diseases was long: 
typhus, typhoid, paratyphoid fever, cholera, dysentery, scarlet fever, 
diphtheria, whooping cough, tuberculosis, scabies, venereal diseases.
Th e most dangerous disease was an infl uenza known as “Spanish 
fl u,” which aff ected the civilian population most of all. It appeared in 
Europe in 1918. As the First World War was drawing to a close the war 
against Spanish fl u was beginning. It most probably came to Europe 
from the United States. Th e papers of neutral Spain were the fi rst in 
159
Europe to report news of it, and hence its name. In the Walloon part 
of Belgium it was called “Flemish fl u;” in Russia it was known as “Chi-
nese fever;” in Poland as “the Bolshevik disease” or “the Ukrainian 
disease;” and in Ceylon it was dubbed “Bombay fever.” Spanish fl u 
turned out to be the world’s biggest killer, causing more deaths than 
the war. For instance, 1,000 soldiers from North Carolina were killed 
during the war, while 13,000 people in that state died of Spanish fl u. 
In Germany the mortality rate for boys in the 5–10 age group rose 
by over 50% from 1913 to 1917, but in 1918 it went up to over 90%. 
Th e corresponding fi gures for boys in the 10–15 age group were 55% 
and 115% respectively. Th e rise in the mortality rate for girls, who are 
stronger and better programmed genetically, was much lower: 40% 
in 1917, and 50% in 1918.
Spanish fl u was a pandemic. It ran round the world, from country 
to country with no regard for political borders. In India the rivers 
were full of corpses; there was not enough wood to cremate them. In 
the USA morgues were full, cadavers were piled on top of one anoth-
er, gravediggers worked day and night. According to estimates about 
500 million were ill with Spanish fl u in 1918–1921, and 20 million to 
50 million, or even 100 million died of it. Th e symptoms were a high 
fever, diarrhoea, rapid dehydration, and pneumonia. It attacked the 
young and strong rather than the elderly and feeble; and the rich 
to the same extent as the poor. It evoked terror and overwhelming 
dread; it disrupted the normal course of public life. Th e peace ne-
gotiations at the end of the war were conducted in the shadow of 
Spanish fl u. Its fi rst wave came in 1918 and was marked by a  large 
morbidity rate, but not as many fatalities as in the next year, which 
turned out to be the most tragic. Th ere had been no human pandemic 
like it since the cholera. No treatment was found for it. Th e medica-
tions which were suggested failed. Preventive measures failed. Th e 
gauze masks recommended for policemen, doctors, postmen, and 
nurses were of no avail. Alcohol, large amounts of which were re-
commended and administered even to children, was no help, either. 
It is thought that other precautions, such as limiting contact with oth-
er people, drinking water that had been boiled, washing hands, air-
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ing buildings, refraining from spitting in the street (for which there 
were fi nes), chewing tobacco, taking baths in ice-cold water, burning 
incense in the home (as practised in Africa), wearing amulets (a Poly-
nesian remedy), and casting sheets of paper with passages from the 
Koran downstream on the River Niger (practised in Nigeria) – did 
not help much, either. For a long time scientists searched for the virus 
causing the disease. It was not found until 1997, and allocated in the 
Infl uenza A (H1N1) virus subtype, but there is still no agreement as 
to what triggered the outbreak of the pandemic.
Typhus was a dangerous disease. It reaped the largest harvest of 
victims in Serbia and Montenegro, owing to the disastrously low 
sense of hygiene and the poor medical service. Within just over 
a  year more than a  quarter of the doctors in Serbia died or were 
killed. About half a million Serbs went down with the disease, and 
150 thousand died. Th e American pacifi st journalist John Reed 
called Serbia “the country of death.” In the spring of 1915 there were 
up to 9–10 thousand new cases a day. Th e typhus epidemic started in 
the Serbian trenches and was brought into civilian settlements. On 
Belgrade’s appeal for assistance Allied and American medical staff  
arrived to help. In March 1915 they set up an international sanitary 
commission to fi ght against the typhus epidemic. In 1916–1917 the 
disease wreaked havoc in Rumania, claiming almost as many victims 
as in Serbia. In 1917 in Russia things were even worse, especially in 
areas ravaged by war. According to estimates, in 1916–1918 more 
soldiers died due to typhus and other contagious diseases than in the 
hostilities. Typhus and malaria combined with famine menaced the 
Levant and Mesopotamia. 80 thousand are believed to have died of 
disease and starvation in the Levant alone.
Typhus and Spanish fl u killed victims within a short time of the 
emergence of the fi rst symptoms, while the consequences of tubercu-
losis could be observed developing gradually over a long period from 
the time of infection, so this disease did not engender such anxiety. 
In all the countries the incidence of tuberculosis rose during the war: 
by 20% in France, 25% in Britain, and over 50% in Germany in rela-
tion to 1913.
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In view of the risk of disease, treatment and preventive measures 
were indispensable everywhere. Social committees and national san-
itary commissions were set up to help those in need. Mobile sani-
tary corps were established which went out into the country towns 
and villages. Th ey entailed fi eld hospitals and laboratories staff ed by 
nurses and medical students. Th e sanitary corps administered small-
pox vaccinations, set up disinfection units, and established treatment 
centres including tuberculosis hospitals, and even conducted de-
lousing campaigns and ran bath-houses.
Scabies was the most common ailment attributable to dirty hands, 
and it was an embarrassing condition, like the venereal diseases. 
Warnings about the dangers of VD from sex with prostitutes were 
given in thousands of talks and lectures, distributed on leafl ets, and 
even delivered from the pulpit in the churches of France and Austria-
Hungary.
During the war charity and social welfare had to change their 
form. Although the scale of the social problems caught society by 
surprise, nonetheless the spirit of civic solidarity and readiness to 
help was very strong and on the whole people rose to the occasion. In 
eff ect, the war gave rise to a socially widespread civic movement on 
an unprecedented mass scale. For example, there were over 400 re-
lief institutions in Scotland alone, and some of them were founded 
during the war. Some dispensed material and moral support to war 
widows, orphans and invalids; others provided aid for the poor and 
distressed; still others cared for refugees and political émigrés. Th ere 
were about 3 million war widows, some of whom married a second 
time, but not straightaway. 40% of the German war widows had re-
married by 1926. Some, especially from the working class, were not 
in such a hurry to wed again; having tasted the sweetness of freedom 
they were loath to forfeit it. Th e problem of how to help the orphans 
in bereaved families was a major challenge. Over half of these chil-
dren were under three when they lost their fathers in the war.
To encourage people to be generous, charity organisations ran ap-
peals and campaigns on a mass scale, such as Russia Day, Serbia Day, 
Bulgaria Day, the Belgian Refugee Appeal, the Prisoners-of-War Ap-
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peal, the Wounded Horses appeal etc. Collections were made in the 
churches, lotteries were organised, and charity concerts, opera and 
theatrical performances were held. Propaganda activities were suc-
cessfully blended with charity work, for instance the sale of the Re-
member the Lusitania medal, the proceeds of which were to go to aid 
war victims. In Austria-Hungary there was a sales drive for stamps 
showing the new Emperor and Empress, promoting the Emperor 
Karl’s charity fund. All the countries issued postage stamps to sup-
port charities dispensing aid to war widows, orphans, and invalids.
Charity funds helped to organise war kitchens which served meals 
for women and children from soldiers’ families; established welfare 
centres and orphanages; and set up the Save the Children Fund to 
alleviate malnutrition. Social funds were used to found homes for 
soldiers’ children, organise holidays for orphans and children from 
poor families, help adults including war invalids fi nd employment or 
set up in self-employment.
Th e largest international relief organisations (mostly American-
based) in terms of available funds and number of volunteers had 
considerable fi nancial assets at their disposal. Th ey dispensed aid 
fi rstly to the Belgian and French inhabitants of occupied territories, 
and secondly to the Serbians and people of the Kingdom of Poland. 
Th e organisation which played the fundamental role was the Ameri-
can Relief Administration (ARA), established on 6th August 1914 on 
the initiative of and headed by Herbert Hoover. Th ousands of vol-
unteers, chiefl y Americans, worked for Hoover’s committee. Its rep-
resentatives went to Europe to determine where the greatest needs 
were, and what kind of relief the war’s civilian victims wanted. On 4th 
October 1914 the Commission for Relief in Belgium initiated opera-
tions under the auspices of the ARA. Its French counterpart was the 
Comité d’alimentation du Nord de la France. Hoover became deeply 
committed to the campaign, as befi tted a Quaker, and worked inde-
fatigably and very effi  ciently on behalf of others. Th anks to an in-
genious promotion drive the Commission for Relief in Belgium col-
lected $52 million, $35 million of which were donated by Americans, 
and $17 million by the British. Other associations and foundations, 
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particularly the Rockefeller Foundation, provided aid for Belgium, 
and in outcome Belgium, which is a small country, received substan-
tial aid. Th e German repressive measures and Belgian heroism made 
the Belgians the favourite benefi ciaries for international aid, turn-
ing their story into a subject for many publications including fi ction, 
and fi lms. To the end of the war they received over 3 million tons 
of supplies. Hoover’s committee also dispensed aid to Serbia, and as 
of the spring of 1915 to the Kingdom of Poland. However, distant 
Serbia was not the darling of the Allies, and eff ectively only received 
assistance in the battle against typhus, which was a threat to the Al-
lied armies as well. In Hoover’s publicity materials the Serbs and the 
Poles were defi nitely treated as second-best to France and Belgium. 
Th e Poles did not stir the world’s conscience, because they were not 
widely known. Poland was an unknown entity, since it was not on the 
world map. Poland did not evoke much sympathy even in the Unit-
ed States, which was inhabited by millions with Polish roots. When 
President Wilson announced that 1st January 1916 would be Polish 
Relief Day, at the instigation of the famous composer and virtuoso 
Ignace Paderewski, the result was a  fairly meagre collection. How-
ever, thanks to the eff orts of Polish intellectuals and politicians in the 
West (including the USA), gradually aid started reaching the Poles 
in need. Unfortunately, they did not manage to persuade the British 
to join the campaign, who saw no interest in helping Central Europe 
and were worried the aid might fall into the hands of the occupying 
German authorities.
Substantial aid reached the Jews of Central and Eastern Europe, 
dispensed by Jewish organisations including the American Jewish 
Joint Distribution Committee, which not only supplied relief but also 
drew the world’s attention to the plight of Jewish communities, the 
pogroms and the growing wave of anti-Semitism. It was hardest for 
them to conduct activities in Russia, especially during the Revolu-
tion and chaos of 1917–1918. At any rate Polish and Russian charity 
organisations met with the same problems, and many of their volun-
teers ended up in front of a Bolshevik fi ring squad.
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5. Material damage. Migrations
Th e greatest amount of material damage occurred in places where 
hostilities were conducted on the land or from the air, and that is 
where civilians suff ered the most. On Polish territories the city of Ka-
lisz was burned, the cities of Gorlice and Żyrardów were devastated, 
and Wiślica Collegiate Church was badly damaged. In Belgium the 
city of Leuven (Louvain) was gutted in a fi re, and its library dating 
back to 1426, along with a collection numbering 280 thousand items 
including manuscripts and 15th-century printed works, was razed. 
Th e cities of Ypres, Malines, and Namur were devastated, and the re-
nowned town houses, including Rubens’ house, on the market-place 
of Antwerp, were destroyed. Historic buildings in Venice sustained 
damage. Th e Hague Convention was violated when Rheims Cathe-
dral, the coronation church of the kings of France, was seriously 
damaged. In 1917 Salonica was gutted by a fi re probably accidentally 
set alight by soldiers. During their retreat from the Western front in 
1918 the Germans destroyed churches, including Noyon Cathedral, 
and castles. Th e towers of churches and cathedrals fell victim to war-
time destruction because they were convenient observation points 
and potential machine-gun sites. Roads and bridges, railway lines, 
houses and homes and public buildings were damaged or demol-
ished. A full enumeration of all the material damage would not do 
justice to the suff ering and anguish of the people in the lands affl  icted 
by the war. Not all the devastation was directly connected with the 
carrying out of wartime objectives. Wherever hostilities erupted vil-
lages and towns disappeared into thin air; the people camped out in 
the forests or fl ed to safer areas. Some of the villages around Verdun 
were razed to the ground and never rebuilt. Nothing remained of the 
village in the vicinity of Fort Vaux. It was never rebuilt but its ruins 
were left  as a grim memorial of the barbarity of war. Th e Polish ter-
ritories were a tragic sight aft er the departure of the Russians in 1915. 
Th ey employed a scorched earth policy, annihilating everything that 
could be destroyed so that nothing should fall into the hands of the 
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pursuing armies of the Central Powers. Th ey burned down all that 
was combustible, and blew up what couldn’t be burned – country 
houses and mansions, public amenities, railway stations. Th ey looted 
and made off  with whatever had any value. Th ey drove herds of thou-
sands of cattle and horses off  with them, they carted away food and 
metal, they pillaged factories taking away machinery and electrical 
equipment. Sometimes due to the haste of their retreat, they did not 
have enough time to carry out their schedule of destruction to the 
full, so in places such as Lemberg (Lwów/Lviv) many sites listed for 
explosion were saved. On many occasions a bountiful gratifi cation 
off ered to a corrupt Russian offi  cer suffi  ced to save a building from 
destruction.
Th e Germans were no better than the Russians and Austrians in 
terms of the scale of destruction. “Whole units pulled down walls, 
and sat on roofs throwing down the tiles. Trees were cut down and 
window-shutters broken. Smoke and clouds of dust rose up from piles 
of rubbish. A frenzy of destruction was afoot. Soldiers ran around in 
obsessive excitement, dressed up in women’s gowns and… top hats… 
Th ey set mines on the roads, they poisoned or fi lled up wells, blew up 
houses, set up death-traps, vandalised railway tracks, telephone lines, 
and burned down literally everything that could be burned down,” 
Ernst Jünger observed during the German retreat from the Western 
front in February 1917. Th e overall results of the destruction were 
over 100 thousand homes devastated in Belgium, over 850 thousand 
in France (the largest number in the department of Meuse), and one 
and a half million buildings on the Polish territories, 10% of which 
were historic.
Th e war was also a  time of forced migration, or rather of mass 
displacement – a word which now earned itself a permanent place 
in the European languages and awareness. Th e mass evacuations 
opened up a dismal chapter in the social history of Europe, a time of 
suff ering and tragedy for the civilian population shift ed from place 
to place, not at all expected or made welcome in their place of reset-
tlement, quite on the contrary – given a hostile reception and treat-
ed as the cause of misfortune, bringers of disease and deterioration 
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in the standard of living for the local community. Evacuees were ef-
fectively made to live and work in new, usually inhuman conditions. 
Th ose who fl ed or were forced to move were mostly inhabitants of 
areas where hostilities were being conducted or where there was 
an impending risk of hostilities. A total of over 10 million changed 
their place of residence during the war. Th e largest groups fl ed or 
were forcibly removed from the western territories of Russia and 
the Kingdom of Poland, moving into the Russian interior. In mid-
February 1917 over 3 million refugees were reported there, and by 
the autumn of 1918 the fi gure had risen to 5 million. Londoners fl ed 
London during the air raids, and in September 1914 700 thousand 
Parisians fl ed Paris in the atmosphere of panic in anticipation of 
a German attack. In July 1915 350 thousand fl ed Warsaw. In 1914 
800 thousand refugees left  East Prussia – 30% of its population – 
and 400 thousand of them arrived in the western regions of Ger-
many. Th ousands of refugees left  Serbia and Montenegro ahead of 
the invading forces of the Central Powers, and thousands more were 
forced to evacuate areas neighbouring on forts and strongholds. 
Tens of thousands of Belgians from Liège, Namur, and Antwerp, and 
Frenchmen from Maubeuge and Verdun were ordered to leave their 
homes. Th e Austrians likewise forcibly evacuated part of the inhab-
itants of cities like Przemyśl and Kraków which they had turned 
into defensible fortresses. Over 10 thousand were expelled from 
Przemyśl, and over 63 thousand from Kraków – one-third of the 
city’s population – in three waves of evacuation. In all in rural and 
urban Galicia 700 thousand to 1 million fl ed or were forcibly driven 
out of their homes, over half of whom were Jews. Some Jews were 
voluntary refugees, fl eeing south-west to Austria and the Czech ter-
ritories with the Austrian authorities; others were forcibly resettled; 
and still others were deported to Russia by the Russians, who sus-
pected them of sympathising with their enemies. On the way they 
were harassed, albeit in general the Russian authorities did not treat 
refugees too kindly, in contravention of the Hague Conventions. 
Some of the Ruthenians of East Galicia, who considered themselves 
kindred of the Russians, followed them into Russia.
167
Th e authorities of the Central Powers and Russia sent refugees and 
evacuees to interim camps, where the food and sanitary conditions 
tended to be bad, and worst in Russia. Many refugees and evacuees 
died; many returned home ill. A large part of their belongings was 
lost or destroyed during the evacuation. Th e victims of hostilities, 
those whose homes were destroyed in the fi ghting, were evacuated 
as well, and sent to interim camps. Hundreds of thousands of Ital-
ians fl ed to southern and western Italy in the aft ermath of the Battle 
of Caporetto. When the Rumanians attacked Austria-Hungary the 
Hungarians evacuated 200 thousand of the inhabitants of Transylva-
nia west. When the tables turned for the Rumanians, they evacuated 
thousands of their own citizens east, to prevent them from working 
or fi ghting for the enemy. In their places of resettlement evacuees 
were to work for their own side in the war.
6. The plight of women
Th e broad spectrum of women’s social and public activity gave 
rise to changes which they welcomed in their status in the family, in 
national and local aff airs and government, and in their political and 
civic status. Th e war witnessed a  rise in feminist movements, and 
feminist literature expanded its readership, which has sometimes 
been interpreted as the origin of the women’s revolution. It had been 
heralded in by Gertrude Atherton, an American woman who lived 
for years in Germany and in 1918 wrote Th e White Morning: a Novel 
of the Power of the German Women in Wartime, which was translated 
into many languages. She claimed that the menfolk had made a mis-
take deciding on war, and that they could not control their emotions 
and psychological reactions. Under Atherton’s leadership, feminists 
appealed to women to become active in political aff airs and urged 
them to take over power in the state, as only women would be able to 
save humankind by assuming power. Th e sooner they did so, the bet-
ter for everybody. Th ere were more feminist manifestos of this kind. 
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Th e best-known came from the pens of British suff ragettes, who were 
full of reproach for male violence, which they called “Prussianism.” 
Th eir books were a sign of a women’s awakening and an expression 
of their authors’ belief that politics was certainly not a male domain. 
During the war the feminist vanguard earned the support of at least 
a segment of the working women, which was a genuinely new devel-
opment. Th ey no longer wanted to play the same role in society as they 
had done hitherto. In 1915 the women of Denmark were granted the 
constitutional right to vote, and in Russia women were given the vote 
in 1917. On 12th November 1918 in Germany the Council of People’s 
Deputies (Rat der Volksbeauft ragten) declared that all women over 
20 would be given the vote in parliamentary elections. On 10th Janu-
ary 1918 the US House of Representatives granted women full voting 
rights in presidential and congressional elections. Th e Senate stalled 
over ratifi cation and did not sign the 20th Amendment to the Consti-
tution until 26th August 1920. Until that time the women of several 
individual states had the right to vote. In Britain the vote was granted 
to women of 30, who were declared “settled and mature.” Women 
under 30 were regarded as “unstable and wilful” and had to wait. Th e 
parliamentarians of France declared their admiration of women, but 
did not grant them the right to vote until almost the end of the Sec-
ond World War, considering them politically immature, susceptible 
to what priests told them, and liable to listen to the opinions of men 
rather than follow their own mind. Th ere was no possibility of a gen-
eral European victory for women, as women’s activists were divided. 
Some staunchly fought for women’s political rights while at the same 
time voicing their opposition to the war. Others were committed to 
the war and did not have much time left  to support the campaign for 
women’s rights. Still others supported government campaigns and 
urged their followers to “have as many children as possible to fi ll the 
vacancies caused by the war,” and engaged in government undertak-
ings such as “Baby’s Week” to improve the social and material status 
of women and children.
Some women’s activists demanded the right to serve in the mili-
tary for women. Th is was new. In Britain the Women’s Army Auxil-
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iary Corps (the WAAC) was founded in 1917, followed by the Wom-
en’s Royal Naval Service (the Wrens) at the end of that year, and the 
Women’s Royal Air Force (the WRAAF) in 1918. In Russia women’s 
fi ghting units were established aft er the February Revolution; they 
included the 1st Russian Women’s Battalion of Death, created by Ma-
ria Bochkareva (Yashka), a peasant’s daughter remembered for her 
bravery. Women served in the Polish Legions; and a British woman 
in a man’s uniform served in the Serbian army. Women’s auxiliary 
units were established in some armies, where they served as nurses, 
cooks, Samaritans, instructors, and secretaries, but basically they did 
not enjoy a very good opinion with the soldiers. Th ey tended to be 
regarded as prostitutes. A good example of patriotism and women’s 
civic involvement was set by Ecaterina Teodoroiu, a  platoon com-
mander in the Rumanian army. 
In outcome of the changes which ensued during the war some 
women freed themselves from the protective shield or straitjacket 
imposed on them by their homes, fathers, and families, and their 
self-confi dence grew. Ideas on women’s social roles started to change; 
women’s view on their rights and potential grew stronger; and their 
activity in organising their own lives increased. Th e freedom born of 
necessity was best visible in women’s clothes. Dress and skirt lengths 
became shorter and women’s wear was looser, more comfortable and 
more practical, although this was a trend that had started before the 
war. Wartime impoverishment and insecurity did not favour the pur-
chase of expensive and elaborate apparel, and hence the fashion for 
simpler, cheaper, and more convenient clothes made of soft er fabrics – 
a  development welcomed especially by younger and middle-class 
women. Lace-up and whalebone corsets, which had reigned supreme 
in women’s fashion for decades, were discarded, and the jackets and 
trousers women now sported more and more oft en had pockets. 
Shorter skirt lengths, which had allowed women to show their ankles 
even before the war and somewhat later their calves, went down to 
just below knee level by the end of the war. Dresses with hip-level 
bodices came in. Apparel which before the war had been regarded 
as shocking or even immoral now became normal and taken for 
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granted. Th e so-called American fashion disseminated by the mov-
ies made a signifi cant impact. Already by the end of the war in Paris, 
London, Berlin, and Stockholm there were women who stood out in 
the crowd with their short hairstyles, make-up, lower neckline, wear-
ing trousers instead of a skirt and holding a cigarette. Cigarettes be-
came a fetish for the liberated avant-garde women. At fi rst there were 
only a few of them, but they were pioneers staking out the trend that 
said women were allowed to do the same as men. For why should it be 
any otherwise? – they said. Before the war decent women could not 
appear in public on their own, without a male or female chaperone. 
Only women from the lower classes or prostitutes could be out in the 
streets. Now all this started to change. In Britain women entered the 
male territory of the pubs and ordered beer, causing a sensation and 
giving the papers something to write about. “Th ousands of bonds 
which have tied women to men have been broken,” the Belgian femi-
nists wrote somewhat optimistically, and their British sisters added, 
“independent management of their homes as head of the household 
during the war has given many married women a new sense of secu-
rity.” Evidence for this was the rising divorce rate. While in 1913 in 
Germany there had been 27 divorces for every 100 thousand inhabit-
ants, by 1920 the fi gure had risen to 59. But these statistics showed 
that the institution of marriage was eff ectively still indissoluble.
Th ese changes aff ected the avant-garde. Millions of women were 
still in the dark about them, and continued to live and work just as 
their mothers and grandmothers had done. Some of the changes 
were only a transient wartime episode. A lasting change in women’s 
status and behaviour was possible only by means of evolution, not 
revolution. Th e power of the patriarchal structures and traditions 
sanctioned by the churches and religions was strong. Men continued 
to be considered the head of the family and responsible for it, while 
women were still “maintained.”
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7. Revolutions
In August 1914 the socialists, anarchists, and pacifi sts went qui-
et. Some relished saying that pacifi sts protested against war only in 
times of peace. Not only pacifi sts, but also the majority of socialists 
accepted their country’s and government’s war policy. But as the war 
drew on, more and more people asked what was the sense of continu-
ing it, more and more people protested against its high social and 
material costs. Th e number of the generally illegal strikes and anti-
war demonstrations, growing year by year, was a measure of the dis-
satisfaction. Perhaps surprisingly, the largest number of strikes were 
staged in Britain. But they were short-lived, and died down as fast 
as they erupted, since employers and employees quickly managed to 
reach an agreement without waiting for state mediation. Oft en wom-
en turned out to be the more determined and active, since they were 
not afraid of consequences such as being barracked up in the event 
of their protest being forcibly brought to an end. Some of the de-
mands women called for were shorter working hours and more pay, 
so that they could reconcile employment with the duties of moth-
erhood. In 1915 a  total of 401 thousand went on strike in Britain; 
whereas only 14 thousand came out in Germany in the same year, In 
1918 923 thousand were on strike in Britain, while the correspond-
ing fi gure for Germany was 391 thousand. According to estimates 
there were 3,227 strikes in Britain in 1915–1918, in which 2.6 million 
participated. Th e corresponding fi gures for France were 1,608 strikes 
and 520 thousand strikers; and respectively 1,801 strikes and 575 
thousand strikers for Italy. In Russia 2,306 strikes erupted in 1916, 
but the fi gure for January and February 1917 was 751. 
Most strikes broke out spontaneously, especially in the fi rst phase 
of the war. Strikers demanded better working conditions and pay, 
and returned to work when their demands were met. Similar strikes 
erupted in neutral countries such as Switzerland and Spain, and 
Asian countries such as China and Japan. In India and Indo-China 
strikes oft en took a violent form, since the metropolitan states were 
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burdening the colonies with the costs of the war. Some had a national 
undercurrent and were essentially a demonstration of the right of na-
tions like the Khmer or the Vietnamese to their own way of life.
With time more and more strikes were organised by trade un-
ions and social democratic groups. Th eir aims were a combination of 
social claims with anti-war demands and they oft en ended in mass 
demonstrations. Th eir numbers rose as the war neared its turning 
point, and under the impact of the Russian Revolution. Despite pro-
hibitions, the number of strikers oft en went over 100 thousand, for 
example in Paris in May and June 1917, or in Berlin, Hamburg, Mu-
nich, Vienna, and Budapest in January 1918. On that occasion a total 
of 700 thousand came out on strike in Austria, 500 thousand in Hun-
gary, and even more in Italy, which was one of the European hotpots 
for strikes. In June 1918 there was an attempt to stage a general strike 
in Hungary, but it was thwarted and the strikers were conscripted. 
Mass strikes tended to fail; they were broken either by a  lock-out, 
or by the militarisation of the workforce, which meant that any who 
refused to work could be treated as refusing to do national service. 
Th ese methods turned out to be very eff ective for breaking strikes.
A form of protest characteristic of the First World War were the 
women’s hunger strikes. Th e protesters demanded better pay and 
called for the improvement of provisions, price reductions, and an 
end to the war. It would be hard to enumerate all the places where 
hunger strikes occurred, and perhaps easier to name those which did 
not have hunger strikes. Oft en such protests ended in shop window-
smashing and looting, which led to police and army intervention. 
Some demonstrations turned into pitched battles between demon-
strators and police and soldiers – for example, the “women’s upris-
ing” in Bulgaria in February 1918, or the violent clashes in Milan 
and Turin. Casualties and deaths occurred. Widows and orphans 
marched, supported by war invalids in a joint moral anti-war front.
Th e pacifi sts came out of hibernation already in 1915, although 
their slogans carried weight only insofar as they accorded with the 
voices of the dissatisfi ed masses. Nonetheless, it would be hard to 
ignore the activities of pacifi sts like Bertrand Russell, who was ar-
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rested and convicted, or Henri Barbusse, author of the anti-war 
novel Le Feu (translated into English by William Fitzwater Wray as 
Under Fire). Pacifi sts from 10 countries, most of them holding left -
wing views, met in Th e Hague, to which the Second Socialist Inter-
national had moved its headquarters following the occupation of 
Brussels, and set up an international pacifi st organisation to prepare 
the foundations for a  perpetual peace. But it was not the pacifi sts 
who determined the attitudes and views of the masses, but instead 
the nationalists and militarists, who organised mass demonstrations 
in favour of greater involvement in the war eff ort. Pro-war attitudes 
were predominant almost until the end of hostilities, although as of 
the spring of 1917 peace was being spoken and written about more 
and more oft en. Th e word “peace,” which in the fi rst years of the war 
had been regarded as virtually synonymous with “treason,” returned 
from exile.
Alongside the pacifi st intellectuals there were also the socialist 
pacifi sts on the left  wing of the socialist movement. Th ey were more 
vociferous and called for immediate peace. Th eir ranks included 
Bolshevik-oriented revolutionists who wanted to transform the war, 
which they called an “imperialist war,” in to a “revolutionary war” to 
wipe out the capitalist world and build up a communist order. Bolshe-
vik revolutionists appealed to the soldier-workers to turn their weap-
ons against the capitalists in their home countries and the offi  cials 
of the capitalist states. Th ey denounced imperialism as the source of 
the war and encouraged Socialist and Social Democrat parliamentar-
ians to leave bourgeois governments and vote against the assignment 
of more money for the war. Th ey wanted soldiers to fraternise with 
their counterparts in enemy armies. Th eir best known representative 
and ideological leader was Lenin, who was followed by others, at fi rst 
few in number but determined and hungry for success. 
One of the fi rst of conferences organised by the Socialist pacifi sts 
was held in September 1915 at Zimmerwald near Berne in Switzerland. 
During their debates they adopted a resolution calling for immediate 
peace, no annexations, and the right of nations to self-determination. 
Th e conference was attended by Bolsheviks. However, Lenin failed to 
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persuade most of the socialist pacifi sts to adopt the Bolshevik postu-
lates. Th e same happened at the next conference, which was held in 
Switzerland again, at Kienthal near Berne, in April 1916. Th e socialist 
pacifi sts passed a resolution criticising the pro-war attitude of the so-
cial democrats, who continued to support the military policies pur-
sued by their countries. Th e socialist pacifi sts deplored the Second 
Socialist International for having followed a policy of submission on 
the war waged by the imperialist states. A Bolshevik resolution call-
ing for revolution was adopted as a minority opinion. At subsequent 
conferences, including the 1917 Stockholm Conference, the social-
ist pacifi st view continued to predominate over the Bolshevik view. 
Nevertheless the working masses in all the belligerent countries lent 
their support to moderate social democratic movements which were 
in favour of the policy pursued by their country, viz. in favour of the 
war, and which Lenin dubbed “socialist chauvinists,” traitors to the 
workers’ cause.
Th us, by the end of 1917 there were three main groups of social-
ists: 1)  social democrats, who enjoyed the support of the majority 
of working-class people; their representatives were members of gov-
ernments and voted in favour of the war; 2) socialist pacifi sts; their 
representatives were against the war and also against the idea of revo-
lution; and 3) the Bolsheviks; their representatives were against the 
war but enthusiastic about the revolution and wanted to take over 
power by force of arms. In 1917–1918 the split between the diverse 
factions of socialists deepened and their mutual polarisation came 
to be seen as the normal situation, particularly in Germany, where 
socialist views were most prevalent. Alongside the predominant Ger-
man Social Democrats (SPD), who supported the German state and 
its war policy, there were the German Bolshevik-oriented activists, 
the most esteemed of whom was Karl Liebknecht, who adopted an 
anti-war attitude in 1914 and persisted in it, and Rosa Luxemburg. 
Liebknecht, Luxemburg and their associates set up secret Bolshevik 
structures in opposition to the SPD, and as of 1916 were known as 
the Spartacus League (Spartakusbund). In May 1916 Liebknecht was 
arrested and imprisoned. In June 1917 the same befell Luxemburg. 
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Th ey were liberated by the November Revolution in 1918. Th e So-
cialist Pacifi sts were a larger and better organised group, and estab-
lished the USPD (the Independent Social Democratic Party of Ger-
many, Die Unabhängige Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands) led 
by Hugo Haase, a Reichstag deputy, and Karl Kautsky. Haase built 
up a  reputation for voting against war credits in 1915, whereupon 
he was dubbed a renegade and along with a few colleagues expelled 
from the SPD, aft er which he founded the USPD. Th e left  wing of the 
USPD was the Spartacus League, though in point of fact they were an 
entirely separate group. Unlike the Spartacus League, the USPD did 
not want to destroy the capitalist state.
Th e end of the war and defeat for the Central Powers radical-
ised German society. Th e signal for anti-war protest was given by 
men of the German navy. Th e mutiny which erupted on the night 
of 4th/5th  November 1918 at Kiel led to the establishment of a  sail-
ors’ council. It started on news that German warships were to sail 
out for a fi nal showdown with the Royal Navy. Sailors took control 
of the ships, arrested the offi  cers, and put up red fl ags. During the 
next few days the same happened in other ports such as Hamburg and 
Bremen. In early November, when the German command announced 
that Germany had lost the war, millions of Germans were infuriated. 
Th ey had been fed lies to the very end by the propaganda machine, 
which had forecast imminent victory. Th eir anger turned against the 
Kaiser and his political entourage. Th e soldiers’ war was drawing to 
a close, and the war of the civilians was beginning. Th roughout Ger-
many soldiers’ and workers’ councils were formed. In some the SPD 
predominated; in others the USPD or the Spartacus League was the 
leading force, and they quarrelled vehemently with each other. On 7th 
November the Munich USPD supported by a crowd of many thou-
sands of demonstrators under the leadership of Kurt Eisner forced 
Ludwig III, the Wittelsbach King of Bavaria, to fl ee. “Th e Wittelsbach 
dynasty ruled Bavaria for seven centuries, and I chased them out in 
seven hours with the help of seven people,” Eisner boasted. Th e So-
cial Democrats acting through the Workers’ and Soldiers’ Council 
assumed power. Eisner was declared prime minister and minister of 
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foreign aff airs of the Free State of Bavaria, in compliance with the will 
of the assembled people of Munich. Th e events in Munich speeded 
up developments. On the following days demonstrators in Berlin and 
other cities called for the Kaiser’s abdication. Th ey were supported by 
right-wing politicians and generals, who hoped that it would make 
the armistice conditions less severe. Th ey expected Germany would 
lose Alsace and Lorraine at the most, but keep its army and the rest of 
the territories including most of its colonies. On 9th November thou-
sands of demonstrators marched along Unter den Linden in Berlin 
shouting, “Hang the Kaiser!” On the same day the Chancellor, Prince 
Maximilian of Baden, telephoned the Kaiser, who was at Spa (Bel-
gium), to inform him that he had publicly announced his abdication, 
and that the Social Democrat Philipp Scheidemann, the future Chan-
cellor of the Weimar Republic, had made an announcement on the 
stairway of the Reichstag declaring Germany a republic. Th e change 
of Germany’s political system had been accomplished in a very short 
time. Only a fortnight before the Kaiser had declared that a descend-
ant of Frederick the Great would never abdicate, and on 2nd Novem-
ber he had turned down the Chancellor’s suggestion that he should 
abdicate, saying he had no intention of leaving the throne because of 
a few hundred Jews and a thousand workers. However, on 10th No-
vember, on learning that German revolutionary units were on their 
way to Spa to arrest him, he fl ed to Holland. Queen Wilhelmina of the 
Netherlands granted him asylum, though not without hesitation. He 
boarded a train for the Dutch border, where he got into a car, as the 
revolutionaries had taken control of the railway lines. Th us 504 years 
of Hohenzollern rule came to an end. Th e dynasty’s last representa-
tive could not and did not want to be reconciled to the fact, and like 
a medieval monarch believed God had invested him with the divine 
right of kings. A fortnight later he signed his act of abdication. Many 
European politicians wanted the “blood-bespattered monster who de-
served to hang” to be tried. Ultimately he managed to save his neck.
Soldiers’ and workers’ councils took power in Germany, and po-
licing was done by the defence units of the soldiers’ councils. Central 
and local government, and municipal authorities hitherto in power 
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resigned. However, unlike the situation in Russia, the majority of the 
members of the new councils did not want to embark on a Bolshevik 
revolution, despite Liebknecht’s call, and were satisfi ed with the de-
claration of a republic, a broad scope of democratisation, and social 
rights for the workers. A revolution of the Bolshevik type was out of 
the question due to opposition from a strong middle class, the infl u-
ential “workers’ aristocracy” and the farmers of Germany. Th e lead-
ers of most councils were either Social Democrats or Independent 
Socialists, whom the Communist Spartacists called “Socialist Trai-
tors.” Council leaders did their best to make the state structures work 
properly to prevent anarchy. Sometimes representatives of the cen-
tre of the political spectrum, Christian Democrats, assumed power. 
For instance in Cologne the Christian Democrat Konrad Adenauer 
stayed in offi  ce as the city’s mayor (Oberbürgermeister).
Revolution broke out in Austria as well, but was limited to Vienna 
and Linz and did not reach rural areas. Workers’ councils were es-
tablished in Vienna and the largest cities, while elsewhere people’s 
councils or parish councils dominated by Christian Democrats were 
set up to manage security and food provisions, and protect the peo-
ple against criminals. Th e anti-war and revolutionary movement 
was not as strong in Austria, nevertheless Russian-style revolution-
ary campaigning could be observed, as police informers reported. 
Following a demonstration in Vienna on 30th October 1918 the So-
cial Democrat Friedrich Adler, who had assassinated the unpopular 
reactionary prime minister Karl von Stürghk (21st October 1916), 
was released from prison and became a member of the new govern-
ment. He was one of two Social Democratic ministers in the new 
cabinet, which held power only in the German-speaking territories, 
as the non-German regions of Austria had seceded and were setting 
up their own national states. Due to war weariness and problems 
with food supplies the revolution in Austria was not so violent nor 
so widespread. Austrian soldiers returning home were physically ex-
hausted, spiritually drained, and completely demoralised. Th ey went 
on only thanks to the need to fi nd food and tranquillity – such were 
the observations and comments.
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On 11th November the Emperor Karl signed a document in which 
he insisted that he was neither abdicating nor renouncing his dynas-
tic right, but merely “withdrawing from state aff airs,” whereupon he 
and his family left  Vienna for Eckartsau Castle, and from there went 
to Switzerland. On the following day the Austrians represented in 
a provisional national assembly declared a German Austrian repub-
lic (Republik Deutschösterreich), which they wanted to be part of the 
German Republic. However, the Allies decided that Austria would be 
an independent state.
Revolution reached Hungary, too. It was led by Mihály Káro-
lyi, a  Hungarian aristocrat who was in favour of Hungary’s seces-
sion from the Habsburg dual monarchy, Hungarian independence, 
and social reform. On 25th October 1918 he created the Hungarian 
National Council, a body which was independent of the Habsburg 
government. Th e revolution won the support of the army and police 
(though aft er some hesitation in the latter case). During the revolu-
tion Prime Minister István Tisza, who was regarded as responsible 
and the most to blame for Hungary’s misfortunes, was assassinated. 
Károlyi assumed power on 31st October. His coalition government 
included Social Democrats. On 1st November Hungary proclaimed 
neutrality, but General Franchet d’Espérey, Allied Commander-in-
Chief in the Balkans, treated it as a  defeated state. Meanwhile the 
historical Kingdom of Hungary disintegrated as the territories in-
habited by non-Magyar national and ethnic groups seceded, forming 
their own national states.
Further developments in the revolutions in Germany, Austria, and 
Hungary belong to the history of the postwar period. Revolutionary 
trends on the Czech territories, in Croatia, Slovakia, Serbia, and Po-
land, albeit present, were much feebler and lost out to the patriotic 
intentions of the masses to set up their own national states.
Revolutionary trends could be observed in the neutral countries 
of Europe, too, especially in Spain, where numerous soldiers’ coun-
cils and juntas sprang up, and 1917/1918 is referred to as “the two 
Bolshevik years.” In point of fact it was not the Bolsheviks that had 
a large following in Spain, but Anarchists, who were anti-Bolshevik, 
proponents of terror, and Syndicalists. Th e black fl ag of the Anarchists 
was hoisted more oft en than the red fl ag of the Socialists. In 1916 and 
1917 Spain experienced a series of general strikes which paralysed the 
country and the government had to introduce martial law.
Even in the normally quiet countries of Scandinavia strikes and 
demonstrations were the order of the day. Strikers called for demo-
cratisation, pay rises, and fewer working hours. Th ey did not want all 
the profi t and gains which had accrued from the auspicious wartime 
trading to fall into the hands of the rich. Th ey wanted those who had 
got rich on wartime trading and the black market taxed. Th ey set 
up councils controlled by moderate Social Democrats to act as their 
authorities. Soldiers’ and workers’ councils were established even in 
France and Britain, but they were not very signifi cant and were rela-
tively free of Bolshevik infl uence.
Th ere was a revolutionary trend in Latin America, too, under the 
impact of either the Mexican Revolution, which came to an end in 
1917, or the Russian Revolution. Th e workers’ councils established in 
Latin America were left -wing, nationalist, and anti-USA in character, 
but not Bolshevik. 1917–1918, the turbulent days of revolution, trig-
gered the emergence of national movements in India, Indo-China, 
and an Islamic independence movement in Indonesia.
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V. The War of the Nations
Some of the belligerent states were multi-ethnic like Russia, 
Austria-Hungary, and the Ottoman Empire. However, on the whole 
the ethnic communities inhabiting them did not voice any aspirations 
to gain independence, stopping at a demand of the right to autonomy 
within the existing state. Th e desire to set up their own nation-state 
could be observed only in some ethno-national groups (such as the 
Poles), or merely their upper strata, and even there it was certainly 
not a hard-and-fast rule. None of the ethno-national groups in the 
imperial states contemplated wide-scale clandestine military action 
in a liberation movement against the state they were in. At any rate 
none of them had the forces needed for such action. Th e nature of the 
1914 mobilisation and of the war, at least in its initial phase, ruled out 
irredentist activities of any kind whatsoever. Soldiers from the vari-
ous ethnic communities making up the multi-ethnic states marched 
off  to war without asking questions to do their soldier’s duty. If the 
governments of the multi-ethnic states had been seriously worried by 
the risk of irredentism, they would never have decided to go to war. 
In the fi rst phase of the global confl ict the so-called national question 
(viz. national aspirations) had absolutely no impact whatsoever on 
the progress of the war. Th e multi-ethnic armies were loyal to their 
monarchs and dynasties, and there were bonds of solidarity bind-
ing the ethno-nationalities to their state, despite the repressions or 
discrimination against them. Th is was so for historical reasons and 
the traditions of loyalty reinforced by the churches and state authori-
ties, as well as for pragmatic reasons: people were in sympathy with 
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the army in which their brothers, sons, and cousins served. Austria-
Hungary was not let down by the Transylvanian Rumanians, who 
bravely fought to defend their state against the Rumanian army in 
1917. Germany was not disappointed by the French-speaking inhabi-
tants of Alsace and Lorraine, as evidenced by the low rate of desertion 
until the autumn of 1918. In eff ect on many of the fronts there was 
fratricidal bloodshed. Poles fought against other Poles; Ukrainians 
met other Ukrainians in combat; and likewise Rumanians clashed 
with Rumanians, Italians with other Italians, and Frenchmen bat-
tled against other Frenchmen. Rumanians served in the armies of 
Rumania, Russia, and Austria-Hungary. Poles served in the Russian, 
Austro-Hungarian, and German army. Th ere were Ukrainians fi ght-
ing for the Russians, Austro-Hungarians, and under the Hungarian 
Honvéd colours. Notwithstanding the general sense of loyalty, there 
were instances of desertion for ethno-national or religious reasons, 
soldiers joining the ranks of the enemy or spreading enemy propa-
ganda, but the scale of the phenomenon was small and had no eff ect 
on the progress of the war. Th e authorities in Berlin, Petrograd, Is-
tanbul, Budapest, and Vienna were more anxious over the possibility 
of national irredentism in the “nationally foreign elements” in their 
ranks than they needed to be. Not until the fi nal phase of the war, 
when the belligerents were exhausted and soldiers’ bonds of solidar-
ity with “their” army, dynasty, and state had worn out, did the na-
tional elites come to the fore, calling for their own national states, in 
compliance with the right of nations to self-determination President 
Woodrow Wilson had outlined. 
1. The Czechs and the Yugoslavs
Let’s take a look at those nations which saw the war as a chance 
to go their own way, in accordance with their national interest. Th is 
means fi rst and foremost the national groups in Austria-Hungary. 
We’ll start with the Czechs. Nonetheless, the Czechs did not have 
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a unifi ed idea of how to behave during the war and how to put for-
ward their national postulates. Some banked on a continuing union 
with Vienna. Others wanted a special status for the lands of the Bo-
hemian Crown within Cisleithania (the Austrian part of the Habs-
burg monarchy), and this was the most popular idea. Still others, 
a minority, looked to Russia and were thinking of full independence. 
Th e majority of the upper and educated classes were at loggerheads 
with Vienna, as their postulate of special status for the Czech lands 
had not been met. Th ey switched their option, pinning their hopes 
on Austria’s arch-enemy, Russia. Some Czech politicians were active 
members of the Pan-Slavic movement even before 1914. When war 
broke out they hoped Russia and her allies would win. However, it 
would have been dangerous to express such opinions openly – they 
would have faced arrest and prosecution. Knowing that they would 
have to keep their mouths shut, Czech anti-Habsburg politicians left  
the country for the West, not for Russia, for they had an intuition that 
it would be the Allies who would be making the decisions on the map 
of Europe and the fate of the Habsburg empire.
Th is was the option chosen by Professor Tomáš Garrigue Masar-
yk, who turned out to be a fi rst-rate, far-sighted politician with a fi ne 
sense of political intuition. For him Austria was “the tool of European 
reactionism.” He had a small group of skilful collaborators, the main 
one was his student, Edvard Beneš. Masaryk and Beneš embarked 
on a publicity campaign for the creation of a free and independent 
Czech state aft er the war, thereby rejecting the continuation of the 
Czech people under Habsburg auspices. Th ere were few Czechs who 
shared this opinion at the time. Originally Masaryk envisaged the 
future independent Czech state as a monarchy with a Romanov for 
its king. But soon he abandoned this idea in favour of a pro-Western 
Czech republic in federation with Slovakia – as Czechoslovakia. In 
1916 in France Masaryk founded the Czechoslovak National Coun-
cil, with the Slovak Milan Štefánik as a  member. Th ey launched 
a publicity campaign in French and English, starting with the most 
basic issues – informing the decision-makers and opinion-shapers 
in the Western countries and their societies that there was a Czech 
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nation, of which not many had heard, and that it had aspirations. At 
the same time they kept up the spirits of the anti-Austrian groups at 
home. Th ey smuggled in publications from the West, hiding them 
in children’s toys, soap, or boxes of soiled linen. Th ey supported the 
Czech Panslavists led by Karel Kramář, who was arrested in May 
1917 for making public statements which were declared seditious, 
subversive to the Habsburg war eff ort, and, along with three com-
panions, was sentenced to death on a  charge of treason. However, 
the clement Kaiser Karl commuted the sentence to long-term im-
prisonment, to avoid creating a hero and martyr for the Czech cause. 
However, apart from the group of the most radical activists, the rest 
of the Czech politicians, including the Agrarian and National Social 
parties, and most of the Catholic groups, all remained loyal to the 
Habsburg empire, at least in their public activities, seeing Masaryk 
as a Russian and Serbian agent. On 31st January 1917 the presidium 
of the Czech club in the Council of State at Vienna wrote to Foreign 
Minister Ottokar Czernin that “the Czech nation did not envisage its 
future in any other manner but in continuance under Habsburg rule, 
just as it had always done in the past.”
Despite the servile enunciations the authorities in Vienna did not 
trust the Czechs, especially as it was precisely the Czechs who mas-
terminded the most spectacular desertions. Th ere was a  lot of talk 
about the 28th infantry regiment, which in April 1915 absconded for 
the service of the Russians. But the pragmatic Czechs saw no point in 
combat that was useless from their point of view, and even less sense 
in dying for a cause they could neither comprehend nor espouse. Th e 
Russians sent the Czech deserters and prisoners-of-war to an already 
existing unit called the Czech Company (Česká družina), which con-
sisted of Czech volunteers, immigrants living on the territory of the 
Romanov Empire. Later the Czech units were reorganised as the 1st 
Czechoslovak (Hussite) Rifl e Regiment and aft erwards renamed the 
Czechoslovak Corps, now generally known as the Czechoslovak Le-
gion. Th e Corps/Legion continued to grow aft er the February Revo-
lution. Th e men serving in its were trained and armed well, and they 
knew what they were fi ghting for. Th ey were the apple of Masaryk’s 
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eye. Not surprisingly, the Czech regiments fought bravely in the Bat-
tle of Zborov (Zborów, now Zboriv, Ukraine) on 2nd June 1917 and 
were the best fi ghting units in the Kerensky Off ensive. Aft er the Bol-
shevik Revolution the Allies pinned their hopes on the Czechoslovak 
Legion, which was formally put under their command. When the 
Germans occupied Ukraine in March 1918 the Allied Supreme Com-
mand ordered the Legion, which was 40,000-strong by then, to move 
east for Vladivostok and north, for evacuation from Russia and re-
inforcement of the Western front. An earlier concept put forward by 
the military authorities in Paris to deploy the Czechs and White Rus-
sians wishing to continue in Allied service for the reactivation of the 
Eastern front turned out to be impracticable. Th e fi rst of the Legion’s 
units, numbering 14,000 men, reached Vladivostok in late April, but 
there were no ships to transport them to Europe. In May there was 
a skirmish at Chelyabinsk between the Czechs and the Bolsheviks. In 
retaliation Lev Trotsky gave the order for the Czechs to be disarmed 
and arrested: any armed Czech caught near the main railway line was 
to be shot on sight. Pressing on in an eastward direction, the Czechs 
had to defend themselves in a constant series of battles against the 
Bolsheviks. Th ey availed themselves of the Trans-Siberian railway, 
which they came to control. Th eir heroic passage marked by combat 
and death made a good impression on the West and raised the Czech 
standing on the world emporium of national interests very substan-
tially. Eventually most of the legionnaires managed to reach Vladi-
vostok, which was then in Allied hands. A  few thousand of them, 
including the committed Communist Jaroslav Hašek, author of Th e 
Good Soldier Švejk, stayed with the Bolsheviks.
Th e legionnaires were the trump card in Masaryk’s policy. He 
played the Czech hand adroitly and made good use of the auspicious 
international situation. He became the most popular politician of 
the “new” Central and Eastern Europe that was coming into being – 
far more popular than any of the Polish or Yugoslav politicians. Al-
though not as numerous as the Poles, the Czechs had more soldiers 
serving with the Allies. Apart from the renowned Legion, the Czechs 
also had a division fi ghting on the Italian front and units fi ghting 
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in France. On 16th December 1917 the French President published 
a decree on the establishment of a Czechoslovak army subject to the 
political authority of the Czechoslovak National Council in Paris.
Meanwhile in 1918 history took a fast turn, which could only have 
pleased the Czechs. In May of that year the government of Austria-
Hungary announced the division of the Czech territories into dis-
tricts according to ethnic criteria, to separate the Czechs off  from 
the Germans. Th e Sudeten Germans were delighted; the Czechs were 
annoyed. Even those Czech politicians who had been pro-Austrian 
hitherto, now came out in opposition to Vienna, with the overrid-
ing support of the people. Owing to the tension the government in 
Vienna withdrew from its plan. In the autumn of 1918 the Czechs 
and Slovaks reached an agreement on the need to create a joint state, 
and the potential to accomplish this. Incidentally, their fi rst agree-
ment was concluded on 30th May 1918 in Pittsburgh. Th ere were 
nearly one million Slovaks in the USA, and they were better educated 
and aware of their national identity than their compatriots in Trans-
leithania (the Kingdom of Hungary). It was easier for them to enter 
an agreement with the Czechs on US territory.
President Wilson supported the ambitions and eff orts of the 
ethno-nations to set up their own national states, in accordance 
with the principle of self-determination, and for defence against the 
Red Revolution. Th e top echelons of the subjugated nations living 
in the Habsburg empire interpreted this as meaning that he did not 
rule out the possibility of its collapse. On the other hand, Britain 
and France did not see the need to dismantle Austria-Hungary as 
a necessary objective of the war, chiefl y because they were counting 
on a separate peace treaty with Vienna. Moreover, they were not at 
all pleased by the prospect of several new national states emerging 
on the ruins of Austria-Hungary. A relic of the 19th-century way of 
thinking appears to have lingered in their attitude. Th ey were used 
to the notion of the Concert of Powers as the decisive factor in Eu-
rope, and the presence of Austria-Hungary in it seemed self-evident. 
Aft er the war the Powers were to negotiate with the other Powers, 
just as they had done before, and they feared that the new multi-
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ethnic and multicultural states would be a source of future confl icts, 
thereby destabilising the continent. Th ey were apprehensive both 
of the rise of Slavic states, which they called “semi-literate,” and of 
the separating off  from the Czech lands of the German areas, which 
wanted to join a Greater Germany (consisting of both prewar Austria 
and the Reich). Even Clemenceau’s famous statement made on 17th 
September 1917, that the Habsburg empire was “a land of counter-
revolution, the habitat of Jesuits, and the torturer of the nations” was 
not a declaration of support for irredentism, but should rather be 
read as pressure on Vienna to quit the war as soon as possible. Like-
wise the Allies’ declaration of 10th January 1918 on the need to liber-
ate the Czechoslovaks from foreign rule can hardly be seen as the 
undertaking of an obligation. Wilson was even more cautious. His 
14 Points of January 1918 did not envisage any new national states 
in place of Austria-Hungary – a big disappointment for the Czechs, 
Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, and Slovaks. Only the Poles were taken into 
consideration. Th e disintegration of the Habsburg empire was not 
acknowledged as a viable project until the middle of 1918. In August 
of that year the Allies recognised the right of the Czechoslovaks and 
of the Yugoslavs to establish their own independent states.
On 28th October, aft er a series of pro-independence demonstra-
tions and a  general strike, the Czechoslovak National Committee 
declared the foundation of a sovereign Czechoslovak state. On 30th 
October at a meeting in Turčianský Svätý Martin (now Martin, Slo-
vakia) the Slovak National Council adopted a  declaration on the 
foundation of a  new state jointly with the Czechs. Its western and 
northern frontiers were to run along the historical borders of the Bo-
hemian Crown, which made for an inevitable clash with the Poles 
over the Těšín (Cieszyn) region of Silesia, and even more ominous 
confl ict with the Sudeten Germans. Already on 23rd October the Ger-
mans living on Czech lands announced that they wanted to be incor-
porated in German Austria – in other words that they did not want 
to be with the Czechs. Similarly the Hungarians could not imagine 
being with the Slovaks in a new Czechoslovak state, reduced to the 
status of a boarder aft er a thousand years as landlord.
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Th e war roused the Southern Slavs and their national elites to ac-
tion. However, they did not share a unifi ed view on friends and foes. 
Th e lands of the Southern Slavs had a population of Catholic Croa-
tians and Slovenes, Orthodox Serbs and Montenegrans, and Muslim 
Bosniaks. Th e Serbs wanted a Serbian state – a Great Serbia encom-
passing all the territories of the Southern Slavs, including the lands 
of the Croats, whom they regarded as Roman Catholic Serbians, and 
the Adriatic seaboard. Th e Croats in turn wanted a Great Croatia, 
a state encompassing both Croats and Serbs, whom they regarded as 
Croats belonging to the Eastern Orthodox Church. Th e foundation 
of this state would be the autonomous Kingdom of Croatia-Slavonia 
hitherto belonging to Hungary. Some Croatians wanted to establish 
a Great Croatia in co-operation with Vienna and Budapest; others 
imagined a new state set up in defi ance of Austria-Hungary. Neither 
the Slovenes nor the Muslims of Bosnia entertained such ambitious 
plans. During the war the Yugoslav option started to gain ground. 
Its staunchest propagators were the anti-Habsburg Serbs and Croats 
living in exile. On 20th July 1917 they met on the Island of Corfu. Th e 
leader of the Croats was Ante Trumbić, and the leader of the Serbs was 
Nikola Pašić. With the support of the Slovenes, they made an agree-
ment that aft er the war and the disintegration of Austria-Hungary 
they would jointly establish a  new kingdom with a  monarch from 
the Serbian Karađorđević dynasty. Th ey adopted a declaration to this 
eff ect and won the support of the deputies to the Habsburg Council 
of State who were members of the joint Yugoslav Club. However, the 
nationalistic politicians who wanted a Great Serbia, and their Croa-
tian counterparts who opted for a Great Croatia, continued to enjoy 
a large following.
Nonetheless the Yugoslav idea became more and more popular 
as the Southern Slavs realised that unity was strength and that they 
would not manage to resist their neighbours’ imperial plans unless 
they were united. Th e Slovenes and Croats counted on Serbian sup-
port in their imminent tussle with Italy, which wanted to incorpo-
rate disputed territories like Istria, Gorizia, and Dalmatia. In fact, the 
confl ict with Italy made some Croats and Slovenes opt for the estab-
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lishment of an autonomous Yugoslavia within a Habsburg state. Th e 
Serbs in favour of the Yugoslavia concept wanted a joint state because 
of their prospective confl ict with Hungary over Vojvodina, and over 
Kosovo with the Albanians, who were being favoured by Austria. Th e 
Serbs were not sure of the loyalty of the Macedonians, some of whom 
wanted to join Bulgaria, and some were thinking of a separate state of 
their own, with only a minority wanting to join Serbia.
Th e Allies encouraged Italy and the Southern Slavs to reach an 
agreement, and thanks to their mediation the Italians agreed to con-
vene in Rome on 8th April 1918 for the Congress of Oppressed Na-
tionalities, in other words those who inhabited Austria-Hungary. 
Th is included the Poles. At the Congress the Italians expressed their 
consent to the establishment of an independent Southern Slavic state 
and promised to hold negotiations on the question of borders, but 
made no binding commitments. Th e outcome of the debates and 
backstage discussions was the initiation of good working relations 
between the antagonists of Vienna and Budapest – the Czechs, Slo-
vaks, Yugoslavs, and Transylvanian Rumanians, which could be read 
as a forecast of their future anti-Hungarian alliance.
Th e Congress outlined the prospects for a  new European and 
world order, and the role in this of an international organisation 
about to enter history under the name of the League of Nations. Th at 
was the fi rst thing the Congress achieved. Th e second was that it 
acknowledged the national state as the best institution to organise 
a nation. And thirdly it recognised the right of the “oppressed na-
tionalities” to self-determination, provided that they respected the 
interests and aspirations of other nations. Th ese were important dec-
larations opening up the road to freedom and independence for the 
hitherto dependent nationalities.
In the spring and summer of 1918 the Southern Slavic nations 
started to set up their own national councils. On 5th October 1918 the 
National Council of the three nations was founded in Zagreb. It was 
to be the supreme authority of the new State of Slovenes, Croats, and 
Serbs (SHS). Th e Slovene Dr. Anton Korošec was appointed its lead-
er. On 29th October the National Council declared the independence 
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of the SHS State, and on the 31st issued an address to the coalition 
expressing its hope that they would confi rm the sovereignty and ter-
ritorial integrity of the Yugoslav state. However, the Italians dragged 
their feet and the coalition withheld its decision. Serbia, Montenegro, 
and Vojvodina did not join the new state. In outcome of further ne-
gotiations, on 1st December 1918 the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and 
Slovenes was founded.
2. From Poland to Finland
In the second phase of the war there was a rise in the activities 
of national movements in East-Central Europe, which was gradually 
occupied by Germany and Austria-Hungary in 1915–1918. Victori-
ous in the East, these two states abolished the Russian administra-
tion and established their own occupying military administration 
and a supreme eastern command known as the Ober Ost. However, 
it was a provisional arrangement, which Austria-Hungary was ready 
to accept as satisfactory, but Germany wanted something more and 
came up with the Mitteleuropa concept, in other words a  German 
Central Europe. Th e original idea was put forward in 1915 in a fa-
mous book by Friedrich Naumann, a  Lutheran pastor and Liberal 
deputy to the Reichstag since 1907. In 1914 a fairly similar concept of 
arrangements in the East, which could be described as an economic 
union of the countries of East-Central Europe, had been represented 
to the Kaiser by Chancellor Th eobald von Bethmann-Hollweg, and 
the two concepts were implemented in the autumn of 1916. Th e oc-
cupying powers set about creating new state entities on the territories 
taken from Russia. Th ey were to be associated politically, economi-
cally, and militarily with the Central Powers and subjected to a “mis-
sion of German civilisation and culture,” as Berlin put it, to create 
a common economic zone east of Germany. Th e German authorities 
believed that the modernisation of these territories would facilitate 
their exploitation, bringing them a  bigger return, since impover-
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ished, backward, and badly organised areas were harder to exploit. 
Th e Mitteleuropa scheme was to secure a more effi  cient management 
of the former Russian territories as a contribution to the war eff ort. 
Th is was to be its fi rst and most important purpose from the point 
of view of Berlin. Secondly, it was to facilitate the disciplining of the 
local peoples, turning them into a guarantee of peace and stability. 
And thirdly, it was to bring Germany and Austria-Hungary new ad-
herents. Th e three aims were coherent and mutually complementary. 
Th e Central Powers did not rule out the possibility of recruiting local 
inhabitants for police and military forces working in co-operation 
with them, and this prospect became more and more important as 
the war dragged on, making the human resources of Central and 
Eastern Europe an asset of increasing consequence. Mitteleuropa was 
an experiment to test the potential for the establishment of a German 
Europe, envisaged as an outcome of victory for the Central Powers 
and consisting of an array of vassal states in the East subordinated to 
Germany within the Mitteleuropa scheme, Austria-Hungary, Ruma-
nia, and Bulgaria, with a vanquished and diminished France and Bel-
gium in the West. Th e idea appealed above all to the politicians, and 
the Kaiser came to like it more and more, referring to it as the Impe-
rial European Union, with German monarchs appointed by him for 
each of the member states.
Th e principal addressees of the Mitteleuropa scheme were to be 
the Poles inhabiting the hitherto Russian-ruled Kingdom of Po-
land. On 5th November 1916 the two Kaisers, Wilhelm II and Franz 
Joseph, created “their own” Kingdom of Poland. On the grounds of 
“the two Emperors’ act” a Polish state was called into being, but to 
the end of the war no borders were demarcated for it. It had a Polish 
administration, judiciary, Polish universities and colleges including 
a university and polytechnic in Warsaw, and it had a Polish educa-
tional system and currency. Th e occupying powers set up a legisla-
tive body, the Provisional Council of State, which commenced op-
erations in January 1917. No king was nominated: on this issue there 
was no agreement between the two Emperors, whether it should be 
a Habsburg or a Hohenzollern, and instead in November 1917 Ger-
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many and Austria-Hungary appointed an interim Regency Council 
of three, with Prince Zdzisław Lubomirski as its most active member. 
Lubomirski was a good organiser and had proved himself an effi  cient 
politician as Mayor of Warsaw. In December 1917 the Regents ap-
pointed a Council of Ministers, i.e. a government, which was gradu-
ally invested with more and more powers. Th e Kingdom of Poland 
was peculiar in that alongside its Polish authorities there were also 
civilian and military occupying authorities operating in it and con-
ducting a policy of maximum economic exploitation until the very 
end of the war. Not many Poles were pleased with the November Act. 
Th ose who were banking on victory for Russia and the Western Al-
lies were hostile to it. Th ose who were in favour of a triple arrange-
ment, viz. the transformation of Galicia and the Kingdom of Poland 
into a third component of the Habsburg empire, in other words an 
Austria-Hungary-Poland, did not like it, either. Th e Poles living in 
the German partitional zone, Greater Poland, Gdańsk and Pomera-
nia, and Upper Silesia, were inimical to it. Th e most vociferous in this 
respect was Wojciech Korfanty, a public fi gure and leader who came 
from Silesia and was a deputy to the German parliament representing 
the Poles. Th e establishment of a Kingdom of Poland under German 
control would mean that the prospective sovereign Poland would be 
deprived of its historic western regions. Not surprisingly the Poles 
living in the German partitional zone looked to the Entente and were 
pleased when a Polish army was established in France under Gen-
eral Józef Haller and politically under the command of the Polish 
National Committee, a kind of provisional government set up in alli-
ance with the Entente. Neither was there a guarantee that lands to the 
east of the border of the Kingdom of Poland, including Grodno and 
Wilno (now Hrodna, Belarus; and Vilnius, Lithuania), with Poles as 
the majority population, would be part of a future sovereign Poland.
Another disputed question between the German occupying au-
thorities and the Polish authorities in Warsaw was who commanded 
the armed forces of the Kingdom of Poland (Polnische Wehrmacht) 
which were being set up. Józef Piłsudski, the leader of the Polish in-
dependence movement, founder of the Polish Legions and future 
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Marshal of the Republic of Poland aft er 1918, saw these forces as the 
germ of a Polish army independent of the Powers that had partitioned 
Poland. But General Hans Beseler, Governor-General of the German 
part of the Kingdom of Poland, regarded the very modest Polnische 
Wehrmacht as a dependent army subordinated to Germany. Beseler 
also tried to gain control of Piłsudski’s Polish Legions and incorpo-
rate them in the Kingdom of Poland’s army. Th e Polish Legions had 
been founded in August 1914, and they were an independent Pol-
ish armed force, even though under Austro-Hungarian command. 
In July 1917 Piłsudski was summoned to take an oath of allegiance to 
the two Kaisers, and when he (and a large number of his legionaries) 
refused, he was interned and detained in the fortress of Magdeburg 
until the end of the war. Th is move aroused a hostile response from 
the Poles, an undeniable sign of the failure of German policy on Po-
land. On 10th November 1918 Piłsudski returned from Magdeburg 
and was given a hero’s welcome as a providential fi gure and a martyr 
for the cause. Th e Regency Council invested him with the command 
and military authority over the Polish forces, and subsequently with 
supreme power over the civilian administrative authorities, which it 
had taken over from the occupying power a few weeks earlier.
Th e Act of 5th November was important because it made the Pol-
ish question an international issue, compelling the opposite side in 
the war to take up a position. Nonetheless London and Paris held 
their peace for a  time, regarding the territories of the Kingdom of 
Poland as legally belonging to Russia. Th ey changed their mind aft er 
the February Revolution, when the Russian Provisional Government 
and Council of Petrograd granted the Poles and other national and 
ethnic groups in Russia the right to cultivate their native language 
and establish their own national institutions and military forces in 
alliance with Russia. Th e ethno-national groups took advantage of 
this opportunity. Th ey also made use of the principle of self-deter-
mination for the nations, which was constantly being emphasised 
by President Wilson. Following the February Revolution the Lithu-
anians, Latvians, Estonians, Finns, Azeris, Armenians, Georgians, 
Ukrainians, and even the Byelorussians started to set up structures 
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for their own states within the framework of Russia. However, their 
territories were gradually being occupied by German and Austro-
Hungarian troops. Aft er the Bolshevik coup d’etat in November 1917 
and the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in March of the following year the 
Germans and Austrians were free to make arrangements in Central 
and Eastern Europe in accordance with their own interests and plans.
Th e most mature of these projects was the scheme the Lithuani-
ans designed for their national state, encouraged by the Act of 5th 
November and the Russian Revolution. In point of fact, they had 
been making vigorous eff orts on behalf of their national aff airs, both 
in the belligerent countries and in America, ever since the begin-
ning of the war. Th e Lithuanian diaspora in America – along with 
all the other diasporas of the “oppressed nationalities” – made up 
an excellent nursery for a  national campaign. Th e leaders of the 
Lithuanian community in the USA lobbied Congress and the White 
House. Th ey were just as effi  cient in the neutral countries of Europe, 
co-organising conferences in Berne, Lausanne, and Th e Hague of the 
nations oppressed by Russia, Germany, and Austria-Hungary. Th e 
Lithuanians were also active in Berlin, encouraging the Germans in 
their Mitteleuropa plans. Finally they got the Germans to consent to 
a conference of Lithuanian organisations, which was held in Vilnius 
on 18th–23rd September 1917. Th e delegates assembled at it elected 
a 20-member Lithuanian National Council (the Taryba) under the 
chairmanship of Antanas Smetona. On 11th November 1917 the 
Taryba declared “the restoration of the independent Lithuanian State 
in Vilnius,” the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in alliance with Germany 
and ruled by a German monarch. Th is was the fi rst Lithuanian dec-
laration of independence. Encouraged by their success, the Lithu-
anians decided on a policy of faits accomplis, counting that their bid 
for independence would soon be recognised, and on 16th February 
1918 passed a  second declaration of independence. Th is time they 
made no mention of alliance with Germany, which resulted in Berlin 
failing to recognise it. Nonetheless the Lithuanians resolutely con-
tinued to build up their independent structures. Th e Sixteenth of 
February would later become Lithuania’s Day of Independence, the 
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national foundation myth. Th e fi rst and second Lithuanian declara-
tions of independence were announced in Vilnius, a city in which – 
according to a census carried out by the Germans – Lithuanians ac-
counted for no more than 2% of the population. Th e majority in the 
city and its environs were the Poles, and hence the Polish popula-
tion of Vilnius/Wilno and its region did not recognise the Lithuani-
ans’ right to the city and region – presaging a major confl ict. Berlin 
did not consent to the establishment of new states in the East until 
the declaration of 5th October 1918 issued by its Chancellor, Prince 
Maximilian of Baden. Th ereupon the Lithuanians hastened their 
preparations, and on 11th November 1918 appointed a government 
led by Augustinas Voldemaras.
Th ere was a considerable amount of activity for Ukrainian inde-
pendence, especially by the Ukrainians of East Galicia, which they 
had considered the nursery of an independent Ukraine even before 
the war. When it broke out the Galician Ukrainians started estab-
lishing national organisations of their own, including the Legion of 
Ukrainian Sich Rifl emen modelled on the Polish Legions. In late 1914 
there were 2,500 men serving in it, and only 1,400 in 1915. As it was 
so small it did not play a major part in combat. Th e Austro-Hungar-
ian authorities did not trust the Ukrainians and did not encourage 
them to expand their units. It was not until late in the war that this 
attitude began to change when a friend of the Ukrainian cause, Arch-
duke Wilhelm von Habsburg, aka Vasyl Vyshyvanyi, son of Arch-
duke Karl Stephan (owner of the great estate of Żywiec in the Polish 
part of Galicia), took command of the Legion. In the autumn of 1918 
the Ukrainian politicians were preparing to take control of the city 
of Lviv (Polish Lwów), where the majority of the population was Pol-
ish, and declare the independence of the Western Ukrainian People’s 
Republic. Th is they did on the night of 31st October – 1st November 
1918, triggering several months of fi ghting between the Poles and 
the Ukrainians. Th e Ukrainian Galician Army was composed of Sich 
legionaries and Ukrainian veterans from other units of the former 
Austro-Hungarian army. Eastern Galicia had a mixed population of 
Ukrainians/Ruthenians, Poles, and Jews. Th ere could be two, three, 
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or even four ethno-national groups living in the same village. Both 
the Poles and the Ukrainians regarded the whole of Eastern Galicia 
as theirs, and hence it was diffi  cult to reach a solution that pleased 
both parties. Eventually the outcome of the Polish-Ukrainian war of 
1919 determined the region’s assignment to the Republic of Poland.
Th e building up of national structures in the part of Ukraine un-
der Russian rule proceeded at a  much slower rate, mainly because 
the local population did not have a  well-defi ned national identity. 
Th e Ukrainians inhabiting that region were divided, into those from 
the west, from the area of Kamyanets-Podilsky and Rivne, and from 
the east, the left  bank of the Dnieper. Th ere were also divisions into 
Whites and Reds; anarchists and free Cossacks; Ukrainians who were 
decidedly in favour of a national state of their own and were mak-
ing an eff ort to set up a free Ukraine, and Little Russians (Malorossy) 
who considered themselves one of the ethnic groups belonging to the 
Great Russian nation. Th ese divisions showed that there were diff er-
ent levels of a sense of Ukrainian identity, and acceptance of the idea 
of a Ukrainian nation. Th e fi rst structures of a free and independent 
Ukraine started to be established aft er the February Revolution. Th eir 
harbinger was the Ukrainian Central Rada (Council), founded on 
17th March 1917 and headed by Professor Mykhailo Hrushevsky. On 
28th June 1917 the Central Rada appointed the General Secretariat, its 
executive body, led by the Socialist Volodymyr Vynnychenko. In the 
summer of 1917 the Ukrainian Central Rada demanded the Russian 
Provisional Government grant Ukraine autonomy, allow Ukrainian to 
be established as the offi  cial language in its administrative authorities 
and schools, and introduce social reforms including the freehold of 
the land for its peasants. All of this was to be implemented within the 
framework of a democratic Russia. Although the Provisional Govern-
ment did not meet all these demands, nevertheless a process of Ukrai-
nisation commenced in the troops of the former Russian Imperial 
Army stationing in Ukraine. Th ere were also new, strictly Ukrainian, 
Free Cossack forces formed, under General Pavlo Skoropadskyi. He 
was a descendant of a line of Cossack noblemen but not in sympathy 
with the aims of the Ukrainian national movement. Th e situation be-
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came even more complicated when the Bolshevik Revolution broke 
out. Th e Bolsheviks had a considerable following in Ukraine. Th eir 
adherents wanted to overthrow the existing authorities and establish 
a Soviet Ukraine. For a time the Ukrainian Central Rada had the up-
per hand and in November 1917 declared the foundation of a Ukrain-
ian People’s Republic “within the federation of the free and equal peo-
ples of Russia.” From June 1917 the Central Rada’s General Secretary 
for military aff airs was Symon Petliura, a 39-year old journalist – an 
eloquent orator and a  talented organiser. In January 1918 the Cen-
tral Rada declared the full independence of the Ukrainian People’s 
Republic. Th e Bolsheviks did not acknowledge this and established 
a Soviet government for Ukraine at Kharkov (Kharkiv) in the east of 
the country. Th ere was fi ghting and for a short time in February 1918 
Soviet forces took control of Kiev (Kyiv).
However, the factor which sealed the immediate fate of Ukraine 
were the Central Powers, who signed a treaty with it at Brest-Litovsk 
on 9th February 1918, making Ukraine the eastern fl ank of Mit-
teleuropa. On the grounds of the second Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (with 
the Bolsheviks, on 3rd March 1918) the Soviet army was to withdraw 
from Ukraine and conclude an agreement with the Ukrainian Peo-
ple’s Republic demarcating the border. Th e Central Powers assumed 
patronage over Ukraine, in the belief that it would furnish them with 
plenty of the raw materials they needed for the war and hundreds 
of thousands of tonnes of food supplies. Th e Treaty of 9th February 
stated explicitly that Ukraine bound itself to deliver 1 million tonnes 
of wheat to the Central Powers by June 1918. Visions of train upon 
train full of all kinds of freight making their way to Vienna and Ber-
lin glowed in the mind’s eye of the dominant contracting party. Th e 
Treaty entered on for the sake of victuals put Ukraine under the con-
trol of the Central Powers and allowed them to exploit Ukrainian 
territory, which they (chiefl y the Germans) were quick to occupy. 
To win the support of the upper echelons of Ukrainian society they 
decided to set up a new state on a vast area. On the west they granted 
it the Chełm/Kholm region and Podlassia (Podlasie, both regions 
now in Poland), which had hitherto been part of the Kingdom of 
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Poland and had a Polish majority population. Th e upshot was a se-
ries of mass demonstrations on Polish territories and put an end to 
any expectations or trust the Poles still had in the Central Powers, 
even though in the end Chełm and Podlassia were not incorporated 
in the proposed state. It was the death-knell for the Polish concept 
of a triple monarchy of Austria-Hungary-Poland. Aft er the dismissal 
of Foreign Minister Czernin Vienna did in fact speed up its work 
to separate off  Galicia from the rest of Cisleithania and grant it far-
reaching powers, but it did so not out of a sudden surge of sympathy 
for the Poles, rather due to eff orts by the Austrian Germans to be-
come the majority population in Cisleithania by segregating off  the 
Slavs of Galicia and Dalmatia. Nonetheless the House of Austria was 
crumbling, and its debris crushing the landlords. It was too late for 
concessions of any kind, and these were pretty minor. Berlin and Vi-
enna had lost in the rivalry to win support in Poland. But did they 
win it in Ukraine? It turned out they had not gained much. No trains 
laden with goods rolled for Germany and Austria-Hungary. Ukraine 
was plagued by domestic confl icts, its government was weak and did 
not even control half of its territory. Despite the presence of Central 
Power forces in Ukraine, fi ghting still went on with the involvement 
of Bolsheviks, White Russian generals, anarchists, peasant insurgents 
taking over large agricultural estates, and three Polish corps engaged 
in hostilities against German forces. Moreover, the railway network 
was too fl imsy and devastated to allow for signifi cant despatches. 
And fi nally, the peasants were obstructing exploitation by hoarding 
foodstuff s and selling them on the local market.
With a  predominantly left -wing democratic membership, the 
Ukrainian Central Rada did not enjoy the confi dence of the Ger-
mans, who put their money on General Skoropadskyi. On 29th March 
1918 at a Peasants’ Congress convened on a German initiative Sko-
ropadskyi was appointed Hetman (a head of state with military and 
civilian powers; a title referring to the traditions of the Cossack state) 
of Ukraine. On the same day he conducted a coup d’état and installed 
a dictatorship. His aim was to restore “the old order.” Supported by 
German troops, he appointed former tsarist offi  cials to the adminis-
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trative and jurisdictive offi  ces, and dismissed Ukrainian nationalists. 
He also started to reprivatise property in rural and urban areas. But 
he did not make much headway, due to widespread resistance, chief-
ly from the Ukrainian peasants. He had not enjoyed much support 
from the very outset, and it waned from week to week. Th e Hetman’s 
men were under attack from all quarters – Ukrainian nationalists, 
Ukrainian socialists, and Bolsheviks. His regime established neither 
a strong army to support its ventures, nor an effi  cient administrative 
system, and fell when the war ended.
Th e Byelorussians and Polish landed gentry living in Byelorussia 
voiced their national aspirations, too. On 25th March 1918 the Coun-
cil of the Byelorussian People’s Republic declared independence, with 
Minsk as the new state’s capital. A diplomatic campaign for its inter-
national recognition was launched by Roman (Raman) Skirmunt, 
a Polish aristocrat. In October 1918 Anton Lutskevich was appointed 
Prime Minister of the Byelorussian government. Th e Germans were 
not too enthusiastic about Byelorussian independence, aware of the 
frailty of the Byelorussian educated classes and the anti-German ten-
dencies of the Orthodox priests and peasants, nevertheless eventu-
ally they recognised it. In practice the Byelorussian People’s Repub-
lic was more of an idea than a reality; no state structures had been 
established when the war came to an end. Nonetheless a handful of 
educated Byelorussians accomplished much in setting up Byelorus-
sian associations, cultural and educational institutions, and schools.
For the fi rst time in history the Finns started to set up their own 
independent state on the north-western peripheries of the Russian 
empire. On 6th December 1917 they declared independence. Pehr 
Evind Svinhufvud, who is known as the Father of Finnish independ-
ence, was the leader of a government referred to as the Independence 
Senate. Like other national groups in Russia, the Finns were riven by 
internal confl icts. Th e White Finns wanted to set up an independ-
ent Finnish state, while the Red Finns, under the leadership of Otto 
Kuusinen, wanted a Finnish Soviet republic. Th e Reds enjoyed the 
backing of Helsinki and the industrialised and urbanised south; the 
Whites were supported by the agrarian regions in central and north-
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ern Finland. Brutal hostilities ensued with much bloodshed. On the 
grounds of a decision issued by the Senate, on 27th January 1918 Carl 
Gustaf Mannerheim, a talented and energetic Russian army general, 
was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the White forces. With Ger-
man assistance, the Whites took control of the country. In October 
1918 the Finnish parliament put Prince Friedrich Karl von Hessen-
Kassel, the Kaiser’s brother-in-law, on the throne of Finland, invest-
ing him with the title of Grand Duke of Finland. Svinhufvud was 
appointed Regent. Finland was to defend the German Mitteleuropa 
on the north. Th e Finns claimed the right to the Åland Islands, even 
though they were inhabited by a Swedish community which in Feb-
ruary 1918 had taken over the islands, expelling the Russians and 
Finns by force of arms. Later the Swedes were ejected by the Ger-
mans. Th e dispute had still not been settled by the end of the war.
Th ings were somewhat tougher for the Latvians and Estonians, 
who had been setting up autonomous structures ever since the Febru-
ary Revolution. An individual who made a particularly distinguished 
contribution to these was the Estonian Jaan Tõnisson. Both national 
communities started to establish their own armed forces, which were 
engaged in heavy fi ghting against the Bolsheviks at the turn of 1917 
and 1918. Power passed from one party to the other. Finally, a  re-
conciliation was eff ected by a swift  and successful German off ensive. 
Aft er 200 years Russian rule on this part of the Baltic seaboard came 
to an end in early February of 1918. Th e Treaty of Brest-Litovsk car-
ried an article confi rming this and announcing the prospective crea-
tion of a Livonian state under German control. But it was not going 
to be a Latvian and Estonian state, instead it was to be governed by 
Germans, with a German prince, and German barons and townsfolk. 
Th e local German landtag assemblies lobbied in Berlin to have this 
plan implemented. Aft er the war the country was to be intensively 
colonised by Germans and serve as a signal component of the Mit-
teleuropa system. Hence on winning their local victory the Germans 
did not recognise Estonia’s declaration of independence and on 24th 
February 1918 arrested its Prime Minister, Konstantin Päts. On 25th 
April 1918 the Kaiser announced the forthcoming creation of a Baltic 
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duchy which was to be united with the Kingdom of Prussia by a per-
sonal union, and have the Kaiser’s brother Wilhelm Heinrich for its 
duke. However, the setting up of its structures went slowly, because 
the Baltendeutsche (Germans settled in the region) did not make up 
more than 10% of the population, and their eff orts were sabotaged by 
the Latvians and Estonians. Th e task was not facilitated by subversive 
Bolshevik activities, either. It was not until 22nd September 1918 that 
the Kaiser issued an act declaring the independence of the United 
Baltic Duchy. Th e announcement was made at a session of the Baltic 
Landtag in Riga. Eff ectively, however, the Duchy never came into ex-
istence, and Adolf Friedrich, Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, never 
came to ascend the throne. Th e war was drawing to an end and the 
Germans were preparing to put up the white fl ag.
3. Jews, Armenians, and Arabs
On the occupied territories of Central and Eastern Europe there 
were also numerous Jewish communities, most of whom wanted cul-
tural autonomy. However, neither Germany nor Austria-Hungary 
had a crystallised opinion on what to do on the “Jewish question.” 
Among the Jews there were also Zionists, who wanted freedom to 
travel to Palestine, which until 1917 belonged to Turkey, and to settle 
there. Finally there were also Jews who wanted Berlin and Vienna to 
establish a Judaeo–Polonia – a Polish–Jewish state – on the territory 
of the former Commonwealth of Poland and Lithuania. Th is idea did 
not take on a  realistic shape and was not adopted by the occupy-
ing powers, either. Wartime was characterised by the emergence of 
very many, oft en contradictory national concepts, of which not much 
came. More oft en than not the belligerent parties shelved the accom-
plishing of such projects to aft er the war. Th ere was a very infl uential 
Zionist, Louis Brandeis, active in the USA. He was a friend of Presi-
dent Wilson and a  judge of the Supreme Court. But it was not the 
USA that had control of the occupied territories in the East. Brandeis 
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drew attention to the risk of pogroms. Indeed, the atmosphere in Eu-
rope was becoming more and more hostile to Jews. Th ey were gen-
erally blamed for all the material hardships and wartime setbacks, 
and accused of cheating on weights and measures, double-dealing, 
malingering, and serving the enemy. 
Th e war motivated European and American Zionists to initiate 
a diplomatic campaign for the establishment of a Jewish state in Pal-
estine, with its capital in Jerusalem. Th e movement received the ac-
tive support of Jewish bankers in Europe and America, who fi nanced 
their publicity drive and the dissemination of information on the not 
yet well-known Zionist movement and its ambition to settle Jews in 
Palestine. To augment their assets, they made an off er to the Turks to 
organise a Jewish legion under their colours and to assist them with 
espionage activities, but the Turks were not interested. Th ey did not 
trust Jews, and deported over ten thousand of them, including David 
Ben Gurion, the future Prime Minister of Israel for two terms in of-
fi ce. Th e British victories in Sinai and Palestine induced the Zionist 
leaders to make Britain an off er of very far-reaching co-operation. 
Th e British authorities were more interested than the Turks. Th e orig-
inal idea of a Jewish legion came from Chaim Weizmann, a British 
Zionist. A legion consisting of three battalions was set up under the 
command of a British offi  cer. Ben Gurion served in the legion and 
distinguished himself for valour. Th e legionaries were recruited from 
the Jewish community settled in Palestine, which counted nearly 100 
thousand. Jewish espionage organisations worked for the British, 
supplying important information, but they were eventually broken 
and their members executed. British politicians reached a  conclu-
sion that an organised Jewish community was a salient part of the 
international community which could not be disregarded, and Prime 
Minister David Lloyd George saw Palestine as the national home of 
the Jews. A Welsh Nonconformist by religion, Lloyd George loved 
the Hebrew Bible, and hence his sympathetic attitude to the Jews. For 
him the Scriptures were literally the Word of God. On 2nd November 
1917 Arthur Balfour, Secretary of State and Foreign Minister in the 
British Cabinet, sent a letter to Lord Lionel Walter Rothschild, Presi-
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dent of the Zionist Federation of Great Britain and Ireland, which 
fi nanced the campaign for Jewish settlement in Palestine. In the let-
ter, later called the Balfour Declaration, His Majesty’s government 
promised to support the establishment of a “national home for the 
Jewish people” in Palestine, though not at the expense of other ethnic 
and religious communities. It called the Arabs, who constituted over 
90% of the population of Palestine, the “non-Jewish communities.” 
Th e Declaration started the Arab-Jewish confl ict in Palestine.
Another issue associated with the Near East was the Armenian 
question. Armenians, Christians of the Eastern rite, lived in the east-
ern, mountainous borderlands of the Ottoman empire, around Lake 
Van. Th e new nationalist trends awoke their pride, and sense of iden-
tity and self-esteem. Th eir aim was to secede from the Ottoman em-
pire and establish an autonomous state entity within the framework of 
imperial Russia. Hence their nationalist campaign earned the support 
of Russia, enemy number one of Turkey. From year to year tension 
grew between the Muslims and the Armenians. Th ere were several 
pogroms. Th e coming to power of a Turkish nationalist group called 
the Young Turks in 1908 spelled serious trouble for the Armenians. 
Th e Young Turks announced that they would establish an ethnically 
homogeneous state, and promoted Pan-Turanian ideas. When the 
war broke out clashes occurred between the two communities in the 
towns along the Turkish-Armenian borderland. Th e Armenians sided 
with Russia and hundreds of volunteers joined the Tsar’s forces. For 
the Turks it was a sign to put the programme of “ethnic cleansing” they 
had prepared even before 1914 into action. Th eir plan was to deport 
the Armenians to remote parts of the Ottoman Empire, to bring down 
their numbers to less than 10% of the population in the borderlands. 
Th e deportations were preceded by a series of pogroms Armenians re-
fer to as the Great Slaughter. Th e Turks and Kurds who massacred the 
Armenians were openly supported by Islamic clerics, and discreetly 
by the authorities in Istanbul. Some of the mullahs actually said that 
if the Muslims did not kill the unfaithful, they would not go to para-
dise. On 27th May 1915 the Ministry of the Interior under Mehmed 
Taalat Pasha decided to deport thousands of Armenians to the area of 
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the Upper Euphrates and the Syrian Desert. Th ose who resisted were 
murdered on the spot, and their houses and workshops were ran-
sacked. Th e Turks seized Armenian property. Th e deportations lasted 
a long time, as the Turks did not have the means to deport a million 
people effi  ciently, even if they had wanted to do it in a civilised way. 
During the deportations, known as death marches or death caravans, 
Armenians were attacked, robbed, and murdered by Muslims. Some 
died as soon as they reached the concentration camps. Aft er the Ar-
menians had been deported from a given place, their church would be 
demolished, or turned into a mosque or a public lavatory, and some 
of the remaining Armenians would be forced to convert to Islam. Or-
ders were given to conduct circumcision in public. Th ose who refused 
to convert, including Armenian priests, were tortured to death. Th ey 
had horseshoes nailed onto their feet, their bodies were abused, their 
heads were stuck on poles. Husbands were made to watch while their 
wives and daughters were being raped and then bundled into a local 
church or monastery and burned alive. Armenian victims were forced 
to dig large pits into which they would then be cast and burned or 
scalded to death with hot tar.
Th e Germans, who had a  strong infl uence over Turkey, turned 
a blind eye to the atrocities, saying it was a Turkish domestic aff air. 
When begged to intervene, the German ambassador in Istanbul re-
mained silent. In August 1915 the German Admiral Wilhelm Sou-
chon said that it would be salutary for Turkey to get rid of the last 
Armenian, for then it would be free of the traitorous bloodsuckers. 
Th e German press referred to the Armenians with contempt, call-
ing them “exploiters” and “Christian Jews.” “Th e Armenian is like 
the Jew, a parasite living outside of his fatherland and devouring the 
marrow of the people hosting him… the patience of the Turks has re-
ally been praiseworthy,” the German papers wrote. Th ey oft en quot-
ed a remark made by Taalat Pasha in 1916 published in the Berliner 
Tageblatt, “We are accused of not distinguishing between innocent 
and guilty Armenians. Th at is absolutely impossible, because those 
who are innocent today may be guilty tomorrow… Armenians are 
like animals, and animals may be chased away and killed with impu-
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nity.” Enver Pasha, the Turkish Minister of War, held a similar view 
of the massacres and brutal deportations, blaming the Armenians for 
all the misfortune the Turks had suff ered and arguing that the Turks 
had a right to put their national security plans into practice. At a time 
when fi ghting was going on in Gallipoli the Armenian massacres did 
not arouse much interest in Europe and America. Th e Armenians 
were left  to their fate, just like the Jews in the Second World War.
According to the latest Turkish research, in 1915–1917 the Arme-
nian population decreased by 972 thousand, in other words many 
more died or were killed than the earlier Turkish statistics had said 
(viz. 300 thousand), but fewer than the Armenian estimates say, 
which is 1.5 million. Half the Armenian national community was 
killed or died of exhaustion. Today the ordeal of the Armenians still 
lies on the world’s conscience, but its memory is divisive. Debate is 
still going on whether it was a war crime or genocide. It has been 
recognised as genocide by the European Parliament, the US House 
of Representatives, Canada, Sweden, and France. Th e Turks defend 
their actions, saying they were provoked by the Armenians, who 
were to blame for their fate, and furthermore Armenians and Rus-
sian troops were robbing and murdering Turks. 
Th ere were also other Christian victims of Turkish purges. Th ey 
included Catholics living in Syria and Mesopotamia, and Nestori-
ans, speakers of Aramaic, the language of Jesus. In the space of a few 
months in 1915 armed units of Turks and Kurds killed hundreds 
of thousands of Christians. Th e Pope protested in their defence. 
Th e  mass murders stopped, but Nestorians continued to be killed. 
Th e purges also aff ected Greeks, who were accused of espionage for 
the Allies. In 1915 hundreds of thousands were driven out of Th race, 
and Anatolia to the islands and coastal areas. Hundreds of young 
Greeks and Armenians were castrated and sent to the harems. Ger-
many protested against the deportations and murders of the Greeks, 
fearing that this could induce Greece to join the Allies. Th ere were 
also pogroms of Jews, in places like Damascus and Istanbul.
Th e national aspirations of the Armenians or Greeks were no sur-
prise for the Turks. What came as a  shock was the conduct of the 
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Muslim Arabs. Not only did the majority of the Arabs refuse to sup-
port the jihad, but they also staged an armed insurrection against 
Turkish forces. Arab-Turkish relations had not been good in 1914, 
for nationalist ideas had reached the Arab communities, too. Dur-
ing the war Arab nationalism, which started in Alexandria, Beirut, 
and Damascus, spread further and further afi eld. Th e slogan of the 
power-craving sheiks and emirs was “Take from the Europeans and 
the Turks what they have taken from the Arabs.”
Th e rebellion of the Arab tribes started in Hijaz. Under the leader-
ship of the nearly octogenarian Hussein Abu-Ali and his sons, Ab-
dullah (Abd Allah) and the ambitious Faisal of the Hashemite dy-
nasty, the rebels took control of the vast territories of Hijaz including 
the road to Mecca. Although Turkish forces put down these revolts 
brutally, new ones kept springing up. Reprisals and outrages only ex-
acerbated the confl ict and made Hussein even more resolved to put 
up resistance. On 5th June 1916 he assumed the command of yet an-
other uprising and declared himself King of Al-Hijaz. He dreamed of 
creating a large Arab state stretching from Hijaz to Syria. In July of 
the same year a handful of Arab insurgents took part in the capture 
of the port of Aqaba on the coast of the Red Sea. 
Initially the Turks did not take the Arab insurgents seriously, 
thinking their rebellion was only a  British intrigue, and the armed 
Bedouins merely British agents. However, there was a Briton who had 
a hand in the Arab rebellion. Th e historian, archaeologist, and army 
offi  cer T.E. Lawrence persuaded the Arabs to take up arms against the 
Turks. He managed to do this thanks to his fl uent Arabic and excel-
lent knowledge of Arabian culture. Lawrence dressed in the Arabian 
manner, which won the confi dence of the Arabs, but infuriated the 
British, earning him many enemies at home. He became famous in his 
lifetime and his swashbuckling exploits provided a plot for numerous 
novels and fi lms. On behalf of the British government he promised 
to assist the Arabs of Hijaz in the establishment of their independent 
states, and gave them generous fi nancial support for as long as he was 
in a position to do so. Th ere was another British agent involved in 
the Arab national movement – Harry St. John Philby, Lawrence’s ri-
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val, but unlike Lawrence he endeavoured to reach an agreement with 
the Saudi Wahhabists. His son Kim would later be a key Soviet spy. 
However, it soon turned out that London was not at all ready to help 
in the setting up of independent Arab states. What it wanted was to 
take over the territories seized from the Turks and make them part of 
the British empire. One of the British generals in the Near East wrote 
that it was convenient for him to give the leaders of the Arab move-
ment the impression that Britain supported them, but the promise of 
independence was a house built on sand. Th e real intentions of Britain 
and France were formulated in a secret agreement negotiated by Mark 
Sykes and Georges François Picot in 1916, which envisaged the par-
titioning of the Ottoman empire aft er the war, but no creation of free 
Arab states. Aft er the war the British were to take over Mesopotamia, 
the southern part of Palestine and what later became Transjordan; 
while France was to have Syria, Lebanon, and Iraqi Mosul. Th e area 
of Palestine between the Jordan and the Mediterranean, along with 
Jerusalem, was to be a condominium of Britain and France. Russia 
issued its consent to the Sykes-Picot Agreement, but received a guar-
antee that it would get Armenia and eastern Anatolia. In 1917 the Al-
lies promised the Italians Smyrna/Izmir and south-western Anatolia. 
Th ereby aft er the war Turkey was to be a rather insignifi cant country 
under the control of the victors. Th e Soviet government, which took 
over the Tsar’s archives, published the Sykes-Picot Agreement, which 
of course infuriated the Arabs and caused a crisis in their relations 
with the Allies. Nonetheless some of the insurgents stayed with the 
British, expecting a  revision of the Sykes-Picot Agreement and 
the emergence of a free Syria with Damascus as its capital, and a free 
Hijaz. When Arab fi ghters entered Damascus alongside Allied troops 
in the autumn of 1918, it was taken as a testimonial of Arab aspira-
tions. Th e Arab force was under the command of Emir Faisal, who 
announced the establishment of a council of state of Great Syria. He 
was given an enthusiastic welcome in Damascus and Beirut both by 
the Muslims and by the local Christians, who made up 25% of the 
population. Eventually, in 1919–1920 the Allies were the ones who 
determined the future of the Arabs.
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4. The Irish case
Th e Irish case was quite diff erent from the ones I have described 
so far. Th e Irish national aspirations were the only serious problem 
of this kind in the West. Th e Irish people had never come to terms 
with the annexation of their island by the English. During the war 
the smouldering confl ict between Britain and the Irish people erupt-
ed with an enhanced intensity, even though the Irishmen serving in 
the British forces were not giving any grounds whatsoever to be sus-
pected of disloyalty. Th e Germans were counting on Irish support, 
and were sending weapons into Ireland for the Irish freedom fi ghters. 
Roger Casement, one of the leaders of the Irish partisans, was tracked 
by British agents and caught on the Irish coast as a consignment of 
arms was being delivered by a German ship. On 3rd August 1916 he 
was hanged. Th e English published his diaries, in which there was an 
account of his homosexual exploits. A debate went on for a long time 
whether the diaries were genuine.
Th e pragmatic Irish wanted independence but were afraid of the 
unforeseen consequences which might have arisen from an armed 
rising during the war, so they did not support the republicans. In-
stead they sided with the adherents of autonomy (home rule) for 
Ireland. Th e pro-independence republicans were irritated by their 
compatriots’ lack of sympathy, and angered by the British putting 
the Home Rule Bill in cold storage. Th ey decided to stage a rising in 
Dublin. Th ey had arms purchased in the USA. On 24th April 1916 
their insurrection – known as the Easter Rising – broke out. Th ey oc-
cupied the General Post Offi  ce and other public buildings, hoisting 
Irish republican fl ags, appointing a provisional government and is-
suing the Proclamation of the Republic of Ireland. Th e leaders of the 
Rising were Patrick Pearse and James Connolly. Dubliners did not 
come out in support of the Rising, and some even hurled abuse at the 
insurgents. On the 29th in the General Post Offi  ce they surrendered. 
100 British soldiers and policemen, 450 civilians, and 52 insurgents 
were killed during the hostilities. Th e Rising was brutally put down. 
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15 leaders, including all the signatories of the Proclamation of the 
Republic, were executed. 75 others had death sentences commuted 
to imprisonment. Th e severe reprisals infuriated the Irish people, 
who now switched their support from home rule to republicanism 
and independence. Michael Collins, one of the insurgents, founded 
the undercover Irish Republican Army (IRA). Th e insurgents of 1916 
wanted to create a legion of martyrs for the cause, in the hope that 
their sacrifi ce would stir the nation’s conscience. And to a certain ex-
tent that is what happened. It was not a question of winning, but of 
resisting for as long as possible. Of letting themselves be killed, just 
like the Christian martyrs in the heroic times. Th eir blood was the 
seed which sprouted, removing the pagan idols and replacing them 
with Christ the Redeemer. Th e blood shed by the Volunteers would 
also bring fruit, open up the eyes of the blind, and win freedom for 
Ireland, as Mario Vargas Llosa wrote in Th e Dream of the Celt (El 
sueño del celta). On 23rd April 1918 the Irish rose up again to fi ght, 
this time in another mode, a general strike. Th e British responded 
by bringing in the troops. Th e leader of the legal Irish independence 
movement was Éamon de Valera, who won the support of the Catho-
lic Church in Ireland and led the Irish people to independence.
Th e renaissance of the national concept in Europe occurred during 
the war. So, too, did the concept of revolution. Hence in 1918 some 
had a social revolution on their mind, while others were absorbed by 
a national revolution which was to bring their national state to life. 
For the elites of the “oppressed nationalities” deprived of their own 
statehood, the war was good news. But if it was to bring the results 
they wanted it could not end too soon, it had to continue as long as 
possible, to debilitate and exhaust the chief belligerents as much as 
possible. Th us, at the end of the war the main enemies of national 
revolution were no longer the imperial powers, which were in a state 
of decline or imminent collapse, but the revolutionary movements 
which instead of national solidarity propagated an internationalist 




In 1918 the German intellectual Oswald Spengler published his 
book Der Untergang des Abendlandes (Th e Decline of the West), in 
which he forecast that Europe would no longer be as powerful and 
as exciting aft er the Great War as it had been before. And indeed, by 
1913 it had reached the peak of what it had been working for over the 
centuries, advancing more and more. It had colonised and subjugated 
the world. It was great and predominant in every respect, imposing its 
will on others and sweeping up almost the entire pool of international 
awards, especially the Nobel Prize. Nothing important could happen 
in the world without the knowledge and consent of Europe. But in 
August 1914 Europe lost its senses, as one British journalist wrote. 
Th ough perhaps that’s what had to happen: once the Europeans had 
reached the summit, they had to climb down to make room for oth-
ers. First of all for the Americans and the Japanese. Aft er the war the 
Age of the Pacifi c started.
Aft er such a bloodthirsty and gruelling war of attrition, Europe 
was no longer in a position to keep and exercise the political, cul-
tural, and economic role it had enjoyed before August 1914. Aft er 
November 1918 it was licking its wounds in the aft ermath of a shat-
tering experience of war, immersed in debt abroad and with respect 
to its citizens, struggling with a grim economic crisis, hyperinfl ation, 
an escalation of grievances, and the virulence of new political move-
ments like Communism, Fascism, and Nazism. Due to this the or-
der introduced in 1919 by the Treaty of Versailles survived only for 
20 years. So we can hardly disagree with one of the contemporary 
French journalists, who said that Europe committed suicide – it fi xed 
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